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CONFERENCE DES PARLEMENTS DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 
CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT
Conference of European Union Parliaments against money laundering

ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE

CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958

ONZIÈME LÉGISLATURE

______________________________________________________

CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION PARLIAMENTS

AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING

(7 and 8 February 2002)

and

PARIS DECLARATION AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING

TOME II

Version anglaise

English version

summary

Page

Preface by Mr. Raymond Forni, President of the National Assembly 5

Introduction 9

Steering Committee of December 3rd, 2001

I – Blueprint for the final declaration 13

II – Minutes of the Steering Committee of December 3rd, 2001 19

III – Blueprint for the final declaration

(version including the comments of the steering committee of December 3rd, 2001) 51

Steering Committee of January 14th, 2002

I – Minutes of the Steering Committee of January 14th, 2002 61

II – Blueprint for the final declaration

(version including the comments of the steering committee of January 14th, 2002) 89

Conference of the European Union Parliaments Against Money Laundering

(7 - 8 February 2002)

I – Draft Paris Declaration Against Money Laundering

(text proposed by the Presidency) 99

II – Minutes of the Working session of February 7th, 2002 107

A – Opening Address 113

B – Round Table 1 :

Transparency of Capital Movements 123

C – Round Table 2 :

Sanctions against Non-co-operative Countries and Territories 141

D – Round Table 3 :

Prudential Rules 159

E – Round Table 4 :

Judicial, Police and Administrative Co-operation 177

III – Paris Declaration Against Money Laundering adopted by the Conference

(February 8th, 2002) 205

IV – Minutes of the Formal Session of February 8th, 2002 213

Preface
by Mr. Raymond Forni, President of the National Assembly

The urgency of a combat

Money laundering has represented a relevant threat to democracy for many years. This misuse of the international financial mechanisms supports the development of serious criminal acts related to frauds, drug-smuggling, mafia-related activities, corruption. Furthermore, the events of September 11th, 2001 have drawn attention on the need of a relentless international fight against terrorism and its financing.

Fighting terrorism and fighting money laundering face the very same urgency. All public international actors must today engage themselves to adopt strong measures aimed at fighting money laundering and punishing those who let these practices flourish. Not only do these criminal acts undermine enterprises and financial actors, but they also dangerously endanger democracy.

The indispensable engagement of the national Parliaments of the European Union

Accordingly, I have taken the initiative to organise a Conference of the Parliaments of the European Union against money laundering, held on the 7th and 8th February 2001, with the aim of completing the actions already undertaken by the European institutions.

Europe has a special responsibility in this area. A large part of the financial crimes is detected in the territories historically or geographically related to the continent. Furthermore, money laundering, like the financing of terrorism, takes advantage of the flaws, weaknesses or simply of the differences between the financial, banking and commercial systems inside and outside Europe. Accordingly, fighting against these practices implies an harmonisation of the regulations, which, it seems to us, should first of all be achieved among the Fifteen. By showing their commitment to implement concrete measures against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, the Europeans cannot but urge the other big financial centres to question their own procedures.

Governments and their departments – in particular justice and police – as well as international and European institutions through the conventions and directives signed over the last years, play a decisive role in the fight against money laundering and financial crime. Some structures fighting these crimes have been put in place and some success has already been achieved.

National Parliaments are not the less important actors of this policy, where national laws constitute a first-class tool in the fight against money laundering. The effectiveness of this combat implies first and foremost clear and well-established laws that, within the framework of the necessary harmonisation of national legislations, take into consideration existing practices and institutions of the other countries. The implementation by law of effective mechanisms is among the criteria adopted by international institutions to evaluate the reliability of a State in effectively fighting financial crime.

Parliaments also have an important responsibility in the ratification of international conventions, the delay of which could constitute a serious drawback.

A special initiative with an uncontested success

This Conference has been aimed at proposing to all national parliaments of the European Union a common Declaration recalling the importance and urgency of the actions to be undertaken and listing a series of concrete measures. In fact, we deemed necessary not to be satisfied with the tracing of bank accounts belonging to those who finance terrorism or carry out money laundering. We have also questioned the very rules governing the offshore centres and, more generally, the effectiveness of the rules and regulations at the disposal of the European democracies in the fight against these menaces.

The rules of procedure and voting usually applied to international or European texts have not been adopted during this Conference. It was not the case of passing a text meant to be immediately enforced in the subscribing countries, since not all the parliamentarians who were present could engage their Parliaments. However, the adopted procedure has allowed each participant to voice his or her personal commitment in this vital democratic combat, by defining the series of measures deemed necessary to make the fight more effective.

This Declaration supported by all delegations present will allow Parliaments to have a common reference and define the bases of a demanding legislative policy. The Parliamentarians present in Paris have voiced their wish to support the incorporation into national law of the fifty-three measures listed in the final declaration of the 8th February 2002.

Only through the strong will of all delegations could this result be achieved. I would like to thank them once more.

Many delegations have proposed to host this Conference in the next years. This fact expresses the will of national Parliaments to follow up this initiative. It could be also foreseen to enlarge this format of the Parliaments of the European Union to other domains, in particular the social domain, where the delay in the harmonisation of the laws and regulations among the Fifteen is obvious.

Introduction

The Conference of the Parliaments of the European Union against money laundering met at the National Assembly on the 7th and 8th February 2002.

Mr. Raymond Forni, President of the National Assembly, had convened the Presidents and a delegation of each parliamentary institution of the European Union, with the aim of "preparing a common text containing some precise items on the basis of which participants will commit themselves to work towards the strengthening of national legislations".

Representatives of the parliamentary institutions of the countries applying for membership of the European Union as well as of the State Duma of the Russian Federation had been invited as observers.

The drafting of a final declaration clearly required some previous work. This was the task of the Steering Committee and the working session of the Conference, held on the 7th February 2002.

When inviting the Presidents to the Conference, President Forni had asked them to appoint some representatives to sit in this Committee, with the aim of drafting the final text collectively. Some European experts had also been invited. There were magistrates, financial-market professionals, academics and representatives of the European institutions.

The Steering Committee met twice, on December 3rd, 2001 and the 14th January 2002. At each meeting all the remarks made by the different parliamentary delegations and the experts were recorded. A new project of the declaration was then drafted, which was transmitted to all participants.

The blueprint for the final declaration established by the Steering Committee at its meeting of the 14th January was itself modified to take into consideration the amendments tabled after the meeting.

Accordingly, a new project of the Paris Declaration was submitted to the Conference at its session of February 7th, during which the last modifications were made.

At the end of the session the "Paris Declaration against Money Laundering" was eventually drafted. The Conference of the Parliaments of the European Union against money laundering adopted it at its formal session of the 8th February 2002.

Steering Committee

Monday 3 December 2001

I - Blueprint for the final declaration in view of the meeting

of February 8 2002

Parts submitted to the steering committee of December 3 2001

PREAMBLE

Money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets ; they represent a threat for the stability of our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism is just a part of this threat, but it uses the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global coordinated mobilisation of States, investigators and law enforcement services will never be able to act as efficiently and as quickly as those they pursue.

From October 1 1996, during the Geneva appeal, European magistrates questioned political decision-makers about this acknowledgment of powerlessness.

In the fight against money laundering and financial crime, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault.

The persistence of legal mechanisms which lead to the impenetrableness of financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, a certain form of leniency vis-à-vis many uncooperative territories which come under the sphere of influence of European Union Member States can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has not been inactive since it set about updating the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling uncooperative territories and loopholes in the systems of cooperative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the cooperation of European Union Member States.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and adopted a series of concrete proposals in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

Subject n° 1 : The transparency of capital movements

An efficient fight against money laundering and financial crime means being able to reconstruct the history of capital movements. The traceability of transactions and order makers is therefore a priority objective, but it comes up against several obstacles, including :

The impenetrableness of certain legal entities (trusts, institutions, foundations and limited partnerships) ;

Objection to investigators with regard to different professional secrets including banking secrecy ;

The existence of international financial services (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers) which do not always enable the order maker to be identified.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic declaration to the financial intelligence unit of transactions carried out using trust or assimilated funds.

Control the form of trusts (standardised documents and ban of suspect clauses).

Provide for the obligation to register trusts in a central register in addition to the identification of the beneficiaries.

Harmonise professional secret release procedures

Standardise the order maker’s identification in international financial messages (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Subject n° 2 : Sanctions against uncooperative territories

The identification of uncooperative territories in the fight against money laundering falls within the scope of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) whose 40 recommendations are the international reference standard.

Determining and applying sanctions depends on the States. A coordinated action by the European Union in this field can only increase the efficiency of these sanctions.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic declaration to the financial intelligence unit of financial transactions with these territories.

Strengthen the prudential ratios applicable to financial transactions carried out with these territories.

Restrict or ban transactions with institutions located in these territories.

Ban European Union member country institutions from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in these territories or from holding dealers’ accounts there.

Subject n° 3 : Legal and police cooperation

The fight against money laundering and financial crime necessarily involves legal and police cooperation due to the systematic globalisation of this type of crime.

Money laundering depends on cross-border economic and financial deals.

European magistrates questioned policy-makers on the obstacles encountered in cooperation from October 1 1996 during the Geneva Appeal.

The European Union has taken on this appeal and has tried to facilitate this cooperation during the last several ‘‘Justice & Home Affairs’’ council meetings. The European Council’s summit meeting in Tampere on October 15 and October 16 1999 began to give concrete expression to these intentions in its conclusions namely by announcing the creation of Eurojust (police and legal coordination structure).

This process is however still too long and could be accelerated by well-known measures since they have been discussed for several years.

Proposals :

Institute a European public prosecutor’s office.

Harmonise criminal sanctions namely by favouring the confiscation of revenue from crime and the instrument of money laundering.

Mutually recognise decisions to freeze, seize and confiscate illicit assets.

Introduce financial crimes including laundering on the list of crimes and offences at the basis of the European warrant for arrest.

Subject n° 4 : Prudential rules

The world deregulation of capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering and financial crime, namely due to the acceleration and the growth in international financial flows that is has generated. The sophistication of techniques and trades which has accompanied financial globalisation needs the reinforcement of capital-adequacy standards and ethical obligations of markets.

This widening of controls and financial regulations should include all providers of financial and legal services, and also international networks, whether traditional and informal (‘‘Hawala’’ type) or, on the contrary, very well integrated in the international capital markets (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Propositions :

Provide for the compulsory approval of agents belonging to a fund or security transfer network by the financial services regulatory authority.

Same measure as for company creation officers.

Organise, internationally, prudential rules and the regulation of the activities of clearing companies, and fund and security payment-delivery companies.

Follow-up of the present declaration

[In order to control and update the measures it recommended during its formative session, the Conference of European Union Parliaments against Money Laundering agreed to meet periodically at the invitation of the parliament of one of the European Union Member States.]

II – Minutes of the Steering Committee

Monday 3 December 2001

List of Participants

Parliaments Represented:

Germany

Bundestag

Mr Andreas NOTHELLE, Deputy Director for Interparliamentary Affairs

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives

Mr Hugo COVELIERS, President of the Flemish Liberal Group (VLD)

Senate

Mr Hugo VANDENBERGHE, President of the Monitoring Committee on Organised Crime, accompanied by Mr T. DEWAELE, Secretary of the Committee

Spain

Congress of Deputies

Mrs Soledad BECERRIL, Vice President of Congress, accompanied by Mrs Silvia MARTI, Legal Adviser

Senate

Mr Alfredo PRADA PRESA, First Vice President of the Senate, accompanied by José-Manuel BRETAL VASQUEZ, Legal Adviser

France

National Assembly

Mr Vincent PEILLON, President of the Investigation Committee on Obstacles to the Control and Repression of Financial Crimes and Money Laundering in Europe

Senate

Mr Bernard ANGELS, Vice President, Senate

Greece

Hellenic Parliament

Mr FLOROS, Deputy, accompanied by Mr NIKOLOUDIS, State Prosecutor and Mrs Eleni CONSTANTINIDOU, civil servant

Italy

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Donato BRUNO, President of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, accompanied by Mr Rodolfo CILLOCO, from the Bureau on Relations with the European Union

Senate

Mr Roberto CENTARO, Senator, accompanied by Mr Sebastiano CARDI, Diplomatic Counsel to the President of the Senate, and Mrs Chiara CIPRIANI (protocol) and Mrs Angela SCARAMUZZI, interpreter

European Parliament

Mrs Elena Ornella PACIOTTI, European Deputy, accompanied by Mr Emilio de CAPITANI, civil servant with the Committee on Liberties, European Parliament

Other Experts

Mr Alan-Bruce BEVERLY, European Commission

Mr Robert BIEVER, State prosecutor (Luxembourg)

Mr Olivier de BAYNAST, Magistrate representing France within Pro-Eurojust

Mr Harlem DESIR, Author of a report for the European Parliament

Mr Dominique GARABIOL, Former Head of Inspection, Council on Financial Markets

Mr Gilles LECLAIR, Deputy Director, Europol

Mr Jean de MAILLARD, Magistrate, High Civil Court, Blois

Mr Jean SPREUTELS, President of the Financial Information Processing Unit (Belgium)

Mr Jean-François THONY, Counsel, Appellate Court, Versailles

 

The Session commences at 2:40 PM and is chaired by Mr Vincent PEILLON.

Vincent PEILLON

Welcome to the Steering Committee meeting for the Conference of European Union Parliaments Against Money Laundering. Allow me to extend my very warm thanks for your attendance. This session was organised in a very short time and, as your schedules are tight, I know that it is difficult for you to squeeze in meetings such as this. That is one of the reasons for which only some of the delegations are represented here today. That being said, you have all received the text that we prepared and which will be discussed over the course of our work sessions. Arnaud Montebourg has also informed me that the luncheon will offer an opportunity for exchange on this topic.

In a few words, I would like to remind you of the French Parliament’s intentions. In the present context, the fight against financial crime and money laundering is a priority amongst multilateral institutions, within the European Union and in most of our governments. This has become even truer since the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Given this context, we thought it would be useful that governmental, European and multilateral initiatives be accompanied by an initiative on the part of the European parliaments, officialising the parliaments’ commitment to the fight against money laundering and financial crime. With this in mind, we wished to bring together a number of experts and parliamentary representatives to endorse a formal declaration, to be issued in February. It is this declaration on which we will work today, for the first session of the Steering Committee. You have received a copy of the proposed text.

We will meet once again to discuss the text on January 14th. Following this session, and until the January meeting, we can still work effectively toward the adoption of the declaration, in writing. We hope to garner the broadest approval possible for the document from each of the European parliaments, as it includes some very new ideas regarding the present situation. This would confer optimal political effectiveness upon the initiative and lend it worth as an international example.

For this afternoon, I suggest that each of the delegations present share their thoughts on the document, so that we may see which points raise problems and deserve to be the subject of further debate and fine-tuning. To begin, I will give the floor to the parliamentary representatives. Following that, I will ask the international experts to present their views on the topic.

Might I ask, then, for your reactions to the text in its present form. We will proceed in alphabetical order, according to the French language, and will therefore begin with Germany (Allemagne). I give the floor to the representative of the Bundestag, Andreas Nothelle, Deputy Director of Parliamentary Affairs.

Andreas NOTHELLE

Thank you. I did not receive the draft declaration until last Friday afternoon. I have therefore not had a chance to study it in detail. However, I did confer upon it with several experts in this field. The text seems acceptable to us, although a few minor amendments would be necessary. These points will have to be discussed with the representatives involved, who have not yet had the opportunity to look it over thoroughly. Nonetheless, I believe that we will easily be able to endorse the text.

The amendments that we would suggest concern, in particular, Paragraph 2, which seems to liken money laundering to terrorism. In our view, these two factors should be kept distinct, and we therefore propose that Paragraph 2 be deleted. We will also submit two additional minor amendments, which I will send to you in writing.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you. If all of the delegations shared your viewpoint, we could move very quickly. However, I fear that will not be the case. To cover a methodological issue, might I ask that you send us the amendments that you have not been able to discuss so that we can distribute them as quickly as possible? This way, we will all be able to follow the changes in the document until it reaches its final form.

I give the floor to Hugo Vandenberghe, from the Belgian Senate.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE

We also received the draft declaration over the course of last week. For this reason, I was not able to discuss the text with the Monitoring Committee on Organised Crime, which meets on Tuesday mornings. I will do so in the very next weeks.

Allow me to emphasise that the events of September 11th should serve as a call to action. In politics, it is important to recognise and seize opportunities. The present context is propitious for the type of initiative you suggest, the principles of which we support. As you know, under the former legislature, the Senate established an Investigative Committee on Organised Crime. This Committee suggested a number of measures against economic and financial crime, all of which were adopted unanimously. I would like to take this opportunity to mention them.

Firstly, we ask that the European Convention on Judicial Co-operation in Penal Matters (20 April 1959) be revised, as Article 2.1 provides that it should not apply to tax-related issues.

Secondly, we suggest that bank secrecy be lifted in the countries where it can still be invoked in matters of organised crime in response to legal injunctions.

The Committee had also recommended that the implementation of Title VI in the Treaty of the European Union (7 February 1992) be hastened, as it works toward strengthening co-operation in the fields of justice and domestic affairs, and opens new avenues in the fight against fraud.

We next suggest continuing in the concrete implementation of Article 209-A of the Treaty of the European Union. The Article was intended to ensure that Member States enforce the same measures in fighting fraud that harms the Community’s financial interests, as they would when fighting fraud that harms their own countries, with a view toward effectively curbing fraudulent practices involving, among other things, subsidies, Community budget or VAT.

By the same token, we recommend that the law punish a new type of tax fraud, when the fraud involves a high tax amount and is carried out through systematic misrepresentation, the objective of which is to disguise reality, especially where VAT is concerned.

We also suggest that a federal magistrate be appointed and entrusted with the fight against money laundering.

In addition, the Belgian Senate proposes that legislation on confiscation be drawn up. This would require making a distinction between the search for the criminal and the misappropriated funds, on the one hand, and the establishment of an illegally-obtained benefit. It would thus be possible that the latter be considered separate from the main case. If this were to come into being, Belgian law would have to do away with the notion of unity of punishment. The Minister of Justice proposed a bill to this effect a few weeks ago.

We also recommend that authorities look into the possibility of introducing asset sharing. This tool would allow the States that contributed to the dismantling of a money-laundering network, or to the seizure of patrimonial belongings to share the confiscated goods.

Lastly, we suggest that all major public markets be subject to strict monitoring, especially when the terms of reference show an amount that is significantly lower than that deemed reasonable by the authorities.

I should add that these proposals are in the process of being implemented.

In my view, obviously, the ideas and themes set forth in your document are constructive. However, I feel that, in order to be effective, our proposals must be concrete and realistic. We cannot be content with a declaration of principle. We must also provide methods for their realisation.

Regarding co-operation between the judiciary and investigative services, the document calls for a European Public Prosecutor. The idea is certainly worthy of further study, but we must also specify operating terms, a timetable for its creation and details about its environment, while also describing our expectations of such an institution from a judiciary standpoint and its relationship to the European Court of Justice. It is, in my view, necessary that the proposals be more precise.

The Senate’s Monitoring Committee has made plans to discuss these matters in January. At that time, we will most certainly be able to suggest amendments to the document you submitted to us.

Vincent PEILLON

I pass the floor to Hugo Coveliers, from the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

Hugo COVELIERS

I, too, received the draft declaration last Friday. The Justice Committee of the Chamber of Representatives will look over it soon. I will simply give you some of my impressions.

Whatever the final form of the text, I feel that the content must be far more concrete. The fight against money laundering will not be won by one country alone, especially if the said country is small. Europe, on the other hand, is in a position to take action. However, even from that standpoint, certain questions arise.

First of all, it would be advisable that we establish the definitions on which the document is to be based. The first theme in the draft document suggests, for instance, that we harmonise the procedures by which we are to ban professional secrecy. In my view, everyone agrees that the purpose of professional secrecy is not to foster money laundering. Many parliamentarians, in Belgium and elsewhere, might object to this measure unless we specify its purpose and our intentions. We wish to prevent "dirty money", in particular that which results from criminal activity, to be injected into the official system with the aim of facilitating or introducing a certain kind of power. For this reason, when we state that we want to harmonise measures on the lifting of professional secrecy, it is necessary to specify what this might protect us from and explain the way in which we intend to achieve our goal. If we do not do so, we may spark symbolic discussion and create opposition that we could do without.

Likewise, the document calls for limitations or bans on transactions with establishments located in non-cooperative territories. I agree with the intent of the proposal, but wonder whether it would entail sanctions comparable with those dealt to States that support terrorism, and which those States always manage to avoid. We need to be more concrete, specifically indicating the measures that we intend to enforce vis-à-vis parties that do not respect the rules, and specifying how we intend to forbid transactions with non-cooperative territories. Everyone knows that banks are very powerful. How will we force them to play by the rules?

As Hugo Vandenberghe emphasised, and even though I am an advocate the European Public Prosecutor, I feel it is necessary to specify its prerogatives. We have already created Europol, which I hope will become an effective European investigations unit. We also created pro-Eurojust, along with an assembly of public prosecutors from the Union Member States. Madame Delmas-Marty has suggested a corpus juris that would apply only to fraud on European subsidies. Do we plan to bring all of these entities together around a European public prosecutor, with one deputy for each of the countries in the Union? Would the latter's powers be only European, or also domestic? These questions are all the more important in a context where national public ministries often encounter difficulties in their relations with the entities we create at the European level. It would therefore advisable to establish protocols on the powers and duties of each of the entities, as well as on the relations that they should maintain with one another.

I agree that we should add financial crimes, including money laundering, to the list of crimes and offences that can give rise to a European warrant for arrest. But while sharing this aim, we will nonetheless need to come to an agreement on the definition of financial offences. This is of the utmost importance. The definitions must be spelled out clearly so as to avoid any and all misinterpretation.

To summarise, I would like to congratulate you for this initiative, Mr Chairman. It is important that the national parliaments and the European Parliament take action against money laundering. Illegally-acquired funds are already a problem. When, in addition, the funds involved are laundered and used to buy a certain type of power, the difficulties add up and, ultimately, threaten democracy. It thus appears necessary to take action at the European level. With this in mind, we need to avoid creating obstacles for ourselves. In order to exempt ourselves from the criticism of certain NGOs, which are all too ready to accuse us of abolishing liberties, we need to define our measures and their objectives precisely. I am in favour of the idea of a European Public Prosecutor, for instance, but feel that it cannot come into being until we have clearly established its relations with national courts.

Vincent PEILLON

We will come back to the problem that you raise. As you say, it will be very difficult to define our purpose. It is true that we must not restrict ourselves to asserting principles; we must also define the area to which they apply. While keeping our ultimate purpose in mind, we will need to strike a proper balance. It will not be easy.

I give the floor to Soledad Becerril, Vice President of the Spanish Congress of Deputies.

Soledad BECERRIL

As I have worked on the document in English, it is easier for me to speak in English. This draft declaration is a valuable contribution to a European framework against financial crime. I expect it to become a benchmark document on a topic that concerns public opinion. My presentation will deal with the four topics that you submitted.

In broad terms, we agree with the document’s introduction. However, we do not agree with the proposal made by one of the members present concerning the suppression of the second paragraph. We believe that the financing of terrorism represents a threat to our democratic society. Furthermore, we agree that it uses the same instruments as all organised crime. Therefore, we support the inclusion of this important paragraph.

Among the four topics within the document, topic one needs to be stressed. It provides effective measures to prevent the misuse of certain corporate vehicles for the purpose of money laundering. It is important to encourage our governments and EU institutions to promote initiatives against money laundering within our corporate vehicles.

