

DÉCLARATION DE M. YASUSHI AKASHI LE 11 JUILLET 1995

(source : MSF)

10

July 11/94

15.



UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
Quartier général des forces de paix des Nations Unies
Zagreb

STATEMENT BY MR. YASUSHI AKASHI, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

At 1440 local time NATO conducted Close Air Support action in the United Nations-declared safe area of Srebrenica. This action was taken in response to my request for air action following the renewed attacks this morning by the Bosnian Serb forces on United Nations Dutch peace-keepers, and the deteriorating situation in the safe area itself.

On 9 July, the Force Commander and myself issued a strong warning to the Bosnian Serbs that Close Air Support would be carried out if they did not cease their attacks on UN personnel in the enclave. We also pointed out that there would be grave consequences if they ignored this warning. We demanded that the offensive against the enclave must cease and that the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to the perimeter of the Demilitarized Zone as delineated by the Morillon Agreement of 8 May 1993. I was in close consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on each step of this process. The Security Council yesterday endorsed our demands and called for immediate compliance by the Bosnian Serbs. It further demanded full respect by the parties of the status of the safe area of Srebrenica, and for the immediate release of UN personnel detained by the Bosnian Serbs.

The Force Commander, on my behalf, also addressed a letter to General Delic of the Bosnian Government Army in which he expressed his deep dismay at Bosnian Government soldiers' deliberate blockage of UNPROFOR troops withdrawing from captured observation posts and their direct targeting of an UNPROFOR armoured personnel carrier which led to the death of one Dutch soldier. This flagrant disregard by the Bosnian Government Army for the safety of United Nations troops assisting in the peace process is unacceptable.

The situation for the civilian population in Srebrenica is now intolerable. There are reports that over one thousand BSA troops have entered the town of Srebrenica and that large numbers of refugees are fleeing north. Addressing the needs of these people remains an urgent priority for the United Nations and its agencies. The Bosnian Serbs have consistently blocked aid convoys to the enclave and, as a result, UNHCR has only been able to deliver a fraction of its targeted aid to Srebrenica. This has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation. There are reports of malnutrition, particularly among the most vulnerable sections of the population. Medical stocks are in short supply and, with the recent influx of refugees from surrounding villages, reserves have become even further stretched. In order to address the looming humanitarian crisis, I again demand complete freedom of movement for relief supplies to the enclaves, including Sarajevo.

The recent events in the Srebrenica safe area and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not detract us from the urgency to reinvigorate the political process and bring the parties together. In the absence of dialogue, the humanitarian crisis already confronting innocent civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina is likely to deepen.

Zagreb, 11 July 1995

**COMPTE RENDU Z-1136 DE M. YASUSHI AKASHI À M. KOFI ANNAN
DU 11 JUILLET 1995 SUR LA SITUATION À SREBRENICA**

(source : MSF)

CZN 1123
CZG 912
SS. 1698

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
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNSC
COMM

MOST IMMEDIATE

95 JUL 11/215:42

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
DATE: 11 JULY 1995 Z - 1136
SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica



This message updates the highlights of the situation in Srebrenica since our Z-1130 of earlier today.

In summary, the situation in Srebrenica is highly fluid.

At 1440 hours, NATO aircraft attacked two Serb tanks threatening the Netherlands blocking position south of Srebrenica. It is not clear if the bombs struck the target. A second pass was cancelled due to obscuration over the target area. Departing aircraft reported Bosnian Serb tanks moving south away from the blocking position.

President Milosevic contacted the SRSG again at about 1500 hours and was briefed on the situation. At that time, Milosevic stated that the Netherlands soldiers in Serb-held areas retained their weapons and equipment, and were free to move about.

At about 1630 hours, UNMOCs reported that the Bosnian Serbs have overrun the village of Srebrenica including the Netherlands company camp. The blocking position has withdrawn toward Srebrenica. Remaining Netherlands forces are in isolated OPs, and the main camp at Potocari is exposed to artillery fire. Large numbers (possibly thousands) of refugees are now moving toward Potocari where the Netherlands battalion reports that there are insufficient resources for their sustenance. Local Serb commanders have threatened to kill Netherlands personnel and shell various villages in the pocket if there are further air attacks. The attitude and defensive capabilities of local Bosnian authorities are not yet clear.

