

**COMPTE RENDU DE L'ENTRETIEN ENTRE LES GÉNÉRAUX
RUPERT SMITH ET RATKO MLADIC LE 19 JUILLET 1995 À HAN-KRAM**

(source : ministère de la Défense)

SSN-930



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T-02

FROM: HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO
OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUPERT SMITH

HC

MOST IMMEDIATE
CODE CABLE

DTG: 192300BJUL95	File Ref:	Stn. Serial No:
From: THE OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER HQ UNPROFOR		Route: No: TOT
To: (1) HQ UNPF ZAGREB	Fax No:	C-KZ-13
AO: EXCLUSIVE FOR SRSG, FC, DFC		
Subject: MEETING NOTES		Page: 6
At Dist:		
Author: LT COL BAXTER MA TO COMD	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature: 
Clearing Officer: LT COL BAXTER MA TO COMD	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature: 

MESSAGE

ATTACHED THE REPORT ON THE MEETING TODAY BETWEEN GENERAL SMITH AND GENERAL MLADIC WITH A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT THE MEETING.

COMD UNPROFOR WILL TAKE RAPID STEPS TO TEST THE STRENGTH OF THE AGREEMENT. GEN NICOLAI (COS UNPROFOR) WILL BE PRESENT TO SUPERVISE THE MOVEMENT OF DUTCHBAT AT BRATUNAC.

GENERAL SMITH DOES NOT WISH THE AGREEMENT TO FALL INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. WE VIEW IT AS A FIRST, LIMITED STEP TOWARDS A NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE BSA.

SRSG

FC

DFC

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
95 JUL 20 - 0 :42
1012

From: Lt Col J R J Baxter
 MA 16 COMD
 VSAT 7201



To: See Distribution

Date: 19 July 95

MEETING GEN SMITH/GEN MLADIC - 19 JUL 95

SUMMARY

1. Gen Smith met Gen Mladic at 'Restoran Jela' at 1200 hrs at Han-Kram on 19 July 1995. The purpose of the meeting was to follow up the negotiations conducted by Mr Bildt in Belgrade the previous weekend. General Mladic was accompanied by General Tolimir and Lt Col Indic.
2. The issues covered during the meeting were Srebrenica including the withdrawal of DUTCHBAT, Zepa and Freedom of Movement for UNHCR and UNPROFOR. At the conclusion of the meeting the Agreement which is attached at Annex A was signed. Throughout the meeting General Smith was in contact with Mr Bildt who was at a parallel meeting with President Milosovic in Belgrade. The meeting was conducted in a brisk and business-like manner, Mladic had come with a clear intent to sign the agreement as opposed to negotiating. He was in a chipper mood evidently buoyed by the BSA success in Zepa.

THE AGREEMENT

3. General Smith went through the draft agreement with General Mladic paragraph by paragraph in order to clarify the language and to avoid the attachment of any conditions and linkages in the BSA proposals. The major points from the discussion on the agreement are as follows:
 - a. In Paragraph one any references to POWs or detainees were removed since each wanted one or the other. It was also decided that it was not correct for the Generals to make an agreement on what ICRC should do in Srebrenica and Zepa. It was felt adequate to secure access for ICRC to all reception centres.
 - b. In Paragraph two General Smith made it clear to Mladic that the 55 soldiers released on the 15 July did not leave Bratunac with their weapons and equipment. He also reported to Mladic the theft of weapons from an UNPROFOR logistic convoy returning from Bratunac. Mladic agreed to do all in his power to return as many of the stolen weapons as possible. General Smith said he would accept Mladic's word on this issue and it was not felt appropriate to include this pledge in the agreement. Nevertheless the Paragraph would stand.