Regarding topic two, a strong consensus exists behind the efforts of the financial action task force in convincing non-compliant jurisdictions to respect the relevant recommendations. In this respect, the rigorous counter-measures adopted to persuade territories to comply with the recommendations may prove indispensable.

Turning to topic three, it is clear that, in the face of the internationalisation of crime, international co-operation needs to be strengthened. Concerning topic four, we must ensure that everyone involved in the transmission of money should be properly registered and supervised. Finally I want to draw your intention to the financing of terrorism. I believe that the implementation of the financial action task force’s special recommendation on money laundering will create a key instrument in the prevention of terrorist activities.

This draft declaration could provide a new important political push to combat financial support for illicit activities and the threats of terrorist. In general terms, we agree with the draft declaration.

Vincent PEILLON

Your agreement in principle is stirring, as it shows strong determination. Our list of proposals was elaborated on the basis of work carried out by this assembly over the last three years. However, by no means do we feel that the final text should be limited to these proposals. Thus, until the text is ratified, we will welcome any and all additional proposals that you might bring forth.

I now give the floor to Alfredo Prada Presa.

Alfredo PRADA PRESA

Since September 11th, terrorism is no longer limited to certain countries. It has become a problem for everyone. Against this background, I suggest that our text assert that the financing of terrorism will be treated in the same way as financial crime and money laundering.

Vincent PEILLON

Once again, let me state that we will have an opportunity to come back to this worrisome topic. As you stated, it is appropriate that these two topics be linked, probably in a more assertive manner, but also in a more precise manner than it has until now.

I call upon Bernard Angels, Vice President of the Senate.

Bernard ANGELS

The Senate’s general viewpoint on the text is the same as that which we have already heard. The Senate’s work follows the same lines as what has been presented today. I will simply offer some of my thoughts on the text. I agree in particular with our Belgian friends, when they say that our work will only be fruitful if it gives rise not only to a declaration, but also to concrete measures that allow us to carry this issue forward at the European level. In my view, this objective truly deserves our attention.

Regarding the text itself, I would like to raise a few questions that might serve as fodder for our discussions.

Theme 1 calls for systematic reporting to the financial intelligence unit. Yet, it is not certain whether each of the European countries has access to a system comparable to France’s "Tracfin". I know that Germany is in the process of developing such a tool. If the same is not true in all of the Member States, those lacking will have to establish financial intelligence units, based on discussions that we will have to guide.

Discussions are also called for where sanctions are concerned so that these may be harmonised. I believe it is possible to reach consensus on this matter, so that Europe as a whole will speak the same "language".

Theme 3 suggests harmonisation of sanctions where offenders are concerned, but does not deal with the informants. I question the logic of that. We should be able to go further, so as to also punish those who come forth with false information.

As regards judiciary and financial co-operation, Eurojust has been mentioned several times. Yet it is clearly not the only institution fighting against financial crime. The Anti-Fraud Office (Office de lutte anti-fraude) has not been mentioned. Yet it deserves to be recognised, having gained access to new means this year. I therefore ask that the role of this institution be reasserted.

I will conclude with an idea sparked by Alfredo Prada Presa’s comments. Whereas the National Assembly has mainly been focusing on financial crime and money laundering, the events of September 11th compel us to broaden our debate, so as to include "underground money". I refer, in particular, to money that is not earned illegally, but which serves to destabilise our planet.

Vincent PEILLON

So that the matter is clear, I should state that the sanctions to which you referred would apply to informers who do not respect the principle of due diligence, but not to non-cooperative territories. It is true that, in this area, legislation differs greatly from one European country to another. It is also true that France is not among the leading countries in this field.

I turn the floor over to our Greek friends.

Mr FLOROS

Given the current state of international affairs, I welcome the goal of this conference and European initiatives against money laundering and terrorism. In Eastern Europe, we have strong evidence of the link between these two illegal activities. I would like to register our agreement with all the proposals. Some minor points have been raised and will be addressed by our national prosecutor. However, the draft document appears to complement the financial action taskforce’s eight new recommendations, proposed in Washington in October 2001.

Mr NIKOLOUDIS

I understand the need to link terrorism and money laundering. However, something appears amiss in our efforts to prove this. Traditionally, money laundering has involved the transformation of illegally held money through legal activities. In the case of terrorism, we seem to encounter just the opposite effect: legally held money flowing towards illegal activities. We have to be careful to respond through legal and correct means. Regarding the idea of a European public prosecutor, we recognise the need but have doubts regarding its effectiveness. In our opinion, one person seems insufficient to promote the European public prosecution.

Finally, regarding topic two, we strongly believe that sanctions should be tough. However, since we believe in tough sanctions, we think they should follow objective and fair procedures.

Vincent PEILLON

We will come back to the topic of sanctions, as a first decision seems imminent for the FATF.

We are presently in the process of preparing what should be the adoption of a declaration of political principle by the national parliaments. The question has been raised as to how precise the latter should be. The affirmation of principles that will later be amplified within our national parliaments is progress in itself. This is particularly true where the lifting of professional secrecy is concerned. We are all aware of the recent events in this area, particularly within the context of the revision of the Directive. We may find ourselves having to debate over how we might be more precise, in particular on topics such as evaluation, sanctions and, as a result, the criteria that we would have to adopt to that end. I speak in the conditional voice, as I have doubts as to whether that method is the easiest.

I give the floor to the Italian delegation.

Roberto CENTARO

I would like to thank you for taking this initiative, which I regard as extremely important. Today, organised crime is exploiting technological progress more than ever before. As a consequence, parliaments and nations are lagging behind. Therefore, this initiative should enable us to formulate a definition of concrete proposals.

I would like to speak about the preamble content and add a fifth topic to the existing list. I would not support the suppression of the second paragraph of the preamble. Money laundering can represent a source financing for terrorism and other similar criminal activities. Therefore, this paragraph would occupy a useful position in the preamble. Even in Italy, the collusion between organised crime and terrorism has been proven conclusively.

Regarding the third paragraph, I would rather speak of global action than mobilisation. In this regard, all countries must play their part. In my opinion, the fourth paragraph of the preamble should be suppressed. As this document is political in nature, judges should play no part in its application. They are employed by the state to apply national laws.

I also want to make a comment on the sixth paragraph of the preamble. Instead of dwelling on legal mechanisms or financial black holes, I would mention legislative inadequacy. Otherwise, parliaments tend to adopt a favourable attitude towards particular action. Furthermore, I would prefer the use of the term ‘states’ than ‘territories’. I will mention my fifth topic at the end of my consideration presentation.

Concerning the topic one, I believe that all member states of the European Union should define a common version of fiscal, criminal and financial law provisions. We need the same definitions for the same crimes. In some countries, the distinction between regular and Mafia-related crime does not exist. In addition, common regulations concerning beneficiaries of trusts and the lifting of professional secrets remain crucial: we need to be in agreement, as vigorous sanctions will be needed.

Turning to topic two, I agree on the necessity to identify non-cooperative countries. I think that severe criminal sanctions are needed, both for organisations and individuals. However, I do not agree that the EU has the right to forbid member states from opening subsidiaries within non-cooperative countries. The criteria applied by the EU are based on the rule of law in vigour within the Union’s borders. In addition, I agree on the need to implement sanctions for non-cooperative countries.

Regarding topic three, I would eliminate the echo of the Geneva appeal. Instead, I would include a passage on the past experience acquired in the EU in the judicial field. In our view, the existence of the Eurojust institution may negate the need for the European prosecutor. What should this role entail? I believe that it should seek to facilitate the circulation of news concerning the different enquiries carried out within the EU countries. However, unless the substantial criminal law of all member states is harmonised, such co-operation will prove elusive. In 1998, Italy signed an agreement with Switzerland, which I will now describe.

Ratified recently by the Italian parliament, the agreement has provoked controversial statements. Unfortunately, such controversy arises due to lack of real knowledge on the matter. However, this agreement allows joined investigations between judges, magistrates and investigations services. Thanks to this agreement, we have the possibility of using videoconferencing during proceedings and of transferring suspects to the other country when required. The series of measures included has created an advanced legal instrument. In addition, co-operation extends to documentation and investigation. Therefore, this type of document should be mentioned in the document.

In conclusion, I would like to mention the value of joint committees. In Italy, we have a joint anti-mafia committee, featuring members from both chambers. I believe that these should be copied in other member states. Such an instrument could combat any national judicial weakness. We must remember that the huge financial resources controlled by criminal organisations remains a serious threat for all EU countries. In this regard, sanctions on money laundering and reinvestment of those funds are essential.

Vincent PEILLON

Could you say more about the fifth theme, which you mentioned briefly, but on which you did not have an opportunity to conclude?

Roberto CENTARO

The fifth topic that I referred to was the need to establish homogenous criminal laws and sanctions across the EU. In addition, I believe that we should recognise the crime of association with criminal activity.

Donato BRUNO

I agree with what has been said so far. In particular, I would support the introduction of a fifth topic. Despite the importance of intelligence, I do not see it included in the text. I would like to conclude by voicing my general support for this initiative. However, after consulting with our parliamentary colleagues in Italy, we may propose some amendments.

Vincent PEILLON

The possible inclusion of a fifth theme brings us back to the topic of better harmonising incriminations. If we take up that theme and want to be precise, we may find ourselves before a Herculean task. There is a chance that we will be forced to do so.

I would like to give the floor to Robert Biever, who is a National Prosecutor for Luxembourg, but was designated by the Luxemburgish authorities.

Robert BIEVER

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I must, however, call to your attention that I was by no means designated by the Chamber of Deputies.

Vincent PEILLON

I found it surprising that the two powers should be amalgamated.

Robert BIEVER

I was also surprised upon reading your list of participants.

Vincent PEILLON

In that case, I will call on you to speak as an expert.

I give the floor to Elena Ornella Paccioti, European Deputy.

Elena Ornella PACCIOTI

Thank you for having brought the European Parliament into your work session. We are also deeply involved in defining the European legislative framework. I have just turned in the text modifying Directive 91 to the Secretariat. I ensure you that I will keep you abreast, in writing, of the discussions and texts under debate at the Parliament in Strasbourg.

We would like to achieve a better understanding of the different national legislative frameworks so as to see the points that distinguish them from the European framework. If you wish, Emilio de Capitani can present a review of the tools that currently exist at the European level.

Vincent PEILLON

We will now give the floor to the experts who accepted our invitation, so that they may present their viewpoints and react to our comments. Some of them, including Robert Biever, represent States, while others belong to European institutions. Harlem Désir, a member of the European Parliament, has worked on today’s topic at length. Other guests are civil servants who work for such institutions as Europol or Eurojust, on which we have already commented.

I give the floor, once again, to Robert Biever.

Robert BIEVER

Thank you for your invitation. I agree with all of the points raised in your text but, once again, I must remind you that I am not speaking on behalf of the Luxemburgish Chamber of Deputies.

None of the points seems likely to give rise to disagreements. However, we must recognise that, over the past five years, parliamentarians have produced many texts, conventions, directives and regulations, not all of which were later transposed into national law. Given that fact, does it not seem appropriate that the Parliaments force themselves to be more careful on this matter?

In addition, it is not enough to elaborate texts. The said texts must also be coherent and intelligible. Moreover, the offices must be given sufficient and competent staffing if they are to implement the texts. When this does not occur, the governments have an easy excuse for not enforcing the legislation, even though they themselves ratified it.

The financing of terrorism was discussed at length. We saw that a single problem can have many different aspects. There is no doubt that terrorism can be financed using funds gathered illegally, and in particular, through extortion. Such cases are instances of ordinary money laundering. A number of tools have been developed to prevent the transferring of large sums of money without any real economic base. Now, since September 11th, we have discovered that a large number of terrorists had received very small amounts of money: they were supported as students would be by their parents. The tools normally used to detect money laundering were obviously not designed to detect that type of financing.

I would also like to broach the topic of the European Public Prosecutor. In my view, this topic alone could take up an entire day of discussions. For the time being, we remain faithful to Eurojust’s philosophy. In other words, we are trying to ensure better collaboration between the various national offices. If we are to make a true leap ahead where quality is concerned, we would have to ask the European Public Prosecutor to arouse public action. However, it would not be able to do so alone. Therefore, we would have to give it a jurisdiction. I do not need to remind you that, throughout the Union, the powers of the Public Prosecutors are checked by the supervisory powers given to the jurisdictions.

My last comment pertains to Theme 4. In this area, we will also have to ensure that sanctions are harmonised not only within the Union, but also with the judgements rendered by the FATF. If this does not occur, there will be considerable confusion. Thus, in this field as well, a number of political decisions will have to be made.

Vincent PEILLON

I give the floor to Alan-Bruce Beverly from the European Commission, who took part in the revision of the Directive.

Alan-Bruce BEVERLY

Thank you for inviting the European Commission to this valuable and worthy occasion. I appreciate the difficulty involved in formulating a balanced document based on a parliamentary declaration and a legislative text. I believe that the reference to terrorism belongs in this document. In this regard, the time is right to progress on this issue.

Regarding the sixth paragraph, I wonder at the number of non co-operative states in existence within the EU sphere of influence. The work of the financial action task force has demonstrated that none of its 29 member countries operate under a perfect system. Some territories may remain co-operative on criminality without that spirit extending to fiscal matters. In this regard, I would question the ability of anti-laundering legislation in combating tax fraud.

Turning to topic one, I fully agree with the presentation of the problems. However, the solutions may require some further discussion. I am not convinced that the financial intelligence units would welcome this extra burden of reporting on additional funds. In addition, in the area of trust law, I do not know of many countries that have adopted a central trust register.

Having worked on the recent EU directive text, I am not sure that a harmonisation of procedures on the lifting of professional secrecy is totally feasible. Following the update of the FATF recommendation, the question of identification of originators of payment is on the agenda. Concerning topic two, I am not certain that a systematic declaration to the financial intelligence units is desirable. Perhaps this system could be applied best to small-scale offshore centres. A recent meeting of EU finance ministers agreed to apply the counter-measures decision of the FATF.

I have no specific comment on topic three except to state that a lot of progress has been achieved on third pillar side of community activity. The Justice and Home Affairs ministers plan to meet soon and are committed to reach agreement. Concerning topic four, a lot of pressure now exists to look at the question of official and non-official movements of funds. I believe that professionals involved in the creation of companies or the provision of company or trust services could and should be regulated. Those were my initial comments. However, we will need to study every recommendation in more detail at a later date.

Olivier de BAYNAST

I am a member of pro-Eurojust, which has already been mentioned. The "pro" stands for "provisoire", which means "temporary" in French. We hope that our status will be finalised by the end of the year.

Experts and users alike expect declarations such as these to provide the impetus that will lead to progress. It is a mighty task because, although today’s topic is a buzzword, it is no less a crucial challenge. In my view, your declaration needs to call for greater consistency among the conventions and texts that are piling up, as many before me have remarked, and through which the users are wading with some difficulty. This discussion gives me an opportunity to emphasise the importance of ratifying those texts, many of which were the subject of lengthy debates. With this and today’s event in mind, I carried out a study of all of the texts that deal with today’s topic. I also indicated whether each of the texts had been ratified and provided a reminder of their content. I think the results will be of use to you.

We see that some texts have been adopted, but are not ratified. Other texts have been ratified, but are not enforced. A number of institutions have been established, but do not work together. It would be appropriate to ask these institutions to co-operate and collaborate. While they most certainly have a role to play, they cannot do so effectively unless they work together. Bernard Angels mentioned the Anti-Fraud Office. It is necessary that the Office join forces with Eurojust, just as Europol should work with Eurojust. Each of these institutions is part of a whole.

As Robert Biever stated, the European Public Prosecutor and Eurojust are two entirely distinct entities. The latter is part of an intergovernmental line of thinking, based on co-operation. If you decide to call for a European Public Prosecutor in your declaration, you will need to make it clear that, in proposing a tighter structure, you are by no means dismissing the importance of the existing institutions. In the past, I have observed that some requests for highly integrated tools were, in fact, a way of disguising the fact that the existing tools were no longer wanted.

The declaration will also have to reflect the ongoing nature of the negotiations. The European arrest warrant will be ratified by the end of the year, or so I hope. Once this is accomplished, it will be impossible to add anything to it. It will therefore be necessary to determine what the warrant can over, even beyond the list. With this idea in mind, I would like to offer my help in finding the wording that will allow optimal usage of the warrant. That being said, given that we are still in the midst of ratifying the European arrest warrant, I ask that each delegation check its country’s standpoint in the negotiations. Amongst the countries represented today, some are strongly against the inclusion of financial crimes in the arrest warrant’s breadth. I would add the latter view could have a devastating effect on public opinion, as it implies that the fight against white-collar crime is not a European priority, contrary to what politicians, whether left-wing or right-wing, have declared.

Vincent PEILLON

We appreciate your having prepared a study for us.

Harlem DESIR

Regarding Theme 1 and the declaration as a whole, we must look into the junction between European legislation and its transposition or ratification in national law. Directive 91-308 is now ten years old and has not proved satisfactory when we have had to deal with real cases of money laundering. This is not due only to the flaws in its wording or to its content, but also to the difficulties that arise in its implementation. As an example, on 2 May 2001, in the case involving the clearinghouse Clearstream, the European Commission declared that it would only ensure that the transposed law was implemented and enforced in Luxembourg, the country involved. The Commission explained that the implementation of the Directive by a country’s financial institutions could only be overseen by the country’s government itself. Yet the Directive requires financial institutions and clearinghouses to report all financial movements that seem to arise from laundering, also defining money laundering in a very broad, albeit unequivocal manner.

In light of this example, I would like to suggest that we study the question of creating a European supervisory body. Such an entity would have direct access to financial establishments and their transactions. This idea is already present, implicitly, in the proposal of designating a European Prosecutor.

Since September 11th, the fight against terrorism has come to involve the rapid implementation of measures against certain establishments and individuals. In my opinion, it was necessary to react. It showed that, where there is will, it is possible to find judiciary devices that limit or forbid transactions with certain establishments. I would like to draw a parallel between this example and the declaration of intent to limit or forbid transactions with institutions in non-cooperative territories, even though the level of priority may not be as high. In this case, for example, it is worth considering a surtax to make offshore investments less attractive.

Regarding Theme 3, I agree with the representative of pro-Eurojust: we can only hope that Eurojust will be given power, as it would allow us to move concretely and swiftly toward the creation of a European Public Prosecutor.

As pertains to the European arrest warrant, might I remind you that the European Parliament spoke out on this topic, when the vote occurred on 29 November. Following Mr Watson’s report, the proposed creation of a European arrest warrant was adopted.

Gilles LECLAIR

I represent Europol, but also a certain number of users within the investigations services and the judicial field. Our destinies are closely tied together.

I would like to discuss investigations of money laundering in general terms. It is unlikely that this type of investigation will change considerably over time. Some are launched when suspicious transactions occur, and involve tracing financial flows back to their source in order to prove that the transactions are the result of infractions on the law. It is therefore necessary, as was previously stated, that everyone agree on the definition of the infraction.

Investigations can also be launched following an infraction to investigate the financial environment of the individuals and companies that took part in the crime, with an view to determining where the funds were reinvested.

Some investigations arise from the surveillance of financial intermediaries, a true challenge. Lastly, we should mention the surveillance of legitimate funds that are reinvested in underground activities.

All of these scenarios require flawless co-operation between the investigations units, the legal system and the financial institutions, at both the national and European levels. Here, we see one of the system’s first failings. The results achieved, when compared to the number of texts adopted, seem altogether trifling. Few positive investigations have been completed in the field of money laundering. It is difficult to believe that this is due to the preventive nature of the texts adopted. Instead, it is more likely that these provisions have led to a certain form of confusion. This needs to be emphasised.

International co-operation is also imperative, but it is precisely the second weakness of the system. It is important to clarify the definition of non-cooperative States, but above all, it is necessary to list them. As players within the European Union, we have all had to deal with obstacles in carrying out our various international court investigations. It is therefore essential that the States agree on a single definition of the term "non-cooperative State". At the same time, it is advisable to be wary of State certification, as seen in the United States for instance, in particular where drugs are concerned.

The stand it has taken regarding professional and bank secrecy deserves to be praised.

Regarding the European Public Prosecutor, in my view, in order for it to be concrete, we must show more resolve. We must first define the Public Prosecutor, as well as the penal procedures it will follow and the investigations units it will govern. The matter remains open for discussion.

The centralisation of lawsuits at the national level and the centralisation of specific investigations structures are both highly desirable. The fact that the investigations, customs and police services are scattered often hinders the success of investigations.

Although it has not been mentioned before, the overturning of the burden of proof has already been called for by a number of conventions. In my opinion, it is a shame that this factor is not mentioned more frequently, as it is particularly helpful when one must determine the source of illegal funds.

As you know, Europol is a new intergovernmental investigations organisation and, as such, does not have distinct investigative powers. Aside from supplying intelligence, our role does not go beyond technical and operational support. In November 2000, we secured the right to work on laundering in all its forms. It is because of this that I stress the importance of sharing intelligence amongst national units. This is another major challenge.

I would also like to put forth a proposal regarding the financing of terrorism, a sensitive topic, but one related to money laundering, insofar as it makes use of all sorts of techniques, some of which are legal. It might be useful to elaborate a specific file that focuses on issues that pertain specifically to terrorism.

Dominique GARABIOL

My background is in banking and I have worked at length with the administrative supervisory authorities on banks and financial markets. I have also taken an active part in helping the investigations units.

I will make three general comments. Firstly, the introductory document would be more powerful if it offered avenues for clarification. Your discussions show that there exists no clear view of the special unit that should be created to fight the money used in organised crime and terrorism. Financial crime encompasses a vast range of crimes and offences.

In order to reach consensus amongst all of the countries and players, it is important to clearly define our objective. In my view, national parliaments could be instrumental in this.

Theme 1 raises the crucial question of professional secrecy. Often times, political and administrative authorities are unaware that professional secrecy can be invoked in the very professions involved. This is known as "shared professional secrecy". It is a very important concept because, although we have developed very ambitious watch systems, these become powerless as soon as a criminal makes use of several banks, as these cannot—at least in theory—communicate with one another. It would therefore appear that it is necessary to recognise shared professional secrecy with in the European Union. This would make it possible for bankers and lawyers to exchange information, as co-users. The barriers that exist today do not allow that and considerably weaken watch mechanisms.

Lastly, I would like to discuss the issue of resources in investigations. I consider all of the factors mentioned in Theme 3 as relating to crimes or offences. We cannot underestimate the importance of giving sufficient resources to investigations units. Studies have shown that the vast majority of money laundering cases that lead to convictions are the result of criminal investigations. Surveillance mechanisms rarely provide instrumental information. Against this background, I would like to refer back to the Palermo Convention, which was signed last December, and which contains a set of very important and useful factors. If the Palermo Convention were transposed into the legislation of as many countries as necessary for it to be enforced, it would make for a crucial leap ahead in quality in the fight against the money used in terrorism and organised crime.

Jean de MAILLARD

I would like to make a few general observations, based on the comments of the various speakers.

We see that the problems related to terrorism place constraints on us as we try to define money laundering. Certain acts, seemingly, cannot be identified with organised crime. We must not react by forcing certain recently identified problems into a definition that was not originally designed with them in mind. The countries that make up the European Union have comparable, if not similar, definitions of money laundering. Terrorism raises a direct challenge to the workings of the economic and financial systems. The financing of terrorism can occur through events entirely different from classic money laundering, yet be just as great a threat to the economic and financial system. It is important to remember this when making any attempt to improve the situation. If we do not work toward introducing rules of good governance into the economic and financial systems, we will never do any better—and yet, we must do better, rather than doing more.