Admiral Smith has agreed to our request, proposed by the Netherlands minister of defence to the SRSG, to suspend air presence and close air support missions over Srebrenica. It is our view that they would endanger the civilian population and our own personnel who are now inter-mixed with Serb forces. NATO aircraft are in high readiness elsewhere.

We are now gathering more detailed information on the situation on the ground in order to determine the needs of the civilian population. We are also examining the issues relat

to the security and possible evacuation of the Netherlands battalion as discussed with the Netherlands defence minister. The Netherlands minister advises that he has been presented by his staff with three options: withdrawal conducted by UNPROFOR with RRF, ~~withdrawal~~ conducted by NATO, and withdrawal conducted by an ad hoc coalition to which France, the UK, and the US have agreed.

The preliminary assessment of the Force Commander is that any withdrawal of the Netherlands battalion must be carried out through negotiation as its members are in some areas already interspersed with Serb forces, its stocks are limited, and the area of Srebrenica is beyond the immediate operational reach of UN or other military forces. General Gbillard has accordingly been instructed to establish an immediate local ceasefire with all parties. He is attempting to contact General Tolimir now. The UNPROFOR deputy civil affairs coordinator has also reached the UNHCR office in Pale, where he will remain as a liaison officer to Pale Serb authorities.

More detailed information on the situation and our intentions will follow as soon as possible.

**COMPTE RENDU Z-1138 DE M. YASUSHI AKASHI À M. KOFI ANNAN
SUR LA SITUATION À SREBRENICA LE 11 JUILLET 1995**

(source : MSF)

CZV-1125
3317-1700
CZG-914

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
MUST IMMEDIATE

UNEP...
COM...
F...
95 JUL 11 20:08

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 2/11 Z

P 1/2

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA - 2/11 Z

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

NUMBER: 2-1138

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica

7

UNEP...
COM...
F...
95 JUL 11 20:14

In addition to my two earlier cables, this message contains further details regarding today's developments, and the latest information provided to us by NATO and the UNMOs in Srebrenica.

Early this afternoon the BSA continued to shell the towns of Srebrenica and Potocari. At 1300 hours HQ UNPROFOR in Srebrenica went to state orange. Fifteen minutes later the BSA intensified its shelling of the two towns. At 1330 hours a TACP was wounded in the fighting west of Srebrenica. At 1440 hours, NATO aircraft attacked two Serb tanks. It appears that two passes were made. The first involved F-16 fighters carrying non-precision munitions. We believe the bombs missed their targets. The second attack, also involving a pair of F-16s, was aborted due to the poor visibility caused by the smoke, which obscured the pilots' view of the targets. The first aircraft in this pair of aircraft was engaged by a SAM missile.

At around 1600 hours, a third aerial attack was initiated by a pair of A-10s and was directed at, at least, one tank and some infantry (bearing small arms) attacking a TACP position. But no ordnance was dropped.

Between 1300 hours and 1500 hours the BSA bypassed the Dutchbat blocking position from the west. The Dutch B-Company subsequently withdrew to Potocari. As this was occurring, the Serbs succeeded in detaining the B-Company commander, thus raising the total number of Dutchmen detained by the BSA to 31. At 1620 hours, the town of Srebrenica itself was overrun by the Corps. At 1800 hours, Dutchbat D-Company reached Potocari and deployed in defensive positions around the Dutchbat camp.

The UNMOs have reported that the number of severely wounded civilians in Potocari camp is between 50-70 persons. There are approximately 1500 displaced persons also in the camp, and this number is expected to grow as more displaced continue to make their way toward the camp. Earlier on, the

Serbs harassed the column of Bosnians leaving Srebrenica for Potocari. Between 1340 and 1500 hours the BSA fired 22 rockets from Dugo Polje (grid 644922) toward Budak (grid 623912) and Gradac (CP625989), i.e. in proximity to the Srebrenica-Potocari road. The sound of the exploding shells was so close to the column of displaced, it caused heightened panic.

First reports from Potocari suggested that there was only enough food and water for 24 hours. However, the UNMOs reported at 1711 hours that Dutchbat was attempting to rectify the situation. Its troops have opened their rations and were trying to make soup out of them. By doing this, the Dutch hope the food will last for a further 48 hours. After that, there will be no food for either UNPROFOR personnel or the displaced.

The shelling of the Srebrenica town itself stopped at 1700 hours and the BSA issued an ultimatum that the displaced and UNPROFOR leave the enclave through a protected corridor.