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c. In the discussion on Paragraph three General Smith explained that it was particularly important for UNHCR to have immediate access to Srebrenica in order to assess the requirement for future aid convoys. Mladic agreed to this without difficulty. The routing of the convoys was discussed; General Smith accepted routing of the convoys via Belgrade.

d. Discussion on this Paragraph was rather more lengthy. General Smith explained to General Mladic that he understood but did not accept General Mladic's reasons for imposing strict control on UNPROFOR. He made it clear to General Mladic that this restriction could only be seen as a temporary arrangement and he assured General Mladic that he would continue to demand complete and unrestricted FOM. Mladic agreed that in time it should be possible for UNPROFOR to resume movement on routes direct from central Bosnia. The term normalisation of relations refers to this intention.

e. Discussion on Paragraph six focused on the need for all UNHCR convoys into Sarajevo to have UNPROFOR escorts. This was at first unacceptable to Mladic who demanded joint escorts, if any were necessary.

f. The discussion on Paragraph seven focused on the withdrawal of DUTCHBAT from Srebrenica. On the matter of the wounded Moslems, General Smith revealed that he had information that not all the injured had been evacuated.- Mladic appeared to have no knowledge of this but agreed to find out and resolve the matter. After some debate Mladic accepted that all locally employed UNPROFOR personnel should be allowed to leave with DUTCHBAT without conditions. General Smith raised the matter of missing DUTCHBAT weapons and equipment; Mladic again offered by a 'Gentlemen's' agreement to do what he could to recover as much of the equipment as possible. Mladic agreed clearance for the resupply convoy for DUTCHBAT due to go to Srebrenica tomorrow and agreed to the departure of DUTCHBAT via Belgrade on the 21 July 95. Mladic was evidently keen for General Smith to present with him to view the move however, in light of General Smith's busy programme, Mladic was happy to accept a nominated member of General Smith's staff to be his representative.

SREBRENICA

4. General Smith asked General Mladic for an account of the activities of BSA troops in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica. General Mladic was at pains to point out that Srebrenica was "finished in a correct way". He stated that the population who moved to Potocari were evacuated at their own request and with the full cooperation and help of UNPROFOR. He reported on a meeting that he had attended on the 11 July with CO DUTCHBAT and three civilian representatives of the local population (he named two of these) at which the arrangements for the evacuation were made. He said he engaged himself personally in this operation and organised as much food and water for the refugees as possible.

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
5. Mladic described how on the night of 10/11 July 95 a significant number of BiH troops broke through the lines in the direction of Tuzla. He explained that he had opened a corridor to let these troops go. He accepted that some skirmishes had taken place with casualties on both sides and that some "unfortunate small incidents" had occurred.

ZEPA

6. Mladic explained to General Smith that Zepa had effectively fallen to the BSA at about 1530 hrs. The BSA attack had made progress overnight. Today he showed on a map the current front line and he further explained that he had set up a meeting between the Ukrainian Company Commander and local civilian representatives at OP2 at 1600 hrs today in order to arrange the evacuation of refugees from the pocket.

SUMMARY

7. General Mladic left at 1530 hrs by helicopter for Zepa. He said he hoped for a further meeting with General Smith on his return from the meeting in London.



J.R.J. BAXTER
Lt Col
MA to COMD

Appendix

A. Agreement between General Smith and General Mladic.

Distribution

HQ UNPF Zagreb for SRSG, FC, DFC.

Internal:

COS, CAC

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AGREEMENT
BETWEEN GENERAL SMITH AND
GENERAL MLADIC

The two sides have agreed the following:

1. To provide access to the ICRC representatives to the reception points by the end of 20 July 95.
2. To provide that the DUTCHBAT soldiers leave Bratunac with their personal belongings and small arms ^{on} 15 July 1995.
3. To provide that UNHCR representatives visit Srebrenica, as well as clearance for humanitarian aid convoys to enter to Srebrenica, from Belgrade through Ljubovija and Bratunac.
4. A positive answer will be given to the request for logistic convoys assigned to UNPROFOR in Potocari and to Zepa, Gorazde and Sarajevo.

The convoy routes for the present will be:

- a. To Zepa - from Belgrade through Visegrad and Rogatica.
- b. To Gorazde - from Belgrade through Visegrad.
- c. To Sarajevo - from Kiseljak through Kobiljaca.

For the time being all convoys must respect the earlier agreements and usual procedures. The intention of both sides is to normalise resupply of UNPROFOR.