Given this objective, it is essential implement better surveillance of persons and capital flows. Harlem Desir rightfully raised the problem of clearinghouses and, more specifically, the Clearstream case, presently being heard in Luxembourg. The facts demonstrate that the lack of surveillance over the economic and financial markets is to blame. In my opinion, if we introduce rules of good governance under European supervision, the economic and financial players will be forced to co-operate—far more than they do presently—with the authorities and, in particular, toward the prevention and repression of money laundering transactions. The Swiss system of self-regulation, which gave rise to great hope, is proof that good legislation alone is not enough. Without political will to guide it, the system reached its limits. Thus, legislative improvements must be followed by the implementation of resources. The overturning of the burden of proof, which Gilles Leclair mentioned, will only be possible if special incriminations, similar to those that exist in the United Kingdom, are adopted. There, bankers must report instances where they do not obey prudential rules. Today, it is unacceptable that a banker should say he does not know how criminal organisations or terrorists perform money laundering.

Regarding the European Public Prosecutor, I see two types of reasoning. The first pertains to the first pillar, while the second is related to the third pillar. In other words, there is a Community-based approach and an intergovernmental approach. Pro-Eurojust is based on the principle of intergovernmental co-operation in investigations. It is a worthy creation, but is not enough alone, when we know that major fraud cases involve several Member States. That is why I believe it is essential to establish a European Public Prosecutor. It will not be a repeat of existing structures. That being said, its sphere of duty remains to be defined. It is my view that we should start by entrusting it with all European fraud cases, in order to test and "break in" the tool that was developed, from a technical standpoint, by the corpus juris. This shows that it is technically possible to initiate the European Public Prosecutor, without creating European jurisdictions. Therein lies one of the innovations of corpus juris. The system should already be workable.

Vincent PEILLON

I give the floor to Jean Spreutels, the only representative of an inspection agency.

Jean SPREUTELS

I am President of the Financial Information Processing Unit, which is Belgium’s financial intelligence unit. I was formerly president of the FATF and its ad hoc group on non-cooperative countries and territories. I am also the current head of the Belgian Delegation within the FATF.

We can only express joy at the National Assembly’s undertaking. There is a need to create a clear political impetus and send a strong political message to the various bodies, whether national or international, that must currently face the problem of money laundering.

Each of the countries in the Union has a financial intelligence unit. This is, in part, the result of the framework decision adopted on 16 October 2000, under the French Presidency, a text that lays down the foundations of the fight against money laundering. On 12 October last, the 15 financial intelligence units met in Brussels, following the events of 11 September, with the aim of further improving our co-operation in the fight against terrorism. Some of my proposals today come from the work carried out during that meeting. If you wish, I can supply you with the official event report.

I, too, believe that we need to move beyond the theoretical distinction that exists between the financing of terrorism and money laundering that results from terror-related crimes. This distinction has become moot, not only because of recent events, but also through the international devices created by the United Nations, the FATF and the European Union. I might add that the FATF’s recommendations suggest that States should not only make the financing of terrorism a criminal act, but also include that crime amongst the offences that constitute money laundering. The link between the two acts has thus been clearly established. I would also add that, on a practical note and to show the effectiveness of the anti-laundering unit in the fight against terrorism, we in Belgium have sent up 24 cases involving terrorism or its financing, since 11 September. Therefore, I do not share in the pessimism shown by some speakers regarding the effectiveness of these devices, especially as Belgium has also recorded some 400 convictions based only on reports of suspicious activity, received by financial institutions. According to investigations units, it would appear that 90% of laundering investigations are spawned by reports of suspicious activity. This shows that we must take a complementary approach.

If you wish, I can send you a document presenting a number of solutions that I will now describe quickly.

In the Preamble, we might specify that we are mainly interested in money laundering of criminal origin, as well as by high economic and financial crime.

Secondly, if we must mention investigators and repressive authorities, we should also broaden the issue to include the authorities responsible for preventing these occurrences. As we have established, the fight includes prevention, on the one hand, and repression, on the other. It is thus appropriate that they should both be mentioned.

Insofar as the Financial Action Group is mentioned, the Preamble might also touch upon Group Egmont, which set the foundations of operational co-operation between the world’s financial intelligence units.

In my view, a few additional elements could be added to the ideas on Theme I. In particular, each country could create a central registry of all bank accounts and account holders, as France does already. Germany and The Netherlands are already looking into this solution.

We could also set limits on cash payments above a certain amount. Here too, some Member States have already done so. The idea seems all the more appropriate in that we are soon going to have to transpose the new European Directive regarding merchants of high-value goods, to cover all cash payments of more than EUR 15 000. In my opinion, it will be difficult to oversee all of this professions’ transactions; it would perhaps be easier to prohibit cash payments of more than EUR 15 000.

Financial intelligence units might also be given direct access to the information held by financial institutions. This already occurs in France and Belgium. Some of my colleagues have told me of difficulties that they encounter for lack of such information. It would also be appropriate to establish sanctions, in particular administrative, against financial institutions that do not fulfil their duties in this area.

Lastly, we are increasingly concerned about the usage of the Internet for international payments. We might consider obliging access providers to identify parties carrying out financial transactions.

Moving on to Theme 2, in addition to the counter-measures listed, we might suggest stricter requirements regarding the identification of economic beneficiaries by financial establishments, before entering relations with individuals or companies based in non-cooperative territories. This counter-measure has already been suggested by the FATF.

As Alan-Bruce Beverly stated, we must avoid overloading financial intelligence units with useless information. In order to achieve this, we might strengthen reporting mechanisms and, possibly, call for systematic reporting at a later time. This would leave local authorities some margin in the implementation of the requirement.

Regarding Theme 3, Bernard Angels was right to call OLAF to our attention. From a more general standpoint, we might also broaden our scope to include administrative co-operation. In order to be effective, we must improve judiciary, investigative and administrative co-operation. This would help us call attention to the importance of overturning or modifying the burden of proof.

Themes 1 and 4 have a number of points in common. We should therefore plan on fleshing them out. In addition, I wonder how we would structure prudential supervision of certain activities, such as clearinghouses, at the international level. This might be a long-term objective, but we would have to be careful not to use our long-term initiative as an alibi for not taking action in the short term. In the short term, I feel that we must ensure that these bodies are monitored by the national authority concerned. Where supervisory authority does exist, it will need to be strengthened. For instance, Euroclear is registered as a financial institution in Belgium, making it possible for both the Financial and Banking Committee and the Financial Information Processing Unit to monitor it, through effective co-operation.

Before looking to create new means at the European level, I feel we should work to improve what already exists.

Vincent PEILLON

For our final speaker, before I summarise the day’s comments, I call upon Jean-François Thony.

Jean-François THONY

After such very fruitful discussion, I will simply make three general comments.

Firstly, without wanting to get into a long discussion on semantics, I must say that, in my opinion, the word "laundering" is being used improperly. The fight against laundering is a means in the fight against the money resulting from organised crime. Now, based on these discussions, it would appear that the means has become the end. For that reason, I would suggest that we banish the word "laundering" from our vocabulary and replace it with the expression "crime’s financial networks". The fight against the financing of terrorism would thus naturally fall under the scope of our discussions.

My second point pertains to the issue of sanctions against rogue states. While I agree that we should enforce sanctions against countries that overtly violate the moral rules that govern financial transactions, I am against the idea that a group of countries that has not been mandated by the international community should draw up the list of those rogue states. Those that draw up the list will have no problem accepting the principle, but those who are not on the list will have trouble accepting the judgement of an authority whose legitimacy has not been recognised. I respect the excellent work carried out by the FATF, but we all now that political factors often prevail over technical factors in the drawing up of such lists. The existing list of non-cooperative countries, for instance, does not exactly match the map of money laundering countries. I am therefore hesitant on this topic. I believe that the declaration should call for the elaboration of a list according to objective principles, something that will be particularly complex to achieve.

In closing, I note that there is no single text at the international level that binds all of our investigative means under a single corpus juris, aside from the European Council’s Strasbourg Convention. A protocol proposal has been issued to update the convention and might provide an opportunity to request a true convention on the prevention and repression of laundering.

Vincent PEILLON

I would like to lay emphasis on the objective that we set for ourselves. This action on the part of national Parliaments is of great political importance, as we were reminded by our European colleagues who have worked on international conventions within the European framework or that of the United Nations.

We all know that there are difficulties in the transposition of existing texts. This is true in matters of money laundering, as in matters of terrorism. We know, for instance, that measures had been taken to freeze and confiscate Osama Bin Laden’s assets before September 2001, but that these were not implemented.

Clearly, our text should include references to these necessary transpositions. We must also realise that, in a world run by intergovernmental and European bodies, our national parliaments still have a decisive role to play. The fact that these parliaments are taking hold of the problems created by laundering carries a strong political meaning.

We must strike a balance so that this declaration can be adopted by the Parliaments, whatever their political tendencies. This implies that our text, in order to be aggressive, must not be a mere administrative circular. It must symbolise the political commitment of our national parliaments and must thus stand the middle ground between a declaration of principle and a list of feasible, precise measures to be implemented.

Despite the hesitation that we heard today, I feel that terrorism should be part of our text, provided that we be more specific and that we describe its connection with criminal activity.

The issue of the European Public Prosecutor was raised on many occasions. Yet I do not think it should be given too much importance. In order to be efficient, we should probably withdraw this recommendation which, though a compelling one, is too vague for many of you.

In contrast, we will have to be far more precise regarding the nature of incriminations in this field and on their harmonisation within national law. We will need to make propositions on this issue.

Based on your comments, we will be able to add a number of ideas to our proposition. We will send them to you very shortly, with the aim of revising the text as quickly as possible. For instance, we will incorporate the idea of developing a registry of bank accounts, something that already exists in many of the Union’s countries and has proved itself useful, as well as a mechanism that will make it possible to restructure the burden of proof.

On behalf of the President of the National Assembly, Mr Raymond Forni, who will join us in the course of our work, I would like to suggest that we adopt the most transparent method possible. Hence, our discussions will be transcribed and that transcription will be distributed quickly, in particular to those of our colleagues who were not able to be present today. In addition, based on the proposals and reserves heard today, we will try to prepare a second version of the document shortly, so that you can discuss it in your respective parliaments.

In closing, let me offer my sincere thanks for your presence. We stand at the beginning, rather than at the end, of a process and hope that, by our next meeting, in January, we will have the opportunity to correspond with you, in writing.

The session ends at 5:10 PM.

 

 

III- Blueprint for the final declaration

Version including the comments of the steering committee of December 3 2001

PREAMBLE

Criminal money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets ; they represent a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism uses very different systems and some of these use the legal economy, although it also resorts to the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global coordinated mobilisation of States, crime prevention and law enforcement services and authorities will never be able to act as efficiently and as quickly as those they pursue.

From October 1 1996, during the Geneva appeal, European magistrates questioned political decision-makers about this acknowledgement of powerlessness.

In the fight against money laundering and the use of the financial system by criminal networks, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault.

The persistence of legal mechanisms which lead to the impenetrableness of financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, a certain form of leniency vis-à-vis many non-cooperative countries and territories which come under the sphere of influence of European Union Member States can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has however not been inactive since it has updated the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling non-cooperative countries and territories, and loopholes in the systems of cooperative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the cooperation of European Union Member States.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and adopted a series of concrete proposals in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

 

 

Subject n° 1 : The transparency of capital movements

An efficient fight against money laundering and financial crime means being able to reconstruct the history of capital movements. The traceability of transactions and order makers is therefore a priority objective, but it comes up against several obstacles, including :

The impenetrableness of certain legal entities (trusts, institutions, foundations and limited partnerships) ;

Objection to investigators with regard to different professional secrets including banking secrecy ;

The existence of international financial services (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers) which do not always enable the order maker to be identified.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of transactions carried out using trust or assimilated funds whenever it is impossible to identify the beneficial owner.

Control the form of trusts (standardised documents and ban of suspect clauses).

Provide for the obligation to register trusts in a central register in addition to the identification of the beneficiaries.

Harmonise professional secret release procedures

Generalise access to information held by financial agencies for financial intelligence units.

Create a central bank account register.

Standardise the order maker’s identification in international financial messages (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Provide for the identification of financial transaction originators on the Internet by access providers.

 

Subject n° 2 : Sanctions against non-cooperative countries and territories

The identification of non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering falls within the scope of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) whose 40 recommendations are the international reference standard. This process must guarantee objective assessment.

Determining and applying sanctions depends on the States. A coordinated action by the European Union in this field can only increase the efficiency of these sanctions.

Proposals :

Strengthen the obligations of financial agencies to identify beneficial owner before establishing relations with individuals or entities in these countries and territories.

Strengthen reporting mechanisms or provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of financial transactions with these countries and territories.

Strengthen the prudential ratios applicable to financial transactions carried out with these countries and territories.

Impose conditions on, restrict, overtax or ban transactions with individuals or entities located in these countries and territories.

Ban European Union member country institutions from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in these territories or from holding dealers’ accounts there.

Ban financial institutions whose head office is located in one of these countries or territories from opening subsidiaries, branches or representatives offices in the European Union.

 

Subject n° 3 : Legal, police and administrative cooperation

The fight against money laundering and financial crime necessarily involves legal, police and administrative cooperation due to the systematic globalisation of this type of crime.

Money laundering depends on cross-border economic and financial deals.

European magistrates questioned policy-makers on the obstacles encountered in cooperation from October 1 1996 during the Geneva Appeal.

The Egmont group has laid the foundations for operational cooperation between financial intelligence units and the setting up of the European Anti-Fraud Office is an initial community response. Nevertheless, police and legal cooperation lags behind somewhat.

Several international instances (UN, Council of Europe, European Union) have proposed States sign conventions aimed at improving this cooperation. Beyond the necessary ratifications of these texts, their application, often full of reserves, is not optimal.

The European Union has regularly endeavoured to encourage this cooperation. With this in mind, the European Council’s summit meeting in Tampere namely announced the creation of Eurojust.

This process is however still too long and must be accelerated by measures which are well-known since they have been discussed for several years.

Proposals :

Ratify, apply and strengthen the consistency of international conventions aimed at facilitating legal cooperation.

Harmonise incriminations in terms of financial crime.

Establish provisions for the sharing of the burden of proof on the criminal origin of money.

Harmonise criminal sanctions namely by favouring the confiscation of revenue from crime and the instrument of money laundering.

Mutually recognise decisions to freeze, seize and confiscate illicit assets.

Provide for a mechanism for sharing between States credits confiscated as a result of international cooperation.

Introduce financial crimes including laundering on the list of offences at the basis of the European warrant for arrest.

Institute a European public prosecutor’s office which initially has jurisdiction over community fraud and for offences which fall within the scope of the European warrant for arrest.

 

Subject n° 4 : Prudential rules

The world deregulation of capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering and financial crime, namely due to the acceleration and the growth in international financial flows that is has generated. The sophistication of techniques and trades which has accompanied financial globalisation needs the reinforcement of capital-adequacy standards and ethical obligations of markets.

This widening of controls and financial regulations should include all providers of financial and legal services, and also international networks, whether traditional and informal (‘‘Hawala’’ type) or, on the contrary, very well integrated in the international capital markets (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Propositions :

Restrict cash payments beyond a given amount.

Provide for the compulsory licensing by the financial services regulatory authority of:

Agents belonging to a cash or security transfer network, including traditional, informal and parallel networks;

Company formation agents.

Foreign exchange offices.

Strengthen prudential rules and, as necessary on an international level, the regulation of the activities of clearing companies, and fund and security payment-delivery companies.

Match the breach of their obligations to supervise the professions subject to them with criminal sanctions.

 

 

 

Steering Committee

Monday 14 JANUARY 2002

 

 

 

I – Minutes of the Steering Committee

Monday, 14 January 2002

List of Participants:

Parliaments Represented

Germany

Dr Hans-Peter UHL, Parliamentarian, accompanied by Mr Andreas NOTHELLE, Civil Servant

Bundesrat

Dr Marcus WENIG, Brandenburg Representative in Brussels

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives

Mr Hugo COVELIERS, President of the Flemish Liberal Group (VLD)

Senate

Mr T. DEWAELE, Civil Servant

Spain

Congress of Deputies

Mrs Soledad BECERRIL, Vice President of Congress

Senate

Mr Alfredo PRADA PRESA, First Vice President of the Senate, accompanied by José-Manuel BRETAL VASQUEZ, Legal Advisor

France

National Assembly

Mr Vincent PEILLON, President of the Investigation Committee on Obstacles to the Control and Repression of Financial Crimes and Money Laundering in Europe

Senate

Mr Bernard ANGELS, Senate Vice President, accompanied by Mr Christian OUDIN, Civil Servant

Greece

Hellenic Parliament

Mrs Maria ARSENIS, Deputy, and Mrs Eleni CONSTANTINIDOU, Civil Servant

Italy

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Donato BRUNO, President of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, accompanied by Mr Rodolfo CILLOCO and Mr Fabrizio CASTALDI, Civil Servants

Senate

Mr Roberto CENTARO, Senator, accompanied by Mr Sebastiano CARDI, Diplomatic Counsel to the President of the Senate and Mrs Laura BOEZIO, Civil Servant

Luxembourg

Mr Laurent MOSAR, Deputy

United Kingdom

Chamber of Commons

Mr John McFALL, Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee, accompanied by Dr Christopher WARD, Administrator

Other Experts

Mr Olivier de BAYNAST, Magistrate Representing France at Pro-Eurojust

Mr Paolo BERNASCONI, University Professor, Lawyer

Mr Harlem DESIR, Author of a Report on the European Parliament

Mr Dominique GARABIOL, Former Head of Inspection, Council on Financial Markets

Mr Gilles LECLAIR, Deputy Director, Europol

Mr Jean de MAILLARD, Magistrate, High Civil Court, Blois

Mr Jean SPREUTELS, President of the Financial Information Processing Unit (Belgium)

Mr Jean-François THONY, Counsel, Appellate Court, Versailles

Observers from Candidate Countries and Russia

Bulgaria

Mr Nicolay TRIFONOV, First Secretary

Estonia

Mrs Gita KALMET, Chargée d’affaires

Hungary

Mr Jozsef OROSZ, Counsellor

Latvia

Mrs Agnija RASA, First Secretary

Lithuania

Mrs Ramune PETRAUSKAITE, Second Secretary

Malta

Pr Salvino BUSUTTIL, Ambassador

Poland

Mr Slawomir CZARLEWSKI, Plenipotentiary Minister

Czech Republic

Mr Bremslav KALUSEK, Counsellor (Trade and Economic Affairs)

Russia

Mr Nicolas BROUSNIKINE, Deputy, accompanied by Mr GRICHANKOV, Deputy, Mr Wladimir MATCHABELLI, sofarus, and Mr Vladimir OUSTINOV, Civil Servant

Slovakia

Mr Stanislav VALLO, Chargé d’affaires

Slovenia

Mrs Darja GOLEZ, First Secretary

Turkey

Mrs Ayse SEZGIN, Counsellor, accompanied by Mrs Sebnem CENK, First Secretary

Observers from Union States

Austria

Mr Bernhardt FAUSTENHAMMER, Second Secretary

Belgium

Mr Bart OUVRY, Minister Counsellor

Luxembourg

Mr Jérôme HAMILIUS, First Secretary

The Netherlands

Mrs Alida VAN EE, Financial Advisor

Other Observers

Mr Michel BEAUSSIER, Lawyer

Mr Laurent ETTORI, Bank Commission

Mr Bertrand de MAZIERES, Secretary General, Council on Financial Markets

Mr David PEYRON, Head of the Financial Section, Paris Public Prosecutor’s Office

 

The session opens at 2:45 PM, and is chaired by Mr Vincent PEILLON.

Vincent PEILLON

I would first like to provide a few indications regarding the elaboration of this declaration, which we hope to be able to adopt on February 8th next. The Steering Committee has already met once, on December 3rd last, examining a text that we had sent out in a relatively short time prior to the meeting. At that session, we called for comments from the various parliamentary delegations and experts present in a systematic manner. The text that you have before you today includes those corrections, which are highlighted so that you can all see them clearly. Today, we will go through the text a second time.

It is my pleasure to welcome delegations that were not able to present on December 3rd: the German Bundestag, the British Chamber of Commons and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies. Likewise, some of the experts present are attending for the first time. Lastly, a number of countries requesting membership in the European Union are represented, not to take a direct part in the work, but to observe. The Russian Duma will also be present as an observer up until the completion of our project, on February 8th.

We aim to reach a conclusion during the February 7-8 session. The adoption of the declaration is expected to take place, with as many countries represented as possible, on the morning of the 8th. Raymond Forni, Chairman of the French National Assembly, will host the event. On the 7th, we have planned a final working session, which is to last the entire day. Since we have worked in the most confidential of settings until now, we would also like to take advantage of that day to carry out "educational" activities. Even though we will definitely still have adjustments to make, we would like the day to be open to representatives of civil society who are interested in these issues, as well as to the national and international press. In the next few days, the members of the Steering Committee will be invited to take part in Round Tables that cover the Declaration’s four topics, and which will provide an opportunity to continue with our discussions in a more informal setting.

Obviously, our ability to publicly explain our choices on that day will be crucial for the credibility of our undertaking. It is clear to us how much the fight against financial crime, trans-national crime and money laundering has become a concern for numerous international bodies, to which the countries represented today belong. We can also see that, very frequently, national parliaments are less involved in these international issues than civil servants or representatives from executive branches, who meet at European Council sessions, G7 meetings or OECD events. Insofar as the sovereignties are still dependent on their national parliaments, it is important to show that we do not lag behind and that we share their aims. It is for this reason that Chairman Forni lends great importance to the conclusions that we will adopt.

We are present in greater numbers today than the last time. I suggest that, as a measure of courtesy, we first give the floor to the parliamentary delegations that were not present at the last Steering Committee meeting, so that they can publicly express their positions. Following that, all those who wish may request the floor.

I will now list the main modifications made to the text following the December 3rd meeting.

In the Preamble to the Declaration, several delegations, and in particular the Spanish delegation, had requested that we provide a clearer explanation of the link between the problem of money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. We did so by emphasising that the many instruments that foster money laundering and the financing of terrorism are often the same, all the while making a distinction between the two phenomena. In short, we laid emphasis both on our shared concern, and on the differences that separate the mechanisms involved.

On the first topic, which pertains to the transparency of capital movements, we added a condition to the requirement that all transactions carried out in fiduciary money be reported, specifying that the reporting will not be mandatory if it is impossible to identify the customer. As the objective described seemed too vague, we added three proposals: firstly, the opening of information held by financial institutions to financial intelligence units, which is called for in anti-laundering laws, but which often raises problems; secondly, the creation of a central bank account register; and thirdly, the identification, by access providers, of parties who carry out financial transactions via Internet. These additions have been highlighted in the text, but we did not indicate which delegations requested them.

The second topic deals, in particular, with sanctions against non-cooperating territories. We have widened the range of sanctions to include such measures as the reinforcement of requirements regarding the identification of the customer, surtaxes on transactions with such territories, or prohibiting entities whose headquarters are based in these territories from establishing themselves inside the European Union.

As regards the third topic, that of investigative and judiciary co-operation, we have integrated co-operation at the administrative level, something that was sorely absent from our discussions and which is obviously a vital form of co-operation. We stressed the need to reinforce the consistency of international conventions on judiciary co-operation, which have become more and more frequent in recent times. Lastly, using Italy as an example, we suggested that the burden of proof be modified where the criminal origin of capital is concerned, but did not go so far as to bring up crime by association with a criminal organisation, a topic on which many a discussion focused. We also added harmonisation of crime definitions, along with the introduction of a mechanism by which confiscated goods could be shared following international co-operation on cases. We had discussed the topic of a European public prosecutor, and many of you, often for opposing reasons, regretted that it was so vaguely and briefly described in the text. Seeing no need to overrun Eurojust’s territory, we wanted the European public prosecutor to be in charge, initially, of issues relating to fraud within the Community, in particular on intra-Community VAT, and issues that are already covered by the European warrant for arrest, such as financial crime.