There have been reports of only one UNPROFOR soldier having been injured during the fighting. Nine Dutchbat OPs are still operational: A (CP533900), C (CP538650) M (New Location 570919), N (CP613940), P (CP645915), Q (CP658893), R (CP659833). These OPs are now described as "very passive".

Dutchbat and the UNMO team are trying to meet the BSA commanders at 1930 hours. The battalion's intention is to propose a very small safe area (perhaps the general area of the compound) to protect the displaced.

The HCR Special Envoy will attempt to go to Tuzla tomorrow to meet with the Bosnian Minister of Refugees, in order to identify the humanitarian requirements. UNHCR assess that over 75% of the population of the enclave are displaced persons who may wish to leave, perhaps to Tuzla. The position of the Bosnian Government on this delicate issue will also be explored by UNHCR.

**NOTE INTERNE DU MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE DU 11 JUILLET 1995
SUR LA SITUATION À SREBRENICA**

(source : ministère de la Défense)

Paris, le 11 juillet 1995
DÉCLASSIFIÉ

Srebrenica : point de situation

1) Les frappes de l'OTAN ont été sans grand résultat militaire (impact de proximité seulement et pas d'acquisition de cibles pour la deuxième passe ; les deux F 16 employaient des munitions non guidées). Un tir de SAM-7 contre la deuxième patrouille.

Durant les opérations, les Serbes (Colonel Indic, Lukavica) ont menacé de s'en prendre aux concentrations de réfugiés et aux Néerlandais détenus si les actions aériennes continuaient. Dans ces conditions, le Général Gobillard, en liaison avec l'Amiral Smith a décidé de suspendre le CAS en maintenant pendant un temps les avions alliés en orbite à proximité de Srebrenica.

La coordination entre l'ONU et l'OTAN est qualifiée de bonne. Les deux commandements étaient d'accord pour autoriser les tirs sur les systèmes de défense sol-air en cas d'intention hostile ; il n'y a pas eu de pression de l'OTAN pour des frappes préemptives.

2) Casques bleus néerlandais : les unités se regroupent vers le QG de Potocari (également bombardé). Tous les postes d'observation du sud ont été repliés ; par contre, les postes nord seraient toujours en place. Les Néerlandais démentent que le commandant de la compagnie soit prisonnier (source ambassade). Le dispositif reste imbriqué. Pas de victimes.

3) La ville est sous le contrôle serbe, d'après Zagreb. De façon surprenante, les défenses bosniaques se sont effondrées. De 10 à 20 000 réfugiés (selon les sources) se sont enfuis vers le nord, accompagnés par les Néerlandais.

4) Washington :

- un appel de l'Ambassadeur Harriman faisant état d'inquiétudes pour Mostar exprimées par les Espagnols auprès de R. Holbrooke ;

- Pentagone : démarche de l'Ambassadeur néerlandais indiquant que ses autorités envisagent l'évacuation de l'enclave ;

- réunion de crise en cours à la Maison Blanche ; toutes les options sont envisagées, de l'action unilatérale en soutien des Néerlandais au déclenchement du 40 104 ;

- la perspective d'une évacuation de Srebrenica est considérée comme le début de la fin.

5) Bruxelles :

- démarche de l'Ambassadeur néerlandais auprès de J. Blot pour indiquer que La Haye envisage l'évacuation et pourrait demander l'appui de l'OTAN (TD a priori non transmis au Ministère de la Défense) ;

- démarche dans le même sens auprès du Secrétariat Général ;

- a priori, pas de pression de la part de Bruxelles pour qu'une telle opération entre dans le cadre des QRO (Quick Reaction Options) prévues pour le 40 104, et pour lesquelles subsistent de fortes divergences de vues sur les modalités de commandement.

6) New York :

- réunion du Conseil de Sécurité à 15 h00, heure de New York.

7) Zagreb :

- réunion de crise entre le Général Janvier et M. Akashi. L'évacuation paraît techniquement très difficile. Entretien prévu entre le Général Janvier et le Chef d'Etat-major néerlandais.

8) Londres :

- reprendre Srebrenica n'est pas envisageable ; grosses inquiétudes face aux déclarations du Président français ;

- on ne peut pas mettre en oeuvre les QRO ;

- il faut être honnête vis-a-vis de ce que l'on peut faire pour les zones de sécurité ;

- l'objectif politique doit être l'application de l'accord de démilitarisation de 1992 (Morillon) : retrait de la BSA et des armes lourdes bosniaques ;

- il faut encourager les Néerlandais à rester.