5. A positive answer will be given to the UNPROFOR request for the rotation of forces in Gorazde and Sarajevo.
6. A positive answer will be given to the UNHCR request for humanitarian aid convoys, according to assessed needs, to Gorazde and Sarajevo, as well as to Srebrenica and Zepa. The Sarajevo convoys are to be escorted by two UNPROFOR wheeled vehicles.
7. To provide the UNPROFOR displacement (including all military, civilian and up to thirty locally-employed personnel) from Potocari with all UNPROFOR weapons, vehicles, stores and equipment, through Ljubovija, by the end of the week, according to following displacement order:
 - a. Evacuation of wounded Moslems from Potocari, as well as from the hospital in Bratunac.
 - b. Evacuation of women, children and elderly Moslems, those who want to leave.

c. Displacement of UNPROFOR to start on 21 July 95 at 1200 hrs.

The entire operation will be supervised by General Smith and General Mladic or their representatives.

8. The water supply system in Sarajevo will be improved.

9. The above mentioned positive steps will be realised in order to provide a concrete and positive contribution to the peace process and to provide fair and impartial treatment of all parties. In particular, the treatment of UNPROFOR locally-employed personnel by both sides.

General Rupert Smith

Rupert Smith

19 July 95'

General Ratko Mladic

Ratko Mladic

19.07.1995'

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

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T-01

FROM: HQ UNPROFOR
OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUPERT SMITH

MOST IMMEDIATE
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DTG: 192359BJUN95	File Ref:	Stn. Serial No:		
From: THE OFFICE OF THE COMD HQ UNPROFOR		Route:	No:	TOT
To: (1) HQ UNPF ZAGREB ATTN: JFC, DFC, COS	Fax No:	MHH&	64	
Subject: ZEPA				Page 4
Int Dist: COS, PINFO				
Drafter: LT COL BAXTER	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature: 		
Releasing Officer: LT COL BAXTER MA TO COMD	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature: 		

MESSAGE

1. DURING TODAY'S MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL SMITH AND GENERAL MLADIC, MLADIC CLAIMED THAT ZEPA HAD FALLEN TO HIS FORCES AND THAT A MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT 1600 HRS AT OP2 BETWEEN BOSNIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, THE UKRAINIAN COMPANY COMMANDER AND THE BSA. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO MAKE THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE EVACUATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE TOWN. MLADIC CLAIMED THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE TOWN AND THAT ONLY SMALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE REMAINED.

2. WE HAVE LEARNT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING FROM SECTOR SARAJEVO. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GENERAL MLADIC AND GENERAL TOJIMIR WERE PRESENT WITH THE UKRAINIAN COMPANY COMMANDER AND TWO BOSNIAN CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WAR PRESIDENCY OF ZEPA. MLADIC MADE A SERIES OF PROPOSALS FOR THE EVACUATION OF WOUNDED, REFUGEES AND THE RETENTION OF MALES BETWEEN 18 AND 55 FOR POW EXCHANGE.

3. THE BSA PROPOSALS REQUIRE THAT ALL MALES BETWEEN 18 AND 55 YEARS OF AGE ARE DETAINED FOR A POW EXCHANGE WITH THE BOSNIANS IN THE NEXT 5 TO 15 DAYS. HE ALSO PROPOSED A TWO STAGE EVACUATION AS FOLLOWS:

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A. THE EVACUATION OF THE WOUNDED IN THREE UKRAINIAN COMPANY TRUCKS TO SARAJEVO AT 1000 HRS 20 JULY 95. 2/4

B. THE EVACUATION OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLDER PEOPLE. MLADIC STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE 50 BUSES AT OP2 AT 1400 HRS 20 JULY 95.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE BOSNIAN CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO THESE PROPOSALS BUT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS CONDITIONAL ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS BY THE ABiH SOLDIERS STILL REMAINING IN THE POKET.

4. THE BSA SAID ALL THE NECESSARY CLEARANCES WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE ROUTING OF CONVOYS AND FUEL WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR UKRAINIAN COMPANY VEHICLES. MLADIC ALSO DEMANDED THAT ALL UN EQUIPMENT IN BOSNIAN HANDS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO UKR COMPANY.