Regarding the fourth topic, that of prudential laws, we introduced the idea of penalising parties that are subject to the laws, but fail to report suspicious activities. This clause exists in other European countries, but not in France, to name one country. There is currently lively debate on this topic in France, as a number of top bank executives have been placed under investigation for money laundering, to which they respond that the crime was not intended.

It is never easy to incorporate ideas suggested on a previous occasion, all the while maintaining the overall equilibrium of the text, along with the sometimes conflicting ideas expressed by various representatives. I suggest that we open the debate using the new text as a foundation, either to bring up certain points that you feel were not given sufficient attention, or to add new proposals.

Hans-Peter UHL

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak. I will limit my contribution to a few remarks, which, according to our experts on money laundering, are important. Regarding the first topic, the first proposal suggests that all transactions carried out with fiduciary money be declared to financial intelligence units, unless it is impossible to identify the customer. The clause limiting the requirement to declare all transactions does not seem realistic to our experts, who feel that it would be preferable to eliminate it. The requirement should be absolute, and not be waived when it is impossible to identify the customer.

As regards judiciary, investigative and administrative co-operation, the key is to determine to which unit suspicious activities should be declared. In general, such declarations are not filed with police stations. The first warnings come from banking institutions. In other words, investigative forces are entirely dependent on information provided by these establishments, insofar as it cannot institute proceedings until the banks have sent out a warning. Normally, investigative forces should have access to information that allows it to address banking institutions directly. Does our judiciary and investigative co-operation lag behind our administrative co-operation? In Germany, we feel that it is very important to avoid any such delay. The problem would be more likely to come from the financial intelligence units. Our experts emphasised this.

In the fourth topic, the Declaration mentions the desire to prohibit cash payments beyond a certain amount. From an intelligence standpoint, the idea is obviously a desirable one, but according to our experts, it is not realistic. It is not possible to implement such a limit. Moreover, the amount has not even been defined. The enforcement of the law would be arduous and the sanctions are difficult to imagine. We feel that it would be preferable to drop this measure, which could not be implemented anyway.

In the German system, the modification of the burden of proof would go against the presumption of innocence, one of the fundamental rules in our constitution. This modification, which would be beneficial, calls for the utmost care, and could be difficult to implement in Germany, with regard to our constitution. Speaking of which, the translation is not quite clear. The English version refers to sharing the burden of proof, while the French version refers to a modification. Is the aim to overturn the burden of proof?

Vincent PEILLON

Some of your comments deal with matters of principle, in particular the last one, regarding the reversal of the burden of proof, which raises the problem of protecting individual liberties. Some other comments were more related to practical aspects, such as cash payment. We are familiar with your traditions. It is true that it is easier to limit payments in other countries, as is already being done. We will obviously take all of your comments into account.

John McFALL

The United Kingdom Parliament sincerely welcomes the initiative taken by Mr Forni. We wish to play a full part. Concerning the first issue, the transparency of capital movements, we feel that creating a central register of bank accounts could impose huge costs on both private and public sectors. In the United Kingdom, the debate has indicated that such a measure may not deliver any real benefits. In this instance, the means justifies the end. We feel that the system providing investigators with tools to access information on bank accounts functions satisfactorily. Indeed, we hope to introduce this targeted system in United Kingdom. From my position as chairman of the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee and from talking to the banks in United Kingdom, I know that there is a high degree of co-operation between the banks and investigative forces. This co-operation has been particularly noticeable since September 11th. In the past, the United Kingdom has resisted creating a central bank account register on the basis that it could be unjustified by insufficient benefits.

The second issue concerns legal, administrative and investigative co-operation. In this regard, we note the recommendation for the establishment of a European public prosecutor. However, this recommendation was rejected by the member-states at the last inter-governmental conference. We feel the differences between the common law system in United Kingdom and the various law systems in France and elsewhere suggest that we remain to be convinced before making any movement. On the issue of trusts, the relevant law in the United Kingdom represents a very complicated system. We feel that the solution is not to abolish trusts, which some feel could be a consequence of the proposal. Instead, we need to ensure transparency by means of empowering investigators to overcome any obstacles in an individual investigation. Such a solution should provide investigative forces and others with the tools to pierce through any veils of confidentiality created in a trust relationship. As trust law underpins all United Kingdom property law, rather than the fundamental approach that is being suggested, we prefer the idea of empowering the investigators.

Another aspect is the information wired transfers. Obviously, we wish to conform to the Financial Action Task Force’s special terrorist financing recommendation number 8. However, we feel that the European Union needs to work in co-operation with other partners to ensure that a global front is agreed. Such an agreement would ensure that the European Union systems themselves are compatible with those elsewhere. Concerning the prudential laws for security transfer networks, the United Kingdom has introduced a registration for money services and businesses. Again, we feel that a registration process could result in disproportionate constraints and minimum benefits. I would commend the registration path that we have taken. Obviously, there would be significant consequences in restricting cash payments over a certain amount. For example, it would prevent legal tender from being used to settle debts. There may be a case for requiring some controls where large cash payments are made, especially concerning the identification of the customer and the obligation to report transactions suspected of being linked to money laundering. From my conversations with bank chief executives and chairmen, I know that they are very encouraged by the government and the financial services agencies in United Kingdom, who aim to ensure the utmost attention to this particular aspect.

In closing, we can say that a number of the proposals need precision before we can assess their implications. In this regard, I draw your attention to the reference to generalising access to information held by financial agencies for financial intelligence units. It has been suggested to me that this could undermine the principle of the court oversight, when investigative forces require financial institutions to produce confidential information. There is a series of implications for several liberties. Following September 11th, the government and Home Office have introduced anti-terrorist legislation, which was criticised on the basis that several liberties were being undermined. For example, the detention of suspects and the possible identification of the suspects could conflict with Habeas Corpus. The government had forced a passage on that issue. The repercussions on several liberties have to be considered by this Committee and the individual parliaments. The accomplishments to date have underlined the need for a European weight basis to take us forward. Above all, we must ensure a global approach on this issue. Money laundering is a global network that does not recognise borders. To act decisively, our ultimate objective should be on a global level.

Vincent PEILLON

Of course, our concerns necessarily go beyond the borders of the European Union. We all understand that money-laundering problems do not stop at our borders. However, we also know that we will be in a better position to bring the rest of the world along with us if we are able to take consistent, unanimous and determined stances as a group. We are well aware that we will not emerge from the depths and into the light in a single bound. Your concern is shared by all of us, as well as by public opinion. We must achieve that delicate balance between our desire to move ahead in the establishment of international public order and the need to respect individual liberties, all the while remaining respectful of our traditions and sovereignties. Following the September 11 attacks, the measures taken by each of our countries with regard to terrorism, whether on the financial aspect or on security, gave rise to discussion and made it necessary to debate over the protection of individual liberties. Let us keep in mind that the protection of individual liberties should not prevent us from admitting, even where terrorism and its financial channels are concerned, that we may not always have done as much as possible. Even when the United Nations recommended certain actions in its resolutions, we did not always scurry to incorporate them into our national law. It is therefore important that we have the will to go beyond what we have done up until now; I believe that this text provides us with the matter needed to do so.

Laurent MOSAR

I would like to thank you for having invited me to this conference and for taking the initiative to instate a conference of European Union parliaments against money laundering. Given that the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies was unfortunately unable to attend the first meeting, it is difficult for me to give a detailed opinion on all of the points made in the draft declaration. I will have to discuss it with the Luxembourg Parliament’s Legal Committee beforehand.

My English colleagues have already stressed an important point in the Preamble. I feel it is important that this policy on the fight against money laundering be extended to all OECD countries. There is no reason to limit it to the European Union or to its candidate countries. I would like the Preamble to stipulate that all of the measures proposed will have to be adapted to all OECD countries. If we do not make this extension, the fight will be very difficult. I would also like to raise the issue of territories belonging to certain countries, as exemplified in the various British Isles. Will the measures also apply to these territories?

Secondly, it seems to me that a great number of highly effective measures have been included in the text. However, some of them are difficult to implement. More importantly, whatever the case, they seem to be in contradiction with the Community’s measures on free movement of goods and services. Perhaps we will have an opportunity to come back to this topic later. Thirdly, some of the measures appear to be in contradiction with the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights. It will therefore be necessary to look at these various aspects, as we would be doing poor parliamentary work if we adopted measures that were not respectful of human rights.

Vincent PEILLON

I would like us to be able to debate the measures you mentioned soon, possibly in writing, in order to determine which ones should be kept and which should be withdrawn. The timetable we have chosen is such that we need to move quickly. The February 7 session will be an open work session and we do not want the public to see too much disagreement between us. All of the work on the basic text should be completed before we begin the educational component of our project, and open it up to the outside world. Therefore, do not hesitate to come back to us on any specifically identified proposals that might bring about problems in principle.

Alfredo PRADA PRESA

The Spanish delegation regrets the fact that the Spanish language is not being used during this working session; we hope that it will be included at the upcoming meeting in February. Spain has just taken over the presidency of the European Council. The main priority established by President Aznar is the fight against terrorism. It is a scourge that can affect any country, as we saw with the painful events of September 11. In order to be effective, the fight against terrorism requires that a single judiciary environment be established, in which, while respecting fundamental rights and liberties, the co-operation between judiciary, investigative and administrative systems are provided with the appropriate tools to fight criminality, whatever form it takes on, be it terrorism or money laundering.

The principle of the European warrant for arrest was eliminated from the declaration that we were presented, due to the ongoing negotiations. Spain hopes that this warrant will be adopted because it is a very effective tool. We must not let this opportunity to engage in debate over the European warrant for arrest, which, thanks to its breadth and characteristics, is expected to make it possible to go beyond the limits of the venerable extradition process and establish an appropriate legal procedure for fighting against global crime. In our view, it would be fitting to work toward a memorandum of understanding between Member States on the warrant for arrest, as it is a fundamental tool in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. For this reason, we request that the following sentences be added, to strengthen the Preamble: "It is therefore fitting to fight terrorism and money laundering using the most effective tools, in order to deal with organised crime and its financial mechanisms. This implies the full adoption and proper enforcement of the European warrant for arrest in the near future."

Roberto CENTARO

The Italian delegation is pleased to see that the number of participants in this conference has grown, to include not only additional countries from the European Union, but also other countries that wish to become a part of the Union, or who are interested in the discussions, as is the case with Russia. I share a great number of the new ideas in the text.

Regarding the Preamble, I share in the comments made by the Spanish delegate on the reinforcement of the fight against terrorism and the creation of a Community-wide judiciary system that is given access to effective means. This point will be more and more important in the future, in particular where the European warrant for arrest is concerned. We must use effective means in the fight against terrorism in order to foster stability within European boundaries. In the third paragraph, the term "mobilisation" calls forth images of armies and unions. The term "action" seems more appropriate to States and governments. In the fifth paragraph, I would refer to the insufficiency of the legislation, the sluggishness of system and the absence of sanctions against non-cooperative States. This can no longer be tolerated because these States benefit from the deficiencies of the legal system. Lastly, I have doubts about the investigative forces and the magistrate mentioned in the sixth paragraph. We now have a common currency and I hope that we will have a common judiciary authority.

I am in full agreement with the German delegate’s comment regarding the first theme. All fiduciary transactions should be reported without exception, regardless of whether the recipient of the funds can be identified. There is no need for that condition, as it is always possible to identify the customer. I believe it would be preferable to require reporting under all circumstances and whatever the conditions. The central register of bank accounts will be difficult to establish, but it will most certainly facilitate access to accounts. The identification of the accountholder is not always reliable, as it is possible for people to lend their identity. I am not against this measure, but I do have doubts as to its effectiveness.

Regarding the second topic, the new terms are well suited and helpful. However, the legislation enforced by certain countries requires full transparency when subsidiaries or offices are to be opened. This transparency must be guaranteed in all situations. The scenarios described are nonetheless of interest. On the third topic, it will be necessary to implement and reinforce investigative and judiciary co-operation, using all of the measures which that entails, so as to harmonise systems in all countries and, in particular, penal procedures. The measure on shared confiscation, however, appears difficult to implement insofar as the legislation of the various Member States must be taken into account, whether in terms of confiscation itself, or regarding the presence of goods. I do not see how we can proceed and I do not know whether such measures would be easy to apply.

The establishment of a European public prosecutor would have to take into account national legislation. In Italy, for example, the public prosecutor is totally independent from the Executive branch and is, by no means, subject to inspection, whether direct or indirect. This is not true in other countries. For the time being, a European public prosecutor would be inefficient and premature. There is no use in creating it as long as the systems used by the Member States are so different from one another. As a first step, we might broaden Eurojust’s jurisdiction by putting it in charge of co-ordination of Community-wide action. This body could ease the exchange of information between the investigative forces of different States. That is one of the first measures we can take to reinforce the fight against terrorism. We must not give the impression that we are building up our institutions by implementing tools that are difficult to use. We must first do whatever is possible to strengthen co-operation between investigative and judiciary forces, and identify the most effective tools.

Lastly, we should include one point in the Preamble. It is important that we foster co-operation and harmonise judiciary methods. This could be the first step in reinforcing the judiciary system—an initial clause that would guarantee that the declaration would be adopted and implemented. It is important that the provisions included in the text be concretely implemented.

Vincent PEILLON

We knew that this debate on the European public prosecutor would come up. I am not surprised to see that the pragmatic and limited approach we took has raised problems. However, that is not the most important factor. We must be flexible. I am more surprised to hear your comments on the central registry of bank accounts, something that already exists in several countries. That kind of tool fully guarantees individual liberties. Some judges and investigators can have access to it for specific investigations. It is an extraordinary tool in the fight against terrorism, financial crime and money laundering. Each of our countries’ judges, if given access to such a tool, would save a considerable amount of time, in a field where speed is often the decisive factor. I understand the issues you raise in principle about the European public prosecutor. I also understand your doubts about cash payments. However, we need to come back to this topic because, as the FATF has maintained for years, they have a strong influence.

Thierry DEWAELE

The Senate’s Commission on the Monitoring of Organised Crime studied the draft on January 8 last. It supports the proposed text in large part, with the exception of a few minor adjustments. The Commission proposes that you specify, at the end of the first paragraph in the Preamble, that money laundering and financial crime are a direct threat not only to the stability of the economy, but also to the security of all citizens in our democratic societies. The Commission does not want the approach to be limited only to its economic dimension.

Regarding the transparency of capital flows, the Commission feels that the concept of financial crime needs to be clarified, in particular as concerns its fiscal aspects. Violations involving money laundering often combine many different aspects. The exclusion of the fiscal dimension does not have to mean draining the entire text of its content, even though we are aware that the problem is a difficult one. This clarification would make it possible to avoid adopting beautifully written texts of principle, that are totally empty where content is concerned. On page 3, the Commission proposes that you add, after "the financial opaqueness of certain legal entities", the following words: "or financial transactions (digital accounts)". The Commission feels that such accounts should be treated as the technical equivalent of fiduciary funds, as they too were designed to make identification of the customer impossible.

As concerns judiciary, investigative and administrative co-operation, the Commission proposes that the three adjectives be listed every time the text mentions co-operation. In the fourth paragraph of page 5, the text refers to various international bodies. The Commission would like to include the work carried out by the OECD in that listing. Lastly, regarding the proposal on page 6, which suggests that financial offences be included in the list of violations covered by the European warrant for arrest, the Commission feels that the 11 December 2001 agreement, relating to the European warrant makes this a moot point. The laundering of proceeds from crime is already one of the 32 major violations that do not require the agreement of both involved countries on the definition of the crime in order for extradition to take place. This point remains to be discussed.

My last comment concerns prudential laws. The Commission asks that some reference be made to the financial intermediaries active on the Internet, seeing as new technologies seem to have been left out of the text. Yet there exist a variety of mechanisms, including online casinos, which can serve as money laundering channels. The introduction of this dimension would make it possible to ensure that prudential laws also apply to intermediaries who work on the Internet.

Vincent PEILLON

I would like to specify that we are using two working languages: French and English. We are hearing other languages today, as some parliamentarians have come with their translators. Naturally, at the final session, we will use all of the Union’s working languages. We did not intend to favour certain languages; we simply stayed with what had been planned in the beginning.

Soledad BECERRIL

My Spanish colleague, Senator Prada, has suggested modifications concerning the preamble. Having restudied this important text with some Spanish MPs and experts, I would like to make some suggestions on the rest of the document.

Concerning the first subject, we suggest the inclusion of another proposal with the following content: "improvement in obtaining and sharing information on cash movements on EU external borders". As we all know, terrorists groups and organisations have shown a clear tendency to use cash in order to finance their activities. According to the presentations on terrorist financing and several international meetings, this is how they are acting today. Therefore, the more intense the controls on the financial sector, the more frequent the use of cash by these groups. In several working papers, the EU Commission has pointed out the possibility of taking action to establish common mechanisms to obtain information on cash flows through the external borders of the European Union. These reasons, among others, would suggest a need to add to this subject.

Regarding subject number two, we suggest adding the following sentence to the last two proposals: "when these countries and territories fail to timely apply the recommendation made by the Financial Action Task Force". In justifying this addition, we think the major contents in these two proposals might not be applied to those cases in which a country has been assessed as non-co-operative by the FATF but is still in the process of application of the FATF recommendation. Therefore, this measure must be applied to those countries that refuse to apply the FATF recommendation.

Regarding subject number three, we suggest adding the following sentence at the end of the first proposal: "In particular, the immediate and effective application of the provisions concerning the European order of detention would be very fruitful for this purpose." I believe this addition does not need a protracted explanation. On the same subject, proposal three poses us some doubts. We agree with the comments made by the Bundestag representative. Whether it due to the translation or the interpretation, we are not sure this paragraph is expressed in correct terms. It could sound to some people as if we were trying to overturn the burden of the proof on the criminal origin of money. As such a measure contradicts a principle of our constitution, as I am sure it does for other European parliaments, we could not accept its passage. Perhaps the paragraph is not clear enough. We are not trying to do something illegal. I would also suggest a new proposal with the following content: "Increase the exchange of information among the European financial intelligence units". The financial intelligence units are the organisations in charge of receiving and analysing information on suspected money laundering. In the fight against money laundering, it is extremely important to demand and encourage the exchange of information between these units.

Vincent PEILLON

Of course, the modification of the burden of proof does not mean reversal. The objective is not to force the accused to justify his actions when the prosecution has no proof. The prosecution must first have access to certain elements, and in particular, be able to demonstrate a connection, the nature of which varies according to the prevailing legislation, with the group of lawbreakers or the criminal organisation. If the prosecution needs to provide that proof, it may become necessary for the incriminated person to justify his way of life. Therefore, it is not necessarily up to the prosecution to show that the lifestyle of the accused has no connection with his income. The system is based on sharing and allows a certain level of results. If you wish, we can supply you with information on the legal procedures already in place, in particular in France and Italy, regarding the modification of the burden of proof.

Maria ARSENIS

We are quite satisfied with the text as formulated and we are also considering it as an important step towards the effective fight against money laundering. The mere effect of the active involvement of the parliaments of the Member States of the European Union, an initiative of the French national assembly, signals our countries’ increased interest on this matter. Moreover, it allows us to be optimistic that the necessary legislative improvements shall take place, a response that will strengthen the existing legal framework. We have no objections to subject number one and four.

Concerning the sanctions against non-co-operative countries, we repeat our position that the obligation to impose severe sanctions is absolutely necessary. However, one must ensure an objective and fair procedure of characterising a non-co-operative country. The text itself is satisfactory. Regarding subject number three, we would like to stress the importance of establishing the share of the burden of proof concerning the legality of the origin of assets. In the case of laundering, we are happy to see that the relevant proposal is in the text. We would also like to state that our country will actively participate in the intense effort needed to establish this principle within the limits allowed in our constitution and the basic principles of our legal system.

Hugo COVELIERS

We continue to discuss a number of issues on which we have diverging viewpoints, and it might be appropriate to come to a decision. We have mentioned the sharing of the burden of proof. We could accept this system, as the presumption of innocence and all of the rights of the defendant remain intact. At a certain point, when society observes that certain people or groups are committing illegal acts, for instance as a part of organised crime, or that they have high income but cannot prove its origin using legal means, it seems fitting that the suspects be asked to provide proof of how they acquired their wealth. I do not see how that goes against fundamental rights. Money laundering is a means, and in order to ferret out terrorist networks or criminals, we must attack it; on this matter, we might also ask ourselves where the border between terrorism and organised crime lies. We can fine-tune this tool, which makes it possible to fight against forms of crime that are very dangerous to democratic society.

Secondly, the European Public Prosecutor was originally intended to fight against fraud at the Community level, meaning mainly misappropriation of subsidies. Do we need to go further and add the crimes that are covered by the various penal laws, and not only by European law? Thirdly, I do not see how Eurojust can co-ordinate investigative action. I thought it was in charge of co-ordinating court actions at the European level. Let us hope that Europol will someday co-ordinate investigative action as well. You have the difficult task of choosing between proposals that are sometimes contradictory.

Vincent PEILLON

Our aim is that there be as few contradictions as possible. We want to produce a clear text, meaning a document to which we can all commit, by keeping disagreements to a minimum. Note that these are sometimes the result of mere errors in translation or comprehension. We can still make progress and we will come to decisions on certain matters when the time comes. The text that we will look over on 7 February will allow each of us to see just how far we can go, based on the progress that we will have made.

Marcus WENIG

Firstly, we feel that the European public prosecutor and Eurojust are not necessarily two distinct entities, given that the latter could very well become a European public prosecutor at a later time. This possibility could be mentioned in the text. Secondly, the international nature of money laundering makes it necessary to adopt measures that reach beyond borders. At the same time, we must each avoid making efforts within our countries that are not consistent with those of others. I therefore feel it is necessary to mention international co-operation, beyond the FATF, on the part of candidate countries to the European Union and the OECD. We should not forget OSCE, which just adopted a plan for the fight against terrorism, including a component on the fight against money laundering. Lastly, would the central register of bank accounts be European or national?

Vincent PEILLON

Central bank account registries at the national level would already be a major step forward.

Donato BRUNO

I agree with the comments regarding Eurojust. Yet you mentioned the role of the European public prosecutor "as a first step". What do you mean by that expression, exactly? Regarding the second topic, we feel it is necessary to refer to countries, rather than territories. Is the term "territory" appropriate? Should it not be defined? On the subject of sanctions against establishments in non-co-operating countries, do you mean prohibiting the founding of new companies or closing existing ones? Lastly, you mentioned mandatory penal sanctions against institutions that fail to report suspicious activities. Yet we must deal with constitutional and legal constraints, just as our British colleagues do. This topic needs to be dealt with in detail. On the 7 February meeting, it will be necessary to clearly explain the meaning of harmonisation at the legal level.

Harlem DESIR

Firstly, we must aim to broaden measures so that the fight can be as international as possible, but we must also make full use of the possibilities within the European Union. We are far from that objective now, if only because the markets and financial establishments within the Union play a considerable part in these transactions. The limits we will come up against with OECD countries must not become an excuse for not going further within the Union. We can go beyond mere governmental co-operation. We can do more to improve powers within the Community, and will thereby also strengthen inter-governmental co-operation.

Secondly, regarding the modification of the burden of proof, I would call to your attention that this is not the first proposal of this kind. You may recall the directives on the fight against discrimination, which were adopted on Commissioner Vitorino’s initiative in 2000. They stated that, where a number of agreeing factors indicate that discrimination has occurred in hiring procedures, for instance, it is up to the accused to demonstrate that the factors behind his decision were legal. There exist cases involving sudden increases in income or capital movements. The mere fact that these have not been justified is suspicious in itself. The establishment or person implicated must show that the movement could not have been suspected and that his trust was violated. Likewise, an establishment must be able to prove that the funds did not result from fraud.

Thirdly, I already set forth a concrete proposal regarding supervision within the Union. The revision of the directive on money laundering, following a decision on the part of the Parliament and the Council on 4 December 2001, makes improvement possible. However, we will once again be hindered by the fact that the Commission’s only prerogative is to ensure that the Directive is incorporated into national law. Inspections on the implementation of the directive are still poorly organised, especially concerning the reporting by financial institutions of capital movements with unidentified sources. By creating a Community-wide supervisory body, we would achieve concrete progress and encourage greater co-operation. We could either create a specific body, or entrust the Commission with this executive power, as has been done in the area of competition, for instance. This point could remain in the section on prudential laws, or also be incorporated into the section on transparency.

Vincent PEILLON

We feel that we have taken that desire into account in Point 4, in particular regarding reinforcement of prudential supervision and regulation, when we limited its perimeter to clearinghouses and companies involved in capital and securities settlements that create major problems for regulatory authorities. Later, we intend to extend this to a supranational body. I would also remind you that penal sanctions against non-reporting establishments already exist in countries such as the United Kingdom. Moving to your next question, we maintained the distinction between non-cooperative territories and countries, as defined by the FATF, since certain territories are legally dependent on a State, but actually enjoy a great deal of freedom from a legislative standpoint. Lastly, the sanction mechanisms proposed are based on suggestions on the part of the FATF, which has asked that Member States apply sanctions against the nation of Nauru.

Paolo BERNASCONI

I accepted your invitation because experience has taught me how important it is to create opportunities for direct contact between people on the front lines and the legislators. I nonetheless have some comments to make regarding the draft declaration.

Firstly, as regards the topic of transparency, I do not know of a single case of economic crime in which the perpetrators did not make use of forged documents or accounts. You must emphasise the importance of the connection between transparency and truth in accounting. We will not be able to fight modern forms of crime if we do not ensure maximal protection of accounts, including bills, regardless of whether the forgery caused direct or indirect damage. I suggest that you highlight the revolutionary step that was recently achieved through the mandatory identification of the customer. In that area as well, it is necessary to provide protection and clear new hurdle by agreeing that a document that lists the name of the customer, when drawn up by a financial institution, holds up in a court of law. As a result, anyone who knowingly draws up or uses a forged document must be punished.

Regarding non-cooperative territories and countries, it is true that many of the violations involve companies established throughout the world, but based in one of these non-cooperative territories. It is important to emphasise that such establishments will not be able to open bank accounts in regulated countries, as they are the most typical tool used in money laundering.

As pertains to judiciary co-operation, we all know that it has been the weakest link for decades. First, Article 10 of Strasbourg Convention Number 141 against money laundering has allowed States to contribute to proceedings in a foreign country of their own will, since 1990. It is high time to turn that possibility into a requirement. Secondly, mutual aid in judiciary matters has always been viewed with wariness. We would make a bold display of progress by invoking a highly meaningful legal proposition: in dubio pro rogatorio. We all believe in the principle in dubio pro reo. While it is true that the presumption of innocence should be respected by the court once evidence has been gathered, any doubt should be enough to motivate requiring co-operation with the authority. A number of delegations stated their concern over the modification of the burden of proof, but let me remind you that it is nothing new. How many Parliaments have already ratified the Vienna Convention of 1988? Article 5, Paragraph 7 of that convention calls for it. It is important not to confuse compliance with the hallowed principle of presumption of innocence in the context of proceedings against a person, in personam, with proceedings that involve only an object, in rem, for instance one million euros or a car. The matter has already been resolved by the European Convention on Human Rights. I hope that I have allayed your concerns. Yet, moving beyond the European warrant for arrest applying to individuals, why do you not give consideration to a European warrant for seizure? It would not affect the individual, but rather the property, all the while respecting the owner.

After decades of wariness, we must clearly show that we have rounded a new corner, not only within the Union, but also towards other countries. The mechanism used to legalise all documents received as part of international co-operation has been discarded, in practice, by all of the States. We must officially assert that this mechanism is defunct by authorising States to reuse evidence supplied by another State as part of mutual aid in judiciary matters. This goes back to prehistoric times. It is up to you to state whether the age of wariness is behind us.

Lastly, a number of you mentioned the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. Two aspects still remain very vague. Firstly, fraud against the States and the Union’s financial interests must fall under the category of major violations related to money laundering. It is also necessary to organise co-operation between countries in order to allow sequestration and mandatory release to foreign authorities of all proceeds from tax fraud, customs fraud or misappropriation of State subsidies, even including patrimonial assets.

Olivier de BAYNAST

As an expert from Eurojust, I fully support these comments. Eurojust needs you to put an end to what has truly become the piling up of measures and systems. In the development of its judiciary and investigative systems, Europe has been trying to outrun its problems for the past few years. Creating new institutions without going the full distance does not make it any easier to solve one’s problems. The European public prosecutor should not come as an addition to the European Anti-Fraud Office, Europol and Eurojust. Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, Europol has just been given the possibility to have access to operational powers. The problem is that the various States do not supply it with the information needed to fulfil its duties. I do not think that the European public prosecutor will be a magic formula that makes political will be followed through in reality. We will not be excused from making the efforts needed to be taken seriously.

Eurojust is not merely an information exchange agency. This tool will make it possible for a national representative not only to exchange information with his counterparts, but also to ask the prosecutor to launch investigations and proceedings. The States, however, do not seem concerned about incorporating the necessary texts into their national legislation. We are therefore waiting, without any idea of competition whatsoever, on the contrary, with a concern for consistency, for the parliaments to ensure that international and European commitments be made as effective as possible through incorporation into their respective laws. We are far from the finish line and I can see that many commitments are made without giving any thought to their implications.

You spoke about the need to avoid duplicates. If your appeal calls for the creation of a European public prosecutor on the basis of corpus juris, meaning to fight against fraud in the financial interest of the communities, but also for the whole of the field covered by the European warrant for arrest, in other words, Eurojust’s jurisdiction, we will see an extremely confusing phenomenon of overlapping. We cannot maintain both a body for co-operation and a federal body.

I have compiled a list of all of the relevant legal instruments on the topic at hand today. The list of conventions awaiting ratification is very long. In the interest of consistency, we need to ensure not only that the institutions created can work, but also that the conventions negotiated can be enforced. For this reason, the Strasbourg Convention is particularly relevant. This appeal could have a more technical and, therefore, a stronger character if these components were mentioned. Similarly, the Convention on Mutual Aid in Criminal Matters (May 2000), which is a response to the authors of the Geneva appeal and which was regretfully eliminated from the declaration, has still not been ratified by a single Member State.

Gilles LECLAIR

As you stated, new structures and conventions are "piling up" and we hope that officials will look over what has already been decided and ratified. For example, the adjustment of the burden of proof has existed since 1988. I found a paradox in the wording of the third topic. Europol and Eurojust are still unfolding. There is still a need to assert the role of these two bodies in the areas of co-ordination and support. Europol’s powers in the field of money laundering were not clearly established until November 2000. It is necessary to focus on the co-ordination between these two organisations before asserting the role of a European public prosecutor, which is currently being entrusted with an extremely broad task. We need the support of the Member States.

Jean de MAILLARD

I agree in part with what was just said. It is necessary to make choices and, in particular, to prevent the piling up of measures and institutions from ultimately concealing a lack of political vision. At the last meeting, I reviewed the two approaches to European matters. The creation of Europol and Eurojust are the result of an inter-governmental rationale, one based on the principle of the third pillar. Governments seem more easily inclined to creating inter-governmental co-operation systems because they think it will allow them to keep a certain amount of control. Someday, it will be necessary to reflect upon the sharp increase in judiciary and domestic cases, based on the principle of the first pillar. While on this topic, there exists a draft directive, based on Article 280, as the Commission has noted that, since 1995, the States have been incapable of ratifying the conventions that they previously signed with spirit and enthusiasm regarding the protection of European financial interests. The States will have to declare, one day, what they intend and do not intend to do. The European public prosecutor is part of the first pillar thinking, and is thus European. The development of institutions such as Europol and Eurojust are part of the intergovernmental line of thought, even if they do have a role to play and are not overrun by the European public prosecutor. We cannot be as effective in the third pillar as in the first.

I also regret the text’s defensiveness where the fight against money laundering is concerned. It includes a set of measures—some clear and warranted, some more vague and difficult to implement. The adoption of certain measures that are too vague will not reflect agreement on the part of all the parliaments, but will rather serve to conceal disagreements. I would like to see a more aggressive approach. Rather than merely calling for investigative, judiciary or prudential measures, I would like to see you adopt measures on good governance. It is too early to try to channel such measures toward larger bodies, such as the OECD, as it would make the process more difficult. The European Union is, in my view, a fitting environment, provided that the will and the capabilities are there.

Lastly, I echo Mr Harlem Desir’s proposal to transfer from the fourth to the first topic the idea of a supervisory body for clearinghouses, a tool that would prove essential in the monitoring of capital flows. The European Union should and could set up a system requiring that all trans-national capital flows be filtered through the clearinghouses, and instituting European inspection powers. Presently, there exist two international clearinghouses: Clearstream and Euroclear. Both are located within Union borders, but neither one is subject to inspection. Other financial transactions do not transit through any clearinghouses. These severe inadequacies are undoubtedly the cause of many of the difficulties we are facing in the fight against criminal money. Supervision is possible and would allow judges and investigators to carry out investigations that are currently impossible, while still respecting individual liberties. It is also important to ensure that probes can be carried out on people. The document contains a few proposals to this effect, but they could go even further. I share your view regarding the bank account register. The French registry is extremely helpful during financial investigations. Entities such as trusts and pension funds need to be listed in a register, along with the names of their customers. Similarly, when the said structures maintain accounts, these need to be made public.

Vincent PEILLON

The text already contains some of your suggestions, in particular, the last one, concerning the registry. We will have to come up with wording that is easier to understand.

Jean de MAILLARD

Let me add that a European publication standard will be needed, so that everyone can work on the same basis in the different States.

Dominique GARABIOL

Along with the other users present, I am left with a feeling of frustration and ineffectiveness after reading your objectives. The ambiguity over the real objectives of the system to be set up has given rise to a number of concerns. Each Member State is split between the desire to meet all of the objectives in terms of effectiveness and the desire to safeguard individual liberties. We will not be able to overcome this obstacle unless we set forth clear objectives. Political agreements have been signed to fight against organised crime, drug traffics and terrorism. Based on this consensus, the various parliaments now need to agree on the instruments that will make it possible to be effective in all areas. We need to prevent vanity from dictating our ambitions, as that would continuously lengthen the list of violations targeted, or even revive the debate over certain institutional aspects of European construction. The proposals presented in the draft declaration are already in place in several countries, even though they may seem difficult to implement for some of you. It will be impossible to enforce them unless they are clearly shown to serve the main objectives of the European Union.

Regarding sanctions against non-cooperating countries, the section that covers the entry of such establishments inside Union borders does not mention the dealings of their correspondents. Yet therein lies a very real concern, one that is also part of the proceeding point. On the subject of the third topic, it would be easier to reach a consensus if financial crime and the harmonisation of financial offences were limited to the Union’s main objectives. In conjunction with the former Head of the French Judiciary Investigation Force, I drew up a report intended for the Minister of the Interior, which suggested that Europol should serve to foster the involvement of European institutions. Europol has since been endowed with a specific responsibility in the area of money laundering and would be capable of effectively co-ordinating European financial intelligence efforts.

The last point in the fourth topic involves the introduction of a penal sanction against professionals that fail to report suspicious activity. In certain countries, heavy sanctions already exist. Harmonisation appears to be one way to improve overall effectiveness. It should be added that the failure to report must be intentional and that the requirements relate to money laundering performed by criminal organisations. Lastly, the exchange of professional information between countries within the Union is currently being slowed down by the various national provisions. For instance, one banking firm is having the hardest time in determining the financial standing of its various European branches. This point is in contradiction with the prudential requirement to perform monitoring on a consolidated basis.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you all for your patience and for the quality of your contributions. On the basis of the ideas presented, we hope to propose a new version of the text within the next eight to ten days. I ask that you then inform us of your comments and objections quickly. That will allow us to organise the 7 February session as efficiently as possible, devoting all of the time needed to clarifying the points that still pose problems for you.

The session is adjourned at 5:10 PM.

 

 

II - Blueprint for the final declaration

Version including the comments of the steering committee

of January 14 2002

PREAMBLE

Criminal money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets ; they represent a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also for the security of our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism uses very different systems and some of these use the legal economy, although it also resorts to the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global and coordinated action of States, crime prevention and law enforcement services and authorities will not be able to fight efficiently against those they pursue.

In the fight against money laundering and the use of the financial system by criminal networks, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault even if the efficiency of its action also depends on the awareness and support of all developed countries.

The persistence of legal mechanisms leading to the impenetrableness of financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, and imperfect co-operation between European Union member states can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has however not been inactive since it has updated the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

The recent political agreement on the European arrest warrant should also enable greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism and financial crime, provided it is quickly applied.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling non-cooperative countries and territories, and loopholes in the systems of cooperative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the cooperation of European Union Member States.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and adopted a series of concrete proposals in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

 

 

Subject n° 1 : The transparency of capital movements

An efficient fight against money laundering and financial crime means being able to reconstruct the history of capital movements. The traceability of transactions and order makers is therefore a priority objective, but it comes up against several obstacles, including :

The impenetrableness of certain legal entities (trusts, institutions, foundations, limited partnerships and numbered accounts) ;

Objection to investigators with regard to different professional secrecies including banking secrecy ;

The existence of international financial services (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers) which do not always enable the order maker to be identified.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of transactions carried out using trust or assimilated funds whenever it is impossible to identify the beneficial owner.

Control the form of trusts (standardised documents and ban of suspect clauses).

Provide for the obligation to register trusts in a central register in addition to the identification of the beneficiaries.

Harmonise professional secret release procedures

Generalise access to information held by financial agencies for financial intelligence units.

Create a central bank account register.

Internationally standardise the order maker’s identification in international financial messages (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Provide for the identification of financial transaction originators on the Internet by access providers.

 

Subject n° 2 :

Sanctions against non-cooperative countries and territories

The identification of non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering falls within the scope of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) whose 40 recommendations are the international reference standard. This process must guarantee objective assessment.

Determining and applying sanctions depends on the States. A coordinated action by the European Union in this field can only increase the efficiency of these sanctions.

Proposals :

Strengthen the obligations of financial agencies to identify economic beneficiaries before establishing relations with individuals or entities in these countries and territories.

Strengthen reporting mechanisms or provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of financial transactions with these countries and territories.

Strengthen the prudential ratios applicable to financial transactions carried out with these countries and territories.

Impose conditions on, restrict, overtax or ban transactions with individuals or entities located in these countries and territories.

Ban European Union member country institutions from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in these territories or from holding dealers’ accounts there.

Ban financial institutions whose head office is located in one of these countries or territories from opening subsidiaries, branches or representatives offices in the European Union or from holding the accounts of correspondents there.

 

Subject n° 3 : Legal, police and administrative cooperation

The fight against money laundering and financial crime necessarily involves legal, police and administrative cooperation due to the systematic globalisation of this type of crime.

Money laundering depends on cross-border economic and financial deals.

The Egmont group has laid the foundations for administrative cooperation between financial intelligence units and the setting up of the European Anti-Fraud Office is an initial community response. Nevertheless, police and legal cooperation lags behind somewhat.

Several international instances (UN, OECD, Council of Europe, European Union) have proposed States sign conventions aimed at improving this cooperation. Beyond the necessary ratifications of these texts, their application, often full of reserves, is not optimal.

The European Union has regularly endeavoured to encourage this cooperation. With this in mind, the European Council’s summit meeting in Tampere namely announced the creation of Eurojust. Likewise, the recent political agreement on the European arrest warrant is an important step which must be strengthened over the coming years.

This process is however still too long and must be accelerated by measures which are well-known since they have been discussed for several years.

Proposals :

Develop information exchanges between financial intelligence units.

Ratify, apply and strengthen the consistency of international conventions aimed at facilitating legal cooperation and fighting against money laundering and criminal organisations.

Harmonise incriminations in terms of financial crime.

Increase responsibility for proving the criminal origin of money.

Harmonise criminal sanctions namely by favouring the confiscation of revenue from crime and the instrument of money laundering.

Mutually recognise decisions to freeze, seize and confiscate illicit assets.

Provide for a mechanism for sharing between States credits confiscated as a result of international cooperation.

Introduce financial crimes including laundering on the list of offences at the basis of the European warrant of arrest. Ensure that the European arrest warrant is quickly applied, particularly in terms of financial crime.

Consolidate the operational nature of Eurojust by enabling it, beyond exchanging information, to instigate and bring actions.

Institute a European public prosecutor’s office which initially has jurisdiction over community fraud and for offences which fall within the scope of the European warrant for arrest.

 

Subject n° 4 : Prudential rules

The world deregulation of capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering and financial crime, namely due to the acceleration and the growth in international financial flows that it has generated. The sophistication of techniques and trades which has accompanied financial globalisation needs the reinforcement of capital-adequacy standards and ethical obligations of markets.

This widening of controls and financial regulations should include all providers of financial and legal services, and also international networks, whether traditional and informal (‘‘Hawala’’ type) or, on the contrary, very well integrated in the international capital markets (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Propositions :

Restrict cash payments beyond a given amount.

Provide for the compulsory licensing by the financial services regulatory authority of:

Agents belonging to a cash or security transfer network, including traditional, informal and parallel networks;

Company formation agents.

Foreign exchange offices.

Active financial intermediary dealers on the Internet.

Strengthen prudential rules and, as necessary on an international level, the regulation of the activities of clearing companies, and fund and security payment-delivery companies.

Match the evident breach of their obligations to supervise the professions subject to them with criminal sanctions.

 

Conference of the European Union Parliaments
Against Money Laundering

7 - 8 February 2002

 

 

 

 

I – DRAFT PARIS DECLARATION AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING

Final declaration of the conference of european union parliaments against money laundering of 8th february 2002

Text proposed by the Presidency

PREAMBLE

Criminal money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets ; they represent a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also for the security of our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism uses very different systems and some of these use the legal economy, although it also resorts to the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global and coordinated action of States, crime prevention and law enforcement services and authorities will not be able to fight efficiently against those they pursue.

In the fight against money laundering and the use of the financial system by criminal networks, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault even if the efficiency of its action also depends on the awareness and support of all developed countries.

The persistence of legal mechanisms which lead to the impenetrableness of financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, and deficiencies in co-operation between European Union member states can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has however not been inactive since it has updated the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

The recent political agreement on the European warrant of arrest should also enable greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism and financial crime, provided it is quickly applied.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling non-cooperative countries and territories, and loopholes in the systems of cooperative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the cooperation of European Union Member States whilst respecting the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and formulated proposals for concrete measures in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

 

Subject n° 1 : The transparency of capital movements

An efficient fight against money laundering and financial crime means being able to reconstruct the history of capital movements. The traceability of transactions and order makers is therefore a priority objective, but it comes up against several obstacles, including :

12. The impenetrableness of certain legal entities (trusts, institutions, foundations, limited partnerships) and anonymous accounts ;

13. Objection to investigators with regard to different professional secrets including banking secrecy ;

14. The operating system of some of the international financial services (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers) which does not always enable the order maker to be identified.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of transactions carried out using trust or assimilated funds.

Control the form of trusts (standardised documents and ban of suspect clauses).

Provide for the obligation to register trusts in a central register in addition to the identification of the beneficiaries.

Harmonise professional secret release procedures

Generalise access to information held by financial agencies for financial intelligence units.

Create a central bank account register.

Internationally standardise the order maker’s identification in international financial messages (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Provide for the identification of financial transaction originators on the Internet by access providers.

Subject n° 2 : Sanctions against uncooperative countries and territories

The identification of non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering falls within the scope of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) whose 40 recommendations are the international reference standard. This process must guarantee objective assessment.

Determining and applying sanctions depends on the States. A coordinated action by the European Union in this field can only increase the efficiency of these sanctions.

Proposals :

Strengthen the obligations of financial agencies to identify economic beneficiaries before establishing relations with individuals or entities in these countries and territories.

Strengthen reporting mechanisms or provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of financial transactions with these countries and territories.

Strengthen the prudential ratios applicable to financial transactions carried out with these countries and territories.

Impose conditions on, restrict, overtax or ban transactions with individuals or entities located in these countries and territories.

Ban European Union member country institutions from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in these territories or from holding dealers’ accounts there.

Ban financial institutions whose head office is located in one of these countries or territories from opening subsidiaries, branches or representatives offices in the European Union or from holding the accounts of correspondents there.

 

Subject n° 3 : Legal, police and administrative cooperation

The fight against money laundering and financial crime necessarily involves legal, police and administrative cooperation due to the systematic globalisation of this type of crime.

Money laundering depends on cross-border economic and financial deals.

The Egmont group has laid the foundations for administrative cooperation between financial intelligence units and the setting up of the European Anti-Fraud Office is an initial community response. Nevertheless, police and legal cooperation lags behind somewhat.

Several international instances (UN, OECD, Council of Europe, European Union) have proposed States sign conventions aimed at improving this cooperation. Beyond the necessary ratifications of these texts, their application, often full of reserves, is not optimal.

The European Union has regularly endeavoured to encourage this cooperation. With this in mind, the European Council’s summit meeting in Tampere namely announced the creation of Eurojust. Likewise, the recent political agreement on the European warrant of arrest is an important step which must be consolidated over the coming years.

Proposals :

Develop information exchanges between financial intelligence units.

Ratify, apply and strengthen the consistency of international conventions aimed at facilitating legal cooperation and fighting against money laundering and criminal organisations.

Harmonise incriminations in terms of financial crime.

Increase responsibility for proving the criminal origin of money.

Harmonise criminal sanctions namely by favouring the confiscation of revenue from crime and the instrument of money laundering.

 

Mutually recognise decisions to freeze, seize and confiscate illicit assets.

Ensure that the European warrant of arrest in quickly applied, namely in terms of financial crime.

Consolidate the operational nature of Eurojust by enabling it, beyond exchanging information, to assist the national authorities concerned in the instigation and enforcement of action and to co-ordinate investigations.

 

Subject n° 4 : Prudential rules

The world deregulation of capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering and financial crime, namely due to the acceleration and the growth in international financial flows that is has generated. The sophistication of techniques and trades which has accompanied financial globalisation needs the reinforcement of capital-adequacy standards and ethical obligations of markets.

This widening of controls and financial regulations should include all providers of financial and legal services, and also international networks, whether traditional and informal (‘‘Hawala’’ type) or, on the contrary, very well integrated in the international capital markets (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Proposals :

Restrict cash payments beyond a given amount.

Provide for the compulsory licensing by the financial services regulatory authority of:

48. Agents belonging to a cash or security transfer network, including traditional, informal and parallel networks;

49. Company formation agents.

50. Foreign exchange offices.

51. Active financial intermediary dealers on the Internet.

Strengthen prudential rules and, as necessary on an international level, the regulation of the activities of clearing companies, and fund and security payment-delivery companies.