5. AT 2015 HRS GENERAL SMITH HAD AN AUDIENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS AMONGST MATTERS ZEPA AND AT 2200 HRS HE MET THE THREE SARAJEVO BASED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZEPA WAR PRESIDENCY AT THEIR REQUEST. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ACCEPT THAT ZEPA HAD FALLEN AND HAD ONLY RECEIVED REPORTS OF FIGHTING ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. THE ZEPA WAR PRESIDENCY MADE AN APPEAL TO GENERAL SMITH TO STOP THE FIGHTING BY DIRECT CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND MADE AN APPEAL FOR HIM TO VISIT THE ENCLAVE AND TO MEDIATE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WITH CO UKRBAT IN ATTENDANCE.

6. AT 0015 HRS WE RECEIVED THE ATTACHED COMMUNICATION FROM GENERAL MLADIC. HQ UNPROFOR INTENDS TO DEPLOY A RECCE PARTY FROM SECTOR SARAJEVO WITH ICRC AND UNHCR IN ORDER TO MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS AND TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.

7. AT 0030 HRS GENERAL SMITH TELEPHONE THE PRESIDENT AND EXPLAINED THE CONTENT OF MLADIC'S COMMUNICATION. THE PRESIDENT QUESTIONED GENERAL SMITH ON THE CONDITION FOR THE SURRENDER BUT APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT ZEPA HAD IN FACT FALLEN. THE PRESIDENT ASKED UNPROFOR TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ALL THE REFUGEE CONVOYS AND HE ALSO REQUESTED UNHCR AND ICRC ASSISTANCE.

8. COMD UNPROFOR WILL GIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS OPERATION TO SECTOR SARAJEVO. IN IS OUR INTENTION TO DEPLOY A RECCE TEAM TO ROGATICA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS AND ASSESS THE SITUATION. SECTOR NE WILL BE INFORMED ON THE LIKELY DESTINATION OF THE CONVOYS AND SECTOR SW WILL BE INFORMED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE REFUGEES FROM ZEPA MAY BE SETTLED IN THE ZENICA AREA.

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9. PLEASE INFORM ICRC AND UNHCR OF THE SITUATION AT YOUR LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PLEASE ALSO RELAY DETAILS OF THE SITUATION TO UNNY WHO HAVE REQUESTED INFORMATION AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE EVENING

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INL BURUM LRS 493139470-7OKD X 19-JUL-1995 21:53:46 108339

FROM: UNMO LO PALS (INTERPRETERS)
 TO: UNMO HQ UNPROFOR/OFFICE OF GENERAL SMITH
 DTG: 192310Z JULY 1995
 SUBJECT: RSA COMMANDER'S LETTER FOR GENERAL SMITH. PLEASE PASS
 THIS LETTER TO THE GENERAL IMMEDIATELY. THANK YOU.

4/4

"HQ ARMY OF THE
 REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
 No: 06/17-470
 19 July 1995

TO: UNPROFOR COMMAND - SARAJEVO
 ATTN: GENERAL R. SMITH

Dear General,

Zepa surrendered. The Muslim delegation that I had received at 1600 hours accepted the surrender conditions.

I ask you to inform a representative of ICRC to be at the check-point in Rogatica tomorrow at 1100 hours. I also ask you to send 50 trucks to transport population that expressed their wish to travel to the territory of the Muslim-Croatian federation. Also 4 fuel trucks with D-2 fuel and 1 fuel truck of gasoline should be sent for the needs of the UNPROFOR UKRBAT unit.

I expect you all at the Rogatica check-point at 0900 hours in order to keep an eye on the implementation of this agreement - our representative will also be present.

Injured people will be transported by UNPROFOR vehicles to Sarajevo at 1000 hours. The rest of them will be transported to Kladanj, starting from 1400 hours in accordance with the prepared schedule.

I ask you to pass to the Muslim representatives my wish to cooperate in order to conduct this task safely.

Sincerely yours,

COMMANDER
 Lieutenant General
 Ratko Mladic"