Match the evident breach of their obligations to supervise the professions subject to them with criminal sanctions.

 

 

II – MINUTES OF THE Working Session

Thursday 7 February 2002

List of Participants

I. Parliaments from the Member States of the European Union

Germany

Bundestag

Mr Frank HOFMANN, MP

Mr Andreas NOTHELLE, Deputy Director, Head of the Department of Interparliamentary Affairs

Ms Vesna POPOVIC, Counsellor at the European Committee

Bundesrat

Prof. Dr Kurt SCHELTER, Minister of Justice and European Affairs, Brandenburg

Ms Dagmar ZIEGLER, Minister of Finance, Brandenburg

Dr Marcus WENIG, Director of the Brandenburg Representation in Brussels

Austria 

Nationalrat

Ms Maria Theresia FEKTER, Chairman of the Justice Committee

Bundesrat

Mr Ferdinand GSTÖTTNER, Chairman of the Justice Committee

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives

Mr Hugo COVELIERS, President of the Flemish Liberal Group (VLD)

Mr Dirk VAN der MAELEN, President of the Flemish Socialist Group

Mr Olivier MAINGAIN, Chairman of the Finance Committee

Senate

Mr Hugo VANDENBERGHE, Chairman of the Committee monitoring organised crime

Mr Thierry DEWAELE, Clerk to the Committee monitoring organised crime

Denmark

Mr Karsten NONBO, MP

Mr Frode SORENSEN, MP

Ms Lotte VIBILD SCHONAU, Legal Adviser

Spain

Congress of Deputies

Ms Soledad BECERRIL, Vice-President

Ms Silvia MARTIN, Legal Adviser

Senate

Mr Alfredo PRADA, First Vice-President

Mr José-Manuel BRETAL, Legal Adviser

France

National Assembly

Mr Vincent PEILLON, Chairman of the Information Mission on Money Laundering

Mr Arnaud MONTEBOURG, rapporteur of the Information Mission

Mr François d’AUBERT, Member of the Information Mission

Mr Michel HUNAULT, Vice-Chairman of the Information Mission

Mr Jean-Pierre BRARD, MP

Mr Pierre BRANA, MP

Senate

Mr Christian OUDIN, Deputy Director

Greece

Hellenic Parliament

Ms Maria ARSENI, MP

Mr Panagiotis NIKOLOUDIS, Public Prosecutor

Ms Eleni KONSTANTINIDOU, Official

Ireland

Dail Eireann

Mr Michael AHERN, MP

Mr Jim MITCHELL, MP

Seanad Eireann

Mr Michael FINNERAN, Senator

Ms Marie FENNELL Clerk to the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service

Italy

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Donato BRUNO, Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Gianclaudio BRESSA, Vice-Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Pietro FONTANINI, Vice-Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Fabrizio CASTALDI, Counsellor at the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Gianfranco NERI, Official at the Office for Relations with the European Union

Ms Cristina DI PIETRO, Interpreter

Senate

Mr Roberto CENTARO, Chairman of the Joint Special Committee on Mafia Crime

Mr Sebastiano CARDI, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Senate

Ms Laura BOEZIO, Protocol Officer

Mr Alessio COLARIZI, Interpreter

Luxembourg

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Lucien WEILER, Chairman of the Finance and Budget Committee, President of the Christian Social Group (CSV)

Mr Jeannot KRECKE, Chairman of the Committee for the Control of Budget Implementation, President of the Socialist Group (LSAP)

Mr Laurent MOSAR, Member of the Finance and Budget Committee

The Netherlands

House of Representatives

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA, MP

United Kingdom

House of Commons

Mr John McFALL, Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee

Mr Michael FALLON, Chairman of the Treasury Sub-committee

Mr Alex KIDNER, Clerk to the Treasury Select Committee

European Parliament

Ms Sarah LUDFORD, MEP

II. Applicant Countries and Russia

Bulgaria

National Assembly

Ms Kamelia KASSABOVA, Vice-President

Ms Ina KILEVA, Adviser to the Vice-President

Cyprus

House of Representatives

Mr Marcos KYPRIANOU, Chairman of the Finance Committee

Estonia

Mr Rein VOOG, MP

Hungary

Mr Janos HORVATH , MP, Chairman of the European Integration Sub-committee

Latvia

Mr Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS, MP

Lithuania

Ms Giedré PURVANECKIENÉ, MP

Malta

House of Representatives

Mr Victor GALEA PACE, MP

Mr Gavin GULIA, MP

Romania

Senate

Mr Aristide ROIBU, Chairman of the Justice Committee

The Republic of Slovenia

National Assembly

Mr Jozef BERNIK, Member of the Finance and Monetary Policy Committee

Turkey

Turkish Parliament

Mr Ahmet TAN, MP, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE

Mr Nejat COSKUN, Director of the Department of Enquiry into Financial Crime at the Ministry of Finance

Russian Federation

State Duma

Mr Nikolay BROUSNIKINE, MP

Mr Mikail GRICHANKOV, MP

Mr Serguey PARINOV, interpreter

III. Experts

Mr Bernard BERTOSSA, General Prosecutor, Geneva

Mr Jean de MAILLARD, Magistrate

Mr Benoît DEJEMEPPE, Chief Public Prosecutor, Brussels

Mr Harlem DESIR, MEP

Mr Dominique GARABIOL, Former Head of the Inspection Department at the Financial Markets Council, France

Mr Gilles LECLAIR, Deputy Director, Europol

Mr Patrick MOULETTE, Secretary General, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)

Mr Jean SPREUTELS, President of the Financial Intelligence Unit, Belgium

Mr Jean-François THONY, Judge of the Court of Appeal in Versailles, Adviser to the United Nations

Mr Samuel VUELTA-SIMON, Head of Project, Eurojust

 

 

The session commences at 9:05 AM.

A - Opening Address

Vincent PEILLON

Chairman, Information Mission on Money Laundering

Ladies and Gentlemen, as Chairman of the French National Assembly’s Information Mission on Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, I wish you a warm welcome to the National Assembly for this final meeting of the Steering Committee, following the sessions on 3 December 2001 and 14 January 2002. This meeting will bring together more participants than usual. It will also allow us to ensure that there is indeed an agreement on text of the joint declaration that will be adopted tomorrow. Almost all Parliaments of the European Union will be represented, with the exception of two of them. I also give my warm greetings to the many observing delegations present, in particular those from countries that are candidates for membership of the Union, as well as our friends from the Duma, who have joined us since the second session of the Steering Committee. As you know, today’s session has a dual objective.

Making the last adjustments to our final declaration, which will be adopted tomorrow

We worked together over the last two sessions of the Steering Committee, we sought to take into account all of the comments that were made and in the last few days you received an updated version of the text. You have been called here to make whatever final modifications you wish to the text. Nonetheless, today’s session must still allow us to move forward.

Explaining the ideas behind our approach and the reasons that led us to make the declarations

This will be done with the utmost transparency, as the press is attending our sessions. We therefore have the duty and the requirement to educate our public.

As regards the organisation of this session, it was difficult to choose between the pulpit and the floor. Each Round Table will be co-chaired by a French MP and a MP from one of the assemblies of the European Union. However, it is obvious that all delegations, as well as all experts, will have the opportunity to intervene at each stage of the text, and to the extent that they wish, so as to share their comments, approval, reservations and modifications.

The text submitted to you today was only very slightly modified since the last working session. Modifications were mainly made to the proposal relating to Eurojust’s jurisdiction at the request of the Italian delegation (line 43, Topic 3).

Each delegation will have to appoint a representative to take part in a final meeting with limited attendance at the end of the day, so as to eliminate all ambiguity and ensuring that we all agree on the declaration that will be adopted tomorrow. Translations of the text will be available in all languages of the Union.

Before starting on Topic 1, I would like to provide a brief reminder of the issue at stake in this meeting. This is the first time that parliamentarians from national parliaments have come together to discuss the fight against money laundering and financial crime. There have been many discussions and texts on the matter in various European or multi-lateral organisations, and these must often be transposed by the national parliaments, which sometimes do so behind schedule. I feel, in particular in the wake of the September 11 2001 events, that it was not possible for national parliaments not to show their will to jointly move forward on the issues of regulating the international financial system, improving legal and investigative co-operation and fighting against all forms of crime that pose a threat to our democracies.

We all know that popular sovereignties still express themselves through our various Parliaments, and that it is not possible, as a last resort, to leave such issues in the hands of international and multilateral institutions (FATF, EU, UN) alone, even if they have done remarkable work. National Parliaments must also take up these issues. We have often adopted anti money-laundering laws, but do not do so together, and have never displayed our determination, as we are doing today, to move ahead as much as we can on these various topics.

With that in mind, I would like to thank you on behalf of National Assembly President Forni, who will join us tomorrow morning together with French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who will open the morning session. My warm thanks to all of you for having reacted positively to this initiative.

Before turning to the first topic of the day, I am ready to take questions if any of you would like o have further explanations on how the session will be organised.

We will soon begin the first Round Table on the transparency of capital movements. However, I would first like to come back to the Preamble. I will read it in full. Each delegation will then be able to comment on the Preamble if it wishes to do so. It has already been worked over and modified several times.

Criminal money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets; they represent a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also for the security of our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism uses very different systems and some of these use the legal economy, although it also resorts to the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global and co-ordinated action of States, crime prevention and law enforcement services and authorities will not be able to fight efficiently against those they pursue.

In the fight against money laundering and the use of the financial system by criminal networks, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault even if the efficiency of its action also depends on the awareness and support of all developed countries.

The persistence of legal mechanisms which lead to the impenetrableness of financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, and deficiencies in co-operation between European Union member states can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has however not been inactive since it has updated the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

The recent political agreement on the European warrant of arrest should also enable greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism and financial crime, provided it is quickly applied.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling non-cooperative countries and territories, and loopholes in the systems of co-operative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the co-operation of European Union Member States in compliance with the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and formulated proposals for concrete measures in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

The modifications have been underlined.

Do you have any particular comments to make on the Preamble?

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA (House of Representatives, The Netherlands)

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I also thank the French National Assembly for its hospitality and for having taken the initiative to organise this meeting for the Member States and applicant countries of the European Union. It will enable Europe’s democratic dimension to be reinforced. It is important that we be able to fight effectively against money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. To this end, Europe must be highly democratic, because we face dilemmas and tension resulting from the strengthening of certain measures and from the preservation of the standards and values that characterise the rule of law.

Regarding the Preamble, it is important to see to what extent we will be able to ensure that the text will be followed up. This excellent declaration will make it possible to take some measures in the future, but certain components will, without a doubt, require further discussion. We need to see what the concrete effects of the declaration will be. In order to achieve this, we would need to include a statement to that effect in the Preamble, and see which points need to be emphasised to ensure the enforcement of all the measures. I would like emphasis to be given to the role of the supervisory authorities, the central banks, the insurance companies and the market supervisory bodies, in particular. We should also define the role that the European Central Bank might play in this area. Overall, I would like these points to be given greater consideration in the Preamble.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you for your comments. Thirteen delegations have to speak. Therefore, please do not hesitate to make your comments in writing, so that we can move ahead without losing any precision. If we go into too much detail during the spoken comments on certain matters, we will come up against a number of problems.

The first point that you raised is a concern shared by everyone. As you stated, there is quite a difference between passing a law and enforcing it. However, this must not prevent us from starting from the beginning, which, in this case, means coming to an agreement on a declaration. We should thus be able to integrate, as you proposed, the following idea in point 10b: "In order to ensure proper follow-up to and updating of the measures it recommended in its founding session, the Conference of European Union Parliaments Against Money Laundering agreed to meet periodically". I think the declaration itself implies a formal commitment to putting it into practice. However, making a decision to have the Parliaments continue to work together over time can be a good idea. The proposal to follow up and extend the declaration is a concrete one. I might add that the French Parliament must now decide whether it wishes to turn its Information Mission on Money Laundering into a standing body. It has been in existence for three years. Such a decision would allow it to carry on its undertakings.

Point 11 allows us to show our determination to carry on this work over time. It will also enable us to report on the legislative action underway in our various parliaments.

Dr Kurt SCHELTER (Germany – Bundesrat)

I have no special comments to make on the Preamble. The text is a well-balanced one, and we are also in agreement with Point 10b that you suggested.

I would like to raise a procedural problem. The German version is not identical to the French version. So as to avoid problems in the course of the translation, will it be possible for you to ask us, as the process unfolds, to propose more precise translations, yet without interrupting the meeting?

Vincent PEILLON

I am sorry to hear this. I hope that other delegations have not had the same problem. We need to find a way to review the translation sometime during the day. Perhaps you could designate someone from your delegation to carry out this work before the restricted session at 6 PM. This should not, however, prevent you from bringing these points to our attention during the discussion.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD (European Parliament)

Thank you, Mr Chairman, for inviting the representatives from the European Parliament to participate in this Conference. We did not take part in the previous meetings, but our participation today shows that the EU has not been idle, in particular on the last topic.

At this stage, I would like to highlight something that might become a problem, in particular on the first subject, regarding the transparency of capital movements. Paragraph 5 of the Preamble states that the persisting legal mechanisms that sustain the "impenetrableness" of financial transactions, the usage of "black holes" in the international financial system and the insufficiencies in the co-operation between Member States of the European Union, can no longer be tolerated. The word used to translate the French term "opacité" does not exist in English. We need to be more explicit in the first Round Table. Making suspicious transactions more transparent as a general rule could be likened with a violation of privacy or a breach of confidentiality on certain information. Is the objective to require that suspicious transactions be reported? The first Round Table will need to reflect on this question. To say that in general the lack of access to knowledge on financial transactions is itself a problem is, in my opinion, too broad a statement and it begs all sorts of questions. I do not have a new version to submit to you, but I feel that the wording selected is too broad a statement. We need to concentrate on how you get investigating access to information about financial transactions when you need it.

Vincent PEILLON

You have raised a fundamental problem that is at the centre of our discussions. We know what we meant in writing the text. We make this clear later in the text, whether regarding shell corporations or professional secrecy. We will have an opportunity to come back to this.

Are you speaking on behalf of the European Parliament or on behalf of the English delegation?

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

As a member of the European Parliament, I am also of course a British member of the European Parliament. There is no doubt that my approach is more Anglo-Saxon. The European Directive on money laundering imposes requirements on lawyers and financial institutions. The means for accessing the information must be determined.

Vincent PEILLON

I was not trying to make a joke. We are, of course, pleased to welcome you here. My question was really a sincere one, so as to find out which delegation you were representing. The questions that you raised are very interesting and are at the centre of our work. We will come back to them point by point.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL (Spain – Congress of Deputies)

The Spanish version of the declaration also has a number of problems in the translation. I think it would be best not to wait until the end of the day before comparing the various linguistic versions of the declaration. In some cases, it is simply a matter of style and there is no effect on the content itself. In other cases, however, the problems pertain to specific terms that are of importance before such a text can be adopted.

Vincent PEILLON

This is the second comment we have heard to that effect. We are embarrassed and extend our apologies to you. It is not possible to work with unsatisfactory translations throughout the day. We will take care of the matter. Translators will be put at your disposal. Please designate one member from each delegation to resolve the various problems with the translation, in conjunction with the translators. There will be no misunderstandings due to translation by the time the 6 PM meeting begins.

John McFALL (United Kingdom – House of Commons)

It is a true pleasure to be participating in another meeting on this highly important topic. My British colleague, Sarah Ludford, has made comments on behalf of the European Parliament. Personally, I represent the UK Parliament.

At the last meeting, I voiced a number of comments. From a philosophical standpoint, I am in agreement with what was said by my British colleague. I see the Preamble as excellent, but feel that we must move from theory to practice. The British Common Law system is different from the legal systems that prevail on the Continent. That is why it will be necessary to take those legal divergences into consideration when we move to the concrete phase of action. Paragraph 9 of the Preamble is acceptable to us, but it would be desirable if we could add, at the end of the paragraph, that there exist divergences in the various legal systems, and that these need to be taken into account. Aside from that, we are in agreement with the general principles expressed in the Preamble.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you. I do not foresee any problems with integrating that into the text.

Jean-Pierre BRARD (France – National Assembly)

There is a need to progress toward greater transparency and a more ethical approach. The process upon which we are embarking will be a long one. I agree with the contributions of our two British colleagues. Thank goodness, Shakespeare’s language is at least as rich as that of Cervantes, Goethe or Molière. Thanks to synonyms, we will be able to find our way out of the problem raised by Ms Ludford, on "impenetrableness". To that end, I propose the following French term: "obscurité".

I am also interested in Paragraph 5 of the Preamble. The work we are carrying out is difficult. It will be all the more difficult for the Union’s current member states when countries that the FATF designates as having unorthodox practices enter the European Union. I wonder whether the fifth line could be amended in the following manner: "Membership in the Union will be suspended for all States included in the FATF’s list."

Vincent PEILLON

That is a strong proposal. We would therefore need to ask the opinion of the various delegations before possibly integrating it into the Preamble.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

The proposal could be considered. We may be able to take it into account, but I do not think that it would be a good thing from a procedural standpoint. I do not see how we could add such a proposal at this stage. It may be possible at a later stage. As far as we are concerned, we cannot adhere to it for the time being.

Vincent PEILLON

As you courageously emphasised, Ms Becerril, the proposal is quite heavy to be adopted at this stage of our work.

Ms Marie-Theresia FEKTER (Austria – Nationalrat)

Concerning the legal status of the document, the Austrian delegation is not currently able to adopt a text that would be binding for Austria, even though we are ready to work constructively with you so as to secure a true majority in the Austrian Parliament in favour of the approval of the declaration.

Roberto CENTARO (Italy – Senate)

I am quite willing to give my agreement on the Preamble. However, it can only be an agreement in principle. A number of constitutional constraints need to be taken into account and could have an effect on the decisions taken by our national parliaments and governments. That is why we should limit ourselves to a declaration of principle that lists hypotheses. Whatever the case, we cannot voice concrete proposals, given that there is no requirement to adhere to the text today. Italian law has not yet integrated the standards that would make it mandatory for us to adhere to the Preamble, which covers issues relating to follow-up, as well as working proposals. Any work to be carried out would have to result from a decision based on our constitutional standards. In addition, the countries included in the FATF’s list were not cited on the basis of concrete evidence. Accordingly, we cannot be bound by the FATF’s list, and the national parliaments might not feel they are bound to the recommendations listed in the Preamble. As I told you, within our parliaments, we must respect a number of constitutional standards.

Vincent PEILLON

There are no further requests to take the floor. We will now address the first topic of the day. We have taken note of a number of modifications. Along with the addition of paragraph 10b, the following will be added to the end of line 9 of the Preamble, as recommended by Mr McFall and Mr Centaro: "respecting the recommendations of the European Union regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties, and differences between national legal systems".

I suggest that we begin the first Round Table, which deals with the transparency of capital movements.

 

 

B - Round Table 1:

Transparency of Capital Movements

Mr Vincent PEILLON, National Assembly (France), Co-Chairman;

Mr Hugo COVELIERS, Chamber of Representatives (Belgium), Co-Chairman;

Mr Bernard BERTOSSA, General Prosecutor (Switzerland);

Mr Jean de MAILLARD, Magistrate (France).

Vincent PEILLON

I would like to welcome Mr Coveliers, Co-Chairman of this Round Table, Mr Bertossa, General Prosecutor from Geneva and Mr de Maillard, Magistrate.

The development of transparency in capital movements is an essential objective to ensure the success of the fight against money laundering. Investigators often find themselves faced with insurmountable obstacles when it comes to ensure the traceability of financial transactions and transaction instigators, a necessity in identifying networks, determining responsibility and preventing further illegal action.

Throughout our work in France and in each of the European countries, we heard from many magistrates, investigators and members of financial intelligence units. Their accounts all raised the same point: that it is difficult to trace capital movements and identify the parties responsible. They all clearly identified their respective stumbling blocks. We have sought to remedy these. With this in mind, we have developed eight proposals.

The delinquent use of trusts has been widely observed in a great number of money laundering operations. In its annual report (February 2001), the FATF indicated that trusts are more and more frequently seen as key networks in large-scale or complex money-laundering schemes. The apparently inviolable anonymity with which they provide their owner or true beneficiary is a problem.

We offer three proposals for regulating trusts:

Reporting of all transactions carried out with trusts to the relevant financial intelligence unit;

In France, the Law of 16 May 2001 has made systematic reporting mandatory.

A minimum regulation on the form of trusts

The regulation would prohibit particular suspicious clauses, in particular clauses on evasion, which are designed to automatically transfer the headquarters of a trust as soon as it comes under legal investigation. There is no need to justify this minimum proposal.

Recording all trusts in a central register in each Member State of the European Union

In addition, we have proposed that procedures for lifting professional secrecy be harmonised so as to facilitate the work of investigators. This topic is a complex one and could be tackled in a European directive. The updating of the Directive on Money Laundering has made it possible, after long and fruitful debate, to specify the means by which lawyers will be subject to mandatory vigilance.

The creation of a central register of bank accounts in each Member State is desirable. Such a system exists in France and Spain, for example. It considerably speeds up investigations. It does not constitute a breach of bank secrecy, as access to the register is limited to investigative units that are working under court order.

Lastly, it is important that new information technologies not make anonymous transactions even easier. The financial services provided via complex or high-speed computer networks must be recorded as rigorously as more traditional transactions. The identification of the customer must be guaranteed, standardised and effective. The inter-bank transfer system Swift is an example of this. Some statements indicate that different practices are tolerated depending on the transaction involved; despite the fact that computerised identification functions exist, they are not always used rigorously. Similarly, the use of Internet for financial transactions, sometimes via virtual casinos, is another example of such delinquent practices, even though identification of the operators by access providers can unfortunately turn out to be more difficult to secure.

These are the main proposals of this first Round Table. I would like to emphasise that they did not set off any clear taking of sides within the Steering Committee, even though several delegations expressed their scepticism about the effectiveness of a central bank account register. I hope that the various practitioners present will be able to allay some of that scepticism and show just how effective the registers are in the fight against financial crime.

I can understand that the proposed regulation on trusts might be more difficult to implement in countries that use them massively. It is our shared duty to ensure that responsibilities are fulfilled. The fact that these proposals were made by the FATF in an inter-governmental context shows that there is strong determination to make progress. It would be desirable that parliaments be able to follow it up.

What we are proposing today remains reasonable. Some parties would have like to go further in developing greater transparency. For example, some experts raised the possibility of implementing a European financial regulatory system, with European inspection authorities. Ultimately, the objective is a desirable one. We will have an opportunity to come back to it. However, if we can progress on these few proposals at the national level, it will already be an accomplishment.

Hugo COVELIERS (Belgium – Chamber of Representatives)

I would like to join my colleagues in congratulating you on the organisation of this conference and on the democratic manner in which the various texts were prepared.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I come from a bilingual country and am therefore familiar with the problems inherent to translating legal texts. It is not a question of translation, but of saying the same thing. We must therefore define what we want to say with precision. Afterwards, it is simply a matter of translating that idea into each of our own languages. As my native language is Dutch, I will continue my presentation in Dutch, so as to avoid a certain number of mistakes in expressing myself. Incidentally, I would like to thank you for having added Dutch to the list of languages spoken at this conference.

The first topic of the day is based on the idea that, if certain financial transactions remain unknown, or if the customer, the intermediary or the beneficiary do not wish to reveal their identity, or if the reason for the transaction is kept secret, then it can be assumed that these transactions are dubious and that the funds come from a source that is not legal.

The point raised by Ms Ludford should be taken into account. She is correct in stating that choices must be made and that privacy must be respected. The authorities can take measures for the good of the people by detecting the illegal activities of certain citizens. Just how far can they go without infringing on the right to privacy?

On Point 15, we wondered to what extent all financial movements should be reported. Maybe reporting should only occur if the economic beneficiary cannot be identified. Is it necessary to identify all of the transactions, or only some of them?

The nature of trusts (Point 16) might lead to a number of problems due to the diversity of legal systems in Europe. I hope that we will be able to defend the idea of adopting at least some regulation in this area at the European level. For some of my colleagues, there was no doubt, during the preparatory meetings, that a central register should be considered, as there was no way to explain why certain trusts would refuse to be listed in such a register if their operations were legal. Are there any factors that argue in favour of not being listed in such a register of trusts or individuals that carry out international financial transactions?

Finally, I think it is difficult but necessary to assert the principle that it is essential to harmonise procedures relating to the lifting of professional secrecy (Point 18). A number of elements must be taken into account, in particular with reference to the legal profession. We need to take into account the rights of the individual, of defence as well as the freedoms that must be respected, but we must also take into account the rights of other citizens to protect themselves from those who do not comply with the regulations in effect.

In certain EU countries, it is possible to identify the customer and the beneficiary of the transfer of funds. When both parties are known, it is easier to determine whether or not money laundering has taken place. I think that, in such a setting, customers and beneficiaries would be much more careful. This also relates to the manual transfer of funds.

Vincent PEILLON

I would like to remind you that we based our suggestions on two proposals made by the FATF in its 2001 Report on the types of crime, all the while respecting procedures at the national level: regulating the form of trusts thanks to the introduction of standardised documentation and making registration mandatory.

Bernard BERTOSSA (Switzerland – Geneva Public Prosecutor)

As a practitioner of penal prosecution and, over the last 12 years in Geneva, having led dozens of criminal proceedings in the field of finance as well as investigations on tens of thousands of accounts and hundreds of thousands of financial transactions and undertakings, I must insist on the need to ensure transparency in this area. It is essential that secrecy not be pitted against investigations.

The problems that we have had to face and that we are still facing are as follows:

Transactions carried out by trusts

These legal entities attempt to conceal the actual economic beneficiary of the transaction and substitute it with a shell. The purpose of these entities, governed by Anglo-Saxon or Continental law, is to conceal the true operator.

Clearinghouses

There exist companies that specialise in clearing, and thereby make it possible to do away with the "paper trail" between transactions.

The various forms of secrecy

Here, we are referring to professional, bank and Defence secrecy, as well as diplomatic immunity. A number of political leaders and diplomats who enjoy diplomatic immunity lend their accounts in order to hide financial transactions. As regards bank secrecy, it is generally no longer a problem for penal judges.

The need to establish transparency that allows penal proceedings authorities to identify the true economic beneficiaries of the transactions, trace transactions back to their source and identify the true destination of the funds is a vital one in the fight against financial crime and its consequences.

The fight against money laundering makes it possible to fight against the benefits of a crime. When a crime is committed, it has financial consequences, as well as consequences on the lives of people. Involvement in a network of corruption within a State whose wealth is unevenly distributed does not only do economic harm, but also does harm to the lives of all citizens.

Switzerland has had the reputation of being financially secretive. In reality, it is not so. If it is of any comfort to the States whose markets compete with Switzerland, let me inform you that, in Switzerland, it is impossible to open a bank account of any kind without indicating the true identity of the economic beneficiary of the accounts. Those of you from the United Kingdom, Luxembourg or Germany can thus rest assured. If the same direction were taken in those countries, this point would not be able to be used by the Swiss market as a competitive factor

Dr Kurt SCHELTER

I would like to ask a question. It is unusual that Parliaments look into a specific form of crime. I think this is a necessity. However, we need to ask ourselves whether the proposals we suggest are feasible, both technically and legally speaking. I believe that we need to be worthy of the reputation of our Parliaments. Therefore, we must avoid making proposals that experts will later deem inapplicable or that lawyers will judge utopian with respect to the European Union’s interior market rules. For this reason, I would like to ask the various experts present whether they have assessed the different proposals on a legal level and on a technical level. I think it is necessary to submit proposals that bring about a modification in national law. At the same time, it is important to prevent our proposals from being hindered by constitutional obstacles or limits in EU treaties.

Vincent PEILLON

You have raised an essential question. As you stated, many of the proposals we are making already exist in certain countries or have already been adopted by some of our governments in various international organisations, but have not been brought to the attention of public opinion or popular sovereignty, of which we are the representatives. Our proposals were not intended, fundamentally, to be innovative, inventive, or even extremist. The objective was simply to ensure the execution of what our governments have already adopted (Tampere Summit, FATF, UN) within the different national parliaments, which remain the trustees of a crucial power. The response, at this stage, is a precise one. On this topic, I believe that the Federal Republic of Germany has just adopted the bank account register. All of the proposals require simple political will; practical and legal feasibility do not enter the picture. I, like all of our colleagues, share your concern. If one of the proposals were to come up against strong legal opposition and, consequently, became nothing more than an excuse, it would have to be discarded.

Jean de MAILLARD (Magistrate)

First of all, let me say how pleased I am, as a magistrate, that this conference has brought together most of the Parliaments of the European Union and the European Parliament. For many years, magistrates have been calling the attention of national and international political leaders to the seriousness of the problems at hand, in particular through the Geneva Appeal, two representatives of which are present here. This conference is thus an important event that deserves to be recognised. Moreover, we were pleased to hear earlier that it will be a lasting initiative.

I would like to share my general feeling on the statements we have heard on the Paris Declaration. Afterward, I will make some comments about Topic 1.

I regret the fact that the Preamble, which in my view effectively sets out the issues at stake, is not fully taken up in the proposals. The problem that practitioners face is that of being able to trace financial flows. As it happens, those flows are no longer national. National legislations and regulations not only slow down and hinder financial transparency, but are also sometimes the very vectors of concealment, in particular concerning trusts and the various forms of secrecy that go against the notion of financial transparency.

Not all financial activities should go public. No one wants that and no one is asking for that; however, no transaction should be able to hide from the control of the various fiscal, investigative or judiciary authorities. The various proposals do not sufficiently bring out the trans-national dimension. I fully understand that the initial purpose of bringing together the national parliaments was to ask that each of them adopt their own national legislation, but if that progress is not completed with European law on the matter, the efforts will have been in vain or insufficient. Each country will legislate using its own instruments. Most importantly, we will not be able to set up the supervisory and inspections bodies on financial flows, which are all trans-national, on the appropriate scale, meaning at least at the European level.

I regret, while on this topic, that the idea of a European Public Prosecutor was not included in the final proposals. We have been talking about it since the Tampere and Nice Summits. Moreover, a Green Paper issued by the Commission shows that it is possible to establish such an entity. The recoil observed since December 2001 is a sign, in my opinion, of regression and insufficient commitment in the will to fight against money laundering and financial crime. Might I remind you that, in the last set of proposals, the prerogatives of the European Public Prosecutor were limited to European budgetary issues and cases of fraud in Europe? It would have made it possible to initiate the European Public Prosecutor which will have to come about, in what I hope will be the near future.

On a related topic, if I am not mistaken, my proposal to create, as a European institution, a supervisory body on clearing houses and the financial system, which would be in charge of setting operating rules for the said establishments and verifing compliance, did not receive the consent of a majority of the parliamentary delegations. I regret this. I feel, in my capacity as a magistrate, that it is not possible to fight against any form of crime without setting a certain number of rules, not for the criminals, but for those who do not want to enter the network of crime. And we have to recognise that the only thing that can stop someone from entering, whether at the global or European level, a fraudulent network is that person’s sense of ethics. The Enron case is enlightening in this respect. It shows that the existence of Codes of Ethics within large international groups does not prevent people from deliberately infringing a law they created when public supervision does not exist. In the same vein, I would also have liked to see means for harmonising the registers called for in Topic 1 at the European level. Common standards for establishing the said registers are needed; otherwise, they will not be utilisable from one country to another. In addition, accounts should be published. Countries like France require commercial companies to publish their annual accounts, which are public. I do not see why a commercial company would not publish its accounts and make them public.

Lastly, regarding inter-bank transfers, and in particular Swift money transfers, it is not enough to identify the customer and the beneficiary. There is also a need to identify the reason for the transaction. Transfer orders should theoretically come with a statement indicating the reason of the transfer. Unfortunately, this practice is not widely followed by customers. Yet it is an effective means of control.

Vincent PEILLON

Your proposals are strong ones. They will probably lead to a number of comments. We will have the opportunity to talk about the European Public Prosecutor this afternoon. The issue of a European regulatory system in this field is an important one, and certain trans-national cases have shown that it is needed. We have too much of a tendency to think that national regulatory authorities are responsible for their banking systems, when in reality, the said systems, in particular in a number of small States that are home to many banks, should be the responsibility of a group of authorities. In this respect, the large States, and France in particular, are rather hypocritical. We need to be able to establish a trans-national and, in particular, European supervisory body. However, we are not at a stage where such a proposal can be made.

Nonetheless, regarding clearing houses, the prospect of European regulation is clearly mentioned in the draft declaration. The call is not at all neutral. On this point, I believe that history will take its course.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I would first like to come back to your first question about the origin of my mandate. I must say that I am wondering I will be able to present this text to my Committee. In addition, my comments are shaped by what is taking place in the European Parliament in this area. I believe that there are a number of possible viewpoints: British, Continental, Liberal or Corporatist. It may be that my nationality is pushing me in one direction or another. It is important to take into account all of these stances that result from our respective nationalities.

Concerning Point 18, on lifting professional secrecy, the government generally encourages professionals to report cases that seem suspicious to them. Resistance to the lifting of professional secrecy appeared within the European Parliament, in particular from Continental European parliamentarians, and not from British MEPs.

I find Paragraph 11 consistent with the rest of the text. It indicates that the objective is to be able to trace back the history of capital movements. We might add "movements of dubious capital". In other words, the paragraph puts emphasis on traceability, which in my view, is satisfactory. However, I am not certain that the rest of the text continues to emphasise traceability when it mentions the single register for the control of trusts, and calls for mandatory registering of all trusts. I am not completely familiar will all of the FATF’s texts, but I have the impression that they put emphasis mainly on identification and on what makes it possible to reconstruct the past history of capital movements. The emphasis should be on alertness, in particular when dealing with large transactions, with the reporting of those that seem dubious as mandatory.

Lastly, we must avoid excessive bureaucracy. I am not sure that the idea of a register is really needed. It may divert attention from the most important aspect, meaning the implementation of an alert system on dubious capital. Will the system be effective? Will it make it possible to trace back the history of capital movements? The central register will not. It is, however, important to have access to complete records. Professionals must be required to report on and have access to the same information as legal authorities. I do not know of any such access where the records of the Justice departments are concerned. Moreover, nothing is said about the protection of data either. In summary, it is important that we not stray from the notion of freedom to enter contracts (Paragraph 16). As an anecdote, I lost all of the benefits amassed in 10 years when I took out car insurance in Belgium. I know that this no longer occurs, but I still feel it is important not to hinder the right to enter different contracts. Such measures display a corporatist attitude. I would like to emphasise that I do not find that very effective. In contrast, taking steps to ensure that records are complete, that professionals know their clients well, and that investigative bodies have access to information are all extremely important points, in my view.

Michael FALLON (United Kingdom – House of Commons)

Mr Chairman, I fully agree. As stated, the recommendations must be concrete and effective. In the United Kingdom, we are not convinced that it is necessary to call on bureaucracy to trace capital movements. Actions must be carried out on bank accounts. Why would some companies not register themselves? I wonder who is going to register an illegal transaction. Perhaps certain less honest transactions would exit our countries, become extra-territorial transactions, and therefore no longer be listed in a central register.

As Ms Ludford stated, the investigative and supervisory authorities must be able to carry out investigations more easily and more quickly. The Public Prosecutor and the courts should also be able to carry out investigations when they have doubts. In addition, standards are needed at the international level, as evidence from the Enron case shows.

However, it is important that these issues not be taken up only through bureaucratic solutions. We must ensure that investigative units and the law are able to carry out quick investigations.

Frode SORENSEN (Denmark – Folketinget)

Thank you for having invited me. This gives us an opportunity to discuss a topic that affects us all: the best way to fight against organised crime and money laundering.

The Danish delegation was not able to participate in the two previous meetings of the Steering Committee, but we thank you for having provided us with the Draft Declaration that you drew up. It contains the same ideas as the proposals that are being examined by the Danish Parliament at this very moment.

Regarding the first topic, I would like to voice some remarks on Points 15 and 20. As pertains to Point 15, which deals with the reporting of all transactions carried out with trusts or assimilated entities to the financial intelligence unit, Danish law requires that, whenever there is the least suspicion that money laundering is taking place, an in-depth study must be carried out. This goes back to what the British delegation was saying. If the suspicion is confirmed, the transaction is frozen. In other words, the investigative bodies are not informed of all transactions involving trusts or assimilated entities, but it is possible to take action as soon as a suspicion arises. This seems suited to the true objective of the proposal. In Denmark, there are not many trusts, but this could change in the future. The Danish delegation would like the text to specify that a transaction must be deemed suspicious before the investigative authorities are informed. To this end, we propose the following text: "Require systematic reporting to the financial intelligence unit of dubious transactions carried out with trusts or assimilated entities".

Point 20 deals with the creation of a central bank account register. In Denmark, each bank has its own register, which is used to inform the fiscal authorities. There is no single fiscal register. We feel that the current system for registering the accounts of Danish citizens or foreigners residing in Denmark is sufficient. There is no need, in our opinion, to go further.

All in all, we are not proposing any modifications of Point 20, but do propose a modification of Point 15.

Ms Marie-Theresia FEKTER

The Austrian delegation considers that Point 18, on the lifting of professional secrecy, poses a problem with respect to Austrian law and is contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. We are dealing with penal cases. In this instance, we would have to accept that professional secrecy also be lifted for certain professions, in particular legal professions. We feel it would be appropriate to replace the term "lift" in Paragraph 18 by the term "harmonise procedures", regarding the enforcement of professional secrecy. In this manner, we would make it understood that we do not necessarily want to lift professional secrecy, so as to comply, in particular, with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In addition, the creation of a central bank account register also poses a problem. In Austria, there exists a system for identifying and communicating dubious or suspicious financial flows. It enables us to quickly obtain information on bank accounts as soon as it is suspected that financial transactions are of criminal nature. A single central register should not be the objective. There exist other solutions, such as establishing more effective networks for combating crime. It should be stated, "Create and standardise rapid recourse to all information on bank accounts of dubious origin". On a similar note, I was glad to hear someone propose that Point 15 be limited to dubious financial transactions.

Bernard BERTOSSA

I think that Ms Fekter is correct on the first point. Lawyers should only be able to invoke secrecy in the practice of their profession. In that sense, there is no violating privacy, and thus no contradiction with the European Convention on Human Rights or the right to defend oneself. On the other hand, a lawyer who uses his title to carry out financial transactions would pose a problem. He is not acting in his capacity as a lawyer, in that case; he is practising another profession, which is not covered by secrecy. Thus, Ms Fekter is correct. Rather than indicating that secrecy should be lifted, it would be more appropriate to indicate the limits of professional secrecy. To cite one example, this does not pose any problems in Switzerland. There, lawyers who are financial intermediaries do not have the right to invoke any form of secrecy with regard to penal prosecution authorities.

On Point 20, I think that the existence of a central bank account register is a very good initiative for prosecution authorities. The goal is to determine whether such or such a person incriminated in penal proceedings actually has an account in a given State and, if so, with which banking institution. The register simplifies the search and, with respect to international mutual aid procedures, often prevents us from finding ourselves faced with the infamous complaint that we are carrying out a "fishing expedition". In Switzerland, for instance, we are not allowed to call upon all Swiss banks on behalf of foreign judges to find out whether an individual, Osama bin Laden, for example, has an account in one of the country’s banks. The existence of such a register would be an interesting step forward for prosecution authorities. However, it would be necessary to limit the access to judiciary authorities, as Ms Ludford indicated.

Jean SPREUTELS (Belgium – President of the Financial Intelligence Unit)

The matter at hand is both fertile and important. It is the subject of lively debate as the FATF’s 40 recommendations undergo revision.

If you agree, I would like to make a few comments on the points that have been raised. I think that the text you added to Paragraph 9 will make it possible to assuage some of the worries expressed by certain delegations. While we are all in agreement as to the objective targeted, it is important to take into account national specificities and differences between the legal systems. To give one example, it would be dangerous to add any form of restriction to Article 19, for instance by making a judge’s order or warrant mandatory for access to intelligence, as such a thing does not exist in most of our countries. At the same time, thanks to the general remark in Paragraph 9, the countries that are familiar with the system will be able to recognise themselves in Article 19.

The same is true where professional secrecy is concerned. Paragraph 9 mentions compliance with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As pertains to Paragraph 15, relating to systematic reporting, it is a fact that the paragraph is worded rather broadly. It would be possible to limit it by indicating, for instance, that the systematic reporting is only required when it is impossible to identify the economic beneficiary. The prime responsibility of the financial body relates to the identification. I believe this is also stipulated by French law.

Vincent PEILLON

That is correct, but it is not its greatest achievement. That stipulation had initially been included by the Steering Committee, but certain delegations requested that the restriction be withdrawn. I was intending to propose it to you as part of my proposed synopsis. Thank you for having foreseen that.

Jean SPREUTELS

The issue of the central bank account register is a delicate one. All of the European Union’s financial intelligence units met in Brussels in October 2001 to develop a joint response to the threat of terrorism. This proposal was made unanimously. We found ourselves faced with huge problems, as did our banks, when it came time to quickly determine whether the people on the various lists published after the September 11 2001 attacks were in fact bank account holders. The central register would be useful to judicial authorities and financial intelligence units alike. Its use should, of course, be limited to the fight against money laundering and serious forms of crime.

The European Council has issued a decision on the freezing of assets. Its enforcement will require domestic measures in each of the Member States so as to provide a rapid response to requests for mutual aid introduced by other Member States. One of the ways to achieve this end is by creating a central register. That is how it works in the Member States that already have such a register.

The creation of a trust register is also the subject of much debate within the FATF. For your information, Jersey, a territory under Common Law, has instated a central trust register due to international and British pressure. Thus, it is possible.

Gilles LECLAIR (Deputy Director, Europol)

I would like to touch on Points 18 and 20. As pertains to Point 18, the notion of trans-nationality is a sensitive one. It is out of the question to renege on the European Convention of Human Rights. I would like to go back to the Commission’s new directive. Additional professions have been subject to mandatory reporting. This goes in the same direction as identifying transaction originators and transactions themselves. Certain legislations are relatively weak regarding the notion of sharing professional secrecy between professions. Two separate professions are not required, at the national level, to exchange information because they can mutually invoke professional secrecy. At the European level, this can add to the confusion inherent to identifying customers and beneficiaries of transactions. Consequently, I suggest that the harmonisation of professional secrecy and the assertion of the notion of sharing between professions be added to the proposal, making the identification of suspicious transactions upstream possible between professionals themselves.

Concerning the central bank account register, I feel that any centralisation and inter-connection of bank account registration systems can only foster speed in the investigations. As Mr Spreutels stated, terrorism has been our recent concern, but this holds true for any type of crime. Rapid identification of bank accounts fosters the effectiveness of investigations.

Jean-Pierre BRARD

I share Mr Bertossa’s opinion on the central register. Our reservations are sometimes the result of insufficient familiarity with our partners’ practices. I worked on fraud in the past. I went to London to interview the British customs authorities. Our French services, which are sometimes suspected of being inclined to go too far in fiscal enquiries, would envy the prerogatives of British customs authorities where investigations are concerned. We might consider them to be undermining liberties, but in fact, they are protecting British citizens from fraudulent practices.

The central register should make it possible to overcome differences in national practices that would bureaucratise and diminish effectiveness. Intra-Community fraud on VAT emphasises the need for centralised data. We cannot put all of our faith in the trustworthiness of financial institutions. To give one example, the top executive of a major French banking institution has just been placed under investigation. He was not about to call attention to the fraudulent behaviour he had noticed because he had taken part in organising it, having weighed all of the risks. Public institutions have their own responsibilities, which they cannot share with their partners if there is to be a shared ethic that reinforces the authority of public entities in the eyes of citizens.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you, Mr Brard, for your tribute to the British services and for your criticism of the limits of the French system. It is important to recognise that it is good to hear such comments in this type of meeting.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG (France – National Assembly)

I would like to emphasise, on behalf of the French delegation, what has been said by various experts regarding the need for a central bank account register. I do not think, as our British friends said, that it would create even greater bureaucracy. From the judges’ standpoint, it would actually serve to lighten up the bureaucracy. Is it possible, especially since September 11 2001, that magistrates who are trying to reconstruct capital flows across several countries be forced to question all of the banks in those territories, when they could achieve the same end in just a few hours by simply making a court request to look at the central bank account register? The demand is a central one for the magistrates who are struggling and spending much more time than the criminals on reconstructing the movements of dubious or suspicious capital. The demand is important and has been expressed for quite some time by magistrates, investigators and members of economic intelligence units.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

I would like to come back to Point 20, which deals with the central register. It is important to be clear: the aim is to develop not a central European register, but central registers in each of the Member States. In addition, it should be indicated that certain Member States already have a central register. That is an important point, as this not a legal requirement intended to make certain countries establish a second register. This needs to be made clear in the report.

Topic 1 also needs to aim to improve information systems on cash movements at national borders. We know perfectly well that some capital movements are part of illegal action. They are not part of any type of procedure, whether on the part of banks or elsewhere. The funds move around as cold, hard cash, in briefcases. It would be beneficial to follow the FATF’s recommendations regarding an information system on the movement of funds between EU countries and surrounding countries, and between the surrounding countries themselves. On this point, we are ready to submit to the will of the majority.

Vincent PEILLON

Thank you all for your remarks.

Some points have a broad bearing. I think that explanations were given on certain needs, on texts that have already been adopted or on practices that already exist and with which some people were not familiar.

The reservations regarding Proposal 15 are understandable. However, if we took on the idea of the Danish delegation, in its present form, we would run the risk of weakening our proposal terribly. As soon as a transaction appears suspicious, whatever the financial intermediary involved, mandatory reporting is generally called for. The suspicion sets off alertness. While holding on to the idea of setting a limit to the proposal, as our text is too broad, I think we should be able to come back to a more precise definition of the restriction. As Mr Spreutels suggested, I propose that we go back to what we had initially written, adding the following terms to Point 15: "in case it is impossible to identify the economic beneficiary". This distinguishes the type of concealment on which we want to take action.

Concerning the remarks voiced by the Danish delegation and by other participants on professional secrecy, our reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen shows that we have made the appropriate distinctions. It is important that harmonisation take place, as Mr Leclair emphasised. The Commission and the European Parliament have recently completed fantastic work on this topic. Mr Leclair’s proposal on shared secrecy is a frequent request. However, certain reservations cannot be eliminated at this stage. In addition, such a great degree of precision would lessen the strength of our request that procedures for lifting professional secrecy be harmonised. If we managed to do so relatively soon amongst European countries, it would be a major step forward where co-operation is concerned.

Regarding the question of the central register, my experience, and the comments of many speakers, show that before accessing the company register or the bank register, steps are always taken to ensure that personal freedoms and a number of basic principles are respected. Moreover, the opening of the registers is subject to court supervision. We can no longer do without this kind of instrument, which does not add complexity but, on the contrary, simplifies the work of investigators.

I suggest, at this stage, and unless there are extremely precise suggestions on the wording that we can submit to the whole of the assembly, that we keep the texts that we have adopted until now, in the hope that the contributions of the various experts on the central bank account register or the company register convinced you.

I would like to add that the existence of registers is a minimum requirement, as they often contain only a small amount of information. In other words, the principle of establishing a register is not a guarantee against crime, but a minimum requirement for fighting crime effectively. This relates less to the bank register than to the company register. The objective is to identify the economic beneficiary. Who is behind the operation? That is generally where the breaking point lies in the chain of movements.

Thank you for the quality of your contributions. I leave the chair to Mr Hunault, Vice-Chairman of the French Information Mission on Money Laundering, former rapporteur for France’s 1996 law on money laundering and, most recently, rapporteur on a text against terrorism before the Council of Europe. He will preside over the second Round Table, which deals with sanctions against non-co-operative countries and territories.

 

 

C - Round Table 2

Sanctions against Non-co-operative Countries and Territories

Mr Frank HOFMANN, Bundestag (Germany), Co-Chairman;

Mr Michel HUNAULT, National Assembly (France), Co-Chairman;

Ms Soledad BECERRIL, Congress of Deputies (Spain);

Mr John McFALL, House of Commons (United Kingdom);

Mr Laurent MOSAR, Chamber of Deputies (Luxembourg);

Mr Gilles LECLAIR, Europol;

Mr Jean SPREUTELS, Financial Intelligence Unit (Belgium);

Mr Jean-François THONY, Magistrate and UN Adviser (France).

Michel HUNAULT (France – National Assembly)

Before giving the floor to my colleague Frank Hofmann, I would like to extend him a warm welcome, as well as to Ms Becerril, Mr McFall, Mr Mosar, Mr Leclair, Mr Spreutels and Mr Thony.

I now give the floor to Mr Hofmann, German parliamentarian and co-chairman of the present round table, which deals with sanctions against non-co-operative countries and territories.

Frank HOFMANN (Germany – Bundestag)

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues, it is a pleasure to be able to jointly preside over this Round Table in Paris, as a German MP. The events of September 11, 2001 and their consequences allowed the entire world to realise the significance of dubious international financial transactions for the safety of our citizens. Organised crime and terrorism have been known to the world for quite some time. Unfortunately, certain countries and certain extra-territorial financial markets do nothing to fight against this criminal activity. For a long time, these were believed to be "exotic" topics, which were the concern of only a few experts. Anyone who tried to take up the topic was immediately suspected of writing a James Bond novel. On September 11, 2001, reality overtook fiction. We all know that terrorism can be financed not only with illegal funds, but also through other financial transactions. Terrorists do not necessarily look to co-operate with organised crime to finance their activities. I think we are realising, more and more, that organised crime and terrorism are linked. Certain States are doing everything they can to fight this plague, but action must also be taken to determine how to handle those who ignore what is going on, or who are active in organised crime. It is important to fight against international terrorism on this front, and it is essential to eliminate the obstacles that prevent illegal financial transactions from being followed. This area needs to be made a priority for action within our Parliaments. We, as MPs, must ensure that these topics are included on the agenda of our various assemblies. That is why I am present today. I fight ardently against the laundering of illegal funds. This fight is of prime importance. I am the speaker of the SPD within the Bundestag. In addition, I was involved in the investigations of a number of cases dealing with the financing of political parties or the Elf Aquitaine scandal in Germany. I had the opportunity to closely study the investigation carried out by Mr Bertossa. This allowed me to understand the difficulties that exist and the instruments that are lacking in the fight against money laundering. My desire is to ardently promote the fight against money laundering. It is necessary that we reflect together on the obstacles that still exist in the fight against money laundering. We made the decision to create a domestic market within the EU. It is therefore necessary that we do everything in our power to tackle the problem and to ensure the stability of democracy and the Rule of law. It is fundamental that these be maintained. This is why it is important to fight against the laundering of illegal funds.

Just like my colleagues from Italy and Germany, I would like to point out that I am not a representative of the German Parliament. I am simply a highly committed German MP who wishes to work in close conjunction with you in the fight against the laundering of illegal funds. The FATF is a very important tool that has established a number of recommendations, in particular as concerns non-co-operative countries and territories. I hope that progress will be achieved in the near future. Sometimes, it is more effective to proceed in a non-diplomatic manner. Consequently, it is important that we call a cat a cat. We will need to discuss, loud and clear, the topic of sanctions. This will make it possible to move ahead on the issue. Certain countries must commit to carrying out a number of actions so as to enable true financial and administrative control of certain financial transactions. Within the EU, progress needs to be made, in particular in our respective Parliaments. International financial crime encompasses a large number of grey areas. It is such that we cannot allow ourselves to do nothing.

I do not know whether we will be able to name certain non-co-operative countries outright. However, we can refer to the FATF’s recommendations. It will certainly be important to take up the issue of sanctions against non-co-operative countries and territories. Point 24 is very important. It calls for true co-ordination within the EU in this area. It also mentions reinforcing the effectiveness of sanctions.

Michel HUNAULT

Thank you, Dear Colleague, for having provided the introduction to the Round Table. You indicated the necessity to reflect on sanctions where non-co-operative countries and territories are concerned. Who would like to contribute at this stage?

Jean SPREUTELS

Mr Chairman, I would like to emphasise, as Jean de Maillard did, the importance of this parliamentary initiative to the experts and field operators that we are. Parliaments have a part to play in providing political impetus. Moreover, they are legitimate bodies.

This topic is the direct corollary of the first topic, and of other topics as well. It provides the weaponry for the international response. It is necessary that we be able to take direct action against States and territories that might continue, after the failure of a certain number of attempts to reach a compromise, with an attitude that is not in line with international rules in this area.

The EU’s role is essential here. For this reason, Paragraph 24 is a key component of the topic, insofar as it insists on developing co-ordination at the European level. In addition, the link with the FATF is essential, as Paragraph 23 reminds us. There is a need for concerted effort at the global level. Paragraph 28 goes even further. Some of the counter-measures being contemplated, such as those that involve restricting or prohibiting transactions or flows, had already been considered by the FATF, but have not yet been included in its set of provisions. For that to occur, the Parliaments’ political impetus would be needed.

Lastly, at two of the European Ecofin Councils, in October 2000 under the French presidency and in October 2001 under the Belgian presidency, each of our governments committed to implementing, jointly and in a timely manner, the counter-measures that the FATF had adopted, and to adapt, if necessary, their legislation. At the last Council, the Member States committed to ensuring that their legislation would allow them to apply the counter-measures by 1 January 2002. Meanwhile, the FATF met one week ago in Hong Kong in order to continue its work on the topic of non-co-operative countries and territories. I am the head of the Belgian delegation within the FATF. We once again examined the black list, which includes 19 countries and territories. Although real progress has been accomplished, we felt that none of the territories were worthy of being removed from the list. As far as candidate countries to the EU are concerned, Hungary is the only country affected. On that topic, the FATF was pleased with the rapid and significant progress achieved by the country, in order to remedy the shortcomings identified. Nonetheless, we decided to fully adhere to the strict procedures that govern inclusion in and removal from the list, in particular regarding Hungary. However, it is possible to imagine that the country might be removed from the list at the next plenary meeting, in June 2002. We are in the process of verifying that all of the laws voted are truly enforced.

In conclusion, I would never have thought that the international community would take action so energetically and unanimously in order to fight against non-co-operative countries and territories. Enormous progress has been achieved over the last two or three years.

Pierre BRANA (France – National Assembly)

Europe is, in my view, a well-suited setting for taking joint action against non-co-operative countries and territories. It was a pilot at the international level in this field. The events of September 11, 2001 gave it further impetus, in particular thanks to the agreement on the European arrest warrant, which was not a realistic possibility in the short term just a few months ago. We must now take advantage of this impetus to go even further. The present Interparliamentary Conference can be a driver in this respect. The list of measures proposed in the final declaration as regards sanctions against non-co-operative countries and territories repeats, essentially, what is said in the FATF’s recommendations. It could be integrated into a future framework decision and/or directive.

Beyond that prospect, the establishing of a true European judiciary area is a real priority. Our efforts must aim to move us beyond the current standstill on certain important texts, such as the draft framework decision on the freezing of assets and proof. We saw that this was possible with the European arrest warrant.

In addition, we need to move toward a more operational definition of the instruments to be used in judiciary and investigative co-operation – Europol and Eurojust – and work toward progressively harmonising penal sanctions within the European Union so as to prevent criminality from being able to extend its scope of action. If it achieves this, Europe will at last be able to fully play its part in combating organised crime within the context of globalisation.

Michel HUNAULT

Thank you, Dear Colleague. I have no doubt that you will be heard. Mr Brard said that he wished that countries requesting membership not be included on the FATF’s black list. Mr Spreutels responded favourably, indicating that Hungary would soon be removed from the list. Mr Brana, I have no doubt that your call for a European judiciary area will be heard.

Jean-François THONY (France – Magistrate)

The present meeting of the European Parliaments on money laundering is entirely fulfilling its promises. Parliaments can play an important role in guiding our governments in the fight against money laundering. We must recognise that our actions, even in Europe, are not always at the level of our promises. When we come to the topic of sanctions against non-co-operative countries and territories, we always think about other countries and not European countries: "Hell is other people". However, a UN report published in 1998 by the Anti-Money Laundering Programme, which I was directing at the time, had identified around 15 financial havens within Europe itself. The concept of financial havens brings together that of offshore centres with that of tax havens. We must therefore stop and look at both our practices and our legislation.

I strongly believe in the effectiveness of sanctions against non-co-operative States and territories. The sanctions have a dissuasive function. In this respect, the FATF’s list of non-co-operative countries and territories has enabled some countries to make headway in implementing legislation that is more in compliance with our standards on the fight against underground financial channels.

There exist two types of financial havens. Sanctions have different effects, depending on the type of financial haven involved. As pertains to financial havens that are major international financial centres, they will be intent on rapidly adapting their legislation, as it is in their interest to focus more on legal money, which involves greater volumes than illegal funds. In contrast, some countries or territories, like Nauru, have no history of financial engineering and do not have structures that are suited to controlling the offshore banks or shell corporations that are based within their borders. No one knew of these countries before they became true modern-day pirates. They must not be allowed to integrate the international financial system. In other words, we will have to find a way to close such offshore centres. In addition, economic alternatives will have to be found for those countries.

What should the sanctions target? The 1998 UN report established a list of 70 States that fulfil the definition of financial haven. The FATF, in the meantime, has drawn up a list of 19 non-co-operative countries or territories. It should be said that the countries identified by the FATF are not necessarily those traditionally included on the map of money-laundering channels. The FATF’s task is not an easy one. It has attracted a certain amount of criticism, in particular vis-à-vis those States that would have taken up the role of censors of the fight against money laundering, having some hidden agenda. It is believed that the said States are not without ulterior motives. The problem is now to determine how States should be named to the list and who should be responsible for that. It is important that solutions be found so that the establishing of such a list no longer comes up against such criticism.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

Mr Hofmann brought up, and rightly so, the problem of non-co-operative countries in general and those that do not co-operate in prosecuting the financial channels behind terrorism. That is what stands out for me in his introduction. As a representative of the Spanish Congress of Deputies – and I do not think I am the exception – I believe that the scope of criminal offence of money laundering should also encompass the fight against the financing of terrorism. It is essential. We all suffer from this problem, some of us more than others within the European Union.

Regarding the issue of sanctions, I know that it is a complex task. It is important that we prevent certain countries from placing themselves at the outskirts of transparency. The FATF – the international Financial Action Task Force that has been mentioned several times already – has already taken effective action in this area. Its role is not an easy one, yet it has already made quite a bit of progress. I would like to salute the members of the FATF present today. They know better than I how difficult their task is.

Some countries do not comply with the rules on transparency. It is difficult to determine what is going on in those territories or countries. Should they be on the black list? What kinds of pressure can we exert on them? Using what instruments? Should we equip ourselves with new sanctions? I think we are capable of achieving results.

I feel that the measures included in the draft declaration are all wise ones. We might include another measure, even though it is a bit late to do so. It pertains to an area that is of particular interest to the FATF: technical assistance for countries and territories that are not yet in compliance with the rules, but which have indicated that they wish to do so. In other words, these are countries that would like to be part of our group, but cannot do so because of a number of technical deficiencies. When that is the case, the FATF provides assistance and follow-up to these countries.

It is appropriate to sanction, but we must also develop means to convince the countries involved. We must be able to help them carry out the necessary changes. We must not limit ourselves to sanctions alone.

All of the proposals in the Draft Declaration are useful and interesting in my eyes. I would like to lay emphasis on Points 28 and 29. They make it possible to complicate the financial workings of non-co-operative countries and territories by cutting them off from the international financial market. That is a good way to pressure them into changing their attitude and modifying their laws and regulations in this area.

Michel HUNAULT

I hope that you will have an answer to your question about technical assistance for countries on the FATF’s list that would like to comply with the rules, but are unable to do so.

John McFALL

I am quite delighted to be here again as a representative of the United Kingdom. I have made note of Mr Brard’s remarks on my country. When I was in Paris two weeks ago to attend a conference, Mr Brard made some rather bitter comments on the United Kingdom. Mr Brard seems to have changed his mind. I am happy to see this.

Our colleague also indicated that we are not in a position to influence our Parliaments. This needs to be taken into account in our deliberations, as it is important to respect both parliamentary debate and the various jurisdictions that exist in Europe. In the United Kingdom, the principles of Common Law prevail in Wales and in England, while Roman law reigns in Scotland. Thus, within the United Kingdom alone, there exist several jurisdictions. The same is true elsewhere in Europe. We also need to take into consideration the political impact of these proposals on our various countries. Until now, we have not really lingered on this question. Nor have we taken up the question of cost-benefit analysis, which it would be appropriate to carry out in certain countries. As far as I am concerned, I am wary of proposals that do not have a cost. We must take into account the impact that these measures will have on taxpayers. Moreover, these proposals will have an impact at the administrative level as well. I am aware of these issues as I head the British Parliament’s Finance Committee, which is in the process of studying the United Kingdom’s new financial agencies. As you may know, a law passed in November 2001 has led to the regrouping of the various agencies in charge of regulations in the United Kingdom under a single entity. This raises the question of the statutory environment. In the United Kingdom, we will have to change our legislation. We must also avoid creating too much bureaucracy in order to allow the financial markets to continue their operations.

I am very pleased with Paragraph 24, which mentions co-ordinated action within the EU on this subject. This can only make sanctions more effective.

We have forgotten to mention the United States, which make up the largest financial market. I recently went to the United States as Chairman of the British Parliament’s Finance Committee to discuss the need for harmonisation and co-ordination between American and British regulations. I was highly aware of this.

Ms Becerril talked about the need to provide technical assistance to certain countries. A few years ago, I was concerned with what was happening in Ireland, which does not have good image in this field. Irish politicians emphasised that they wanted to comply with international standards in this area, but also stated that they needed our support. The "carrot and stick" policy is the best suited response in this situation.

As we fight against money laundering, it is important to keep in mind that a large amount of illegal funds becomes legal and that this has an impact on all of our cities, and on the young people suffering from drug addiction. The link between illegal funds and drugs is well known. In other words, as we present our proposals, we need to remember that the laundering of illegal funds has a direct impact on our citizens.

In my view, the FATF needs to be supported and reinforced, especially in the wake of September 11 2001. It does not have access to sufficient means. We must all go before our national Parliaments in order to ensure that the work carried out by the FATF is reinforced. I am glad to see that transparency and the need for co-operation are being set forward in this section. As another participant stated, we must call a cat a cat. After all, the draft declaration is nothing more than a set of wishes. We must ensure that those wishes can be granted, in compliance with national traditions, and as part of a global response to the laundering of illegal funds. Today’s global society no longer recognises national borders.

Lastly, it appears that this forum is slated to become a standing forum, with periodical meetings. I would be delighted to welcome all of the delegates at this conference to London, so that we might carry out our present undertakings, with the assurance that Mr Brard will help us through Customs.

Laurent MOSAR (Luxembourg – Chamber of Deputies)

It is with great pleasure that I attend this meeting on behalf of Luxembourg’s Chamber of Deputies. My pleasure is all the greater given that I come from a country that is often criticised in relation to the fight against money laundering. That criticism is both exaggerated and unfounded. The subject of this Round Table deals with sanctions against countries and territories identified as non-co-operative by the FATF. In my opinion, the subject needs to be approached from three different angles. We should first identify the sanctions that could be easily applied in our countries (Member States of the FATF or the EU) and the sanctions that are applicable to other countries. In addition, I am in favour of certain countries’ being recognised as what they are: nations or countries that are hopeless or have no future. In that regard, I support the reinforcement of commercial or banking practices that can restrict the use of offshore companies. In Luxembourg, it is impossible to open a bank account for a legal entity that is governed by the law of one of those countries. The only exceptions are when the banker can obtain guarantees on the company, both on a personal level and on a professional level. There must be no reasonable doubt regarding the nature of the applicant’s business and the source of the funds he intends to deposit.

The close supervision of financial transactions without economic background is both possible and necessary. The relevant Luxembourg authorities take their duties very seriously, inspecting and auditing companies, account holders (whether national or foreign) and financial relations between entities under Luxembourg law and those under foreign law. In Luxembourg, we have observed that, since the implementation of the measures that allow for verification and identification of economic beneficiaries and dubious financial transactions, and the underlying operations, the interest of offshore players and anonymous entities have far less interest in our country. This proves the effectiveness of the "quarantine line" we have set up around the financial market’s operations. We fully intend to carry on with this line of action, and invite our partners to set up the same legal and prudential rules and practices as we have.

With this in mind, I listened carefully to Mr Peillon’s statements. He pointed out the small countries that are home to a large number of banks and which might encounter problems with supervision. It seems to me that the problems with supervision do not affect small countries alone. They are also present in large countries.

All in all, I adhere almost without any reserves to all of the proposals in the second topic of the final declaration. However, the proposal that prohibits financial establishments from the EU to open offices in non-co-operative countries or territories poses a problem, in my view. I am not fundamentally opposed to it, but I feel that it is impossible to credibly exercise control in this field. If a financial institution wishes to establish or maintain itself in a non-co-operative country or territory, it can always call upon a shell corporation to ensure its presence, even if it is not identifiable as such at first glance. The administrative and legal form of the control procedures would, in all likelihood, be completely out of proportion with respect to the results expected. I am more of the opinion that reinforcing legal and prudential supervisory requirements within the EU will bring about better results than prohibiting operations outside EU borders. This belief does not, however, prevent me from accepting the presence of the measure within the set of actions proposed.

The issue of non-co-operative territories identified as such by the FATF and either hopeless or without a future is one that concerns me. To support my statement, I would like to use two examples: the Republic of Nauru and Niue Island. The Republic of Nauru’s only resource, phosphate, was used up a few years ago. The country’s history of mining led to the downfall of its own prospects for reusing seven-eighths of the island’s 20 kilometres. In reality, at the present time, Nauru no longer has an economy. Niue, an island of similar size, does not have many more inhabitants than a single village in Luxembourg. It does not have an economy either, with the exception of a new product, that of Internet domain names ending with "nu". The content of the sites is no more acceptable than those who operate them. What is our intention? How will the 20 000 or 10 000 inhabitants of these countries survive, given the means that are available to them? I used these two examples of countries on the FATF’s list to call your attention to the fact that there is no alternative for these countries to sustain themselves. There are other examples.

In conclusion, we will not put an end to financial crime unless we take a global approach to the phenomenon and its causes.

Michel HUNAULT

Thank you, Dear Colleague, for your strong commitment in the fight against the laundering of illegal funds. I noted that you are not opposed to the wording of Paragraph 29. In addition, you raised the issue of control. This will certainly give rise to some exchange during the discussion.

Gilles LECLAIR

We have all come up against certain territories and certain countries over the course of our investigations. The importance, in this respect, of Point 24, which calls for the reinforcement of co-ordinated action within the EU, should be recognised. It is the EU’s duty to set the example in this area. It is fundamental that this example be followed by effects within the EU itself. In addition, the causal relationship between the first two round tables is clear. It is important that we highlight the way in which compliance with the prohibitions will be checked, as the representative from Luxembourg emphasised. Whatever the means, the prohibitions are a step in the right direction. The EU must be exemplary. Furthermore, I feel that the prohibition should be extended to the new professions mentioned in the new European Directives. Certain legal professions have subsidiaries in a number of financial havens, which serve as convenient stops for more or less illegal transactions.

As regards the financing of terrorism, we need to reflect on the role of tolerant States. It is important that we make a number of distinctions where terrorism is concerned. There exist several types of terrorism. Terrorism is sometimes financed through means that are specific to organised crime. In other cases, terrorism can be financed using legal money that is made illegal, as was the case with the events of September 11. Certain tolerant States should be placed under surveillance with respect to that. It is the duty of EU States to do away with a number of political and economic obstacles to the listing of certain States in the index. It should be emphasised that certain terrorist actions are financed using misappropriated funds from NGOs.

Michel HUNAULT

Do sanctions have a dissuasive effect? What are the ramifications of being on the FATF’s black list? I give the floor to Mr Moulette, whom I thank for being present today.

Patrick MOULETTE (Secretary General, FATF)

I am very honoured to be able to attend your session. The topics brought up by the Conference are essential ones and are at the heart of both the FATF’s work and the fight against money laundering. The FATF’s was, moreover, mentioned on many occasions. I was glad to see this. In addition, I would like to thank Mr McFall, who insisted on the necessity of having access to adequate means at the international level to fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. I believe that, on this point and on others, the Parliaments can help us significantly.

One of the FATF’s priority undertakings consists of establishing the list of non-co-operative countries and territories. We devote a great deal of time to this at our meetings, during which many experts from our Member States take the floor. The list of non-co-operative countries or territories has come under criticism, but less so than other international initiatives, such as that of the Forum on Financial Stability or that of the OECD. The FATF’s list was elaborated on the basis of 25 objective criteria that define the failings of anti-money laundering systems. We followed a transparent procedure. The initiative has set off progress that is unprecedented in the history of the fight against money laundering. This needs to be emphasised. It took a certain amount of courage for the FATF’s members to set out on such an undertaking. It was the first time in history that governmental experts from a certain number of countries were courageous enough to identify the countries that are non-co-operative in the fight against money laundering, meaning the countries who do not co-operate in the fight against organised crime.

Equal treatment is an important issue. As we fight against money laundering, we must never lose sight of the fact that we must first look at our own shortcomings. This means that the FATF’s Member States must comply with the rules that they establish. I believe that we also exerted pressure from within when necessary over the first 10 years of the FATF’s existence. We did not hesitate to apply the same measure to one of our Member States as that which we apply to countries on the FATF list. Recommendation 21 was applied to Austria due to the problem with anonymous savings accounts. The recommendation refers back to the publication of a public declaration that points out that the country has not done enough to enforce anti-money laundering measures. We had threatened Austria with suspension if it did not take care of the issue, which was raising problems of anonymity and is at the heart of the issue taken up by the FATF.

The issue of technical assistance has already been raised. In a large number of press releases, the FATF’s members clearly commit to supplying technical assistance, whenever required, to countries that have made the political decision to embark on the path toward reform. However, the technical assistance is supplied by members of the FATF, insofar as the FATF is not a true international organisation, but an action group. In addition, the action plan for combating terrorist financing clearly indicates that countries that wish to change their legislation so as to adopt the FATF’s eight special recommendations on the fight against terrorist financing will, if necessary, be able to benefit from technical assistance supplied by the Member States.

As part of the broadening of its mandate, the FATF implemented a system to fight against terrorist financing at the Washington meeting, held in October 2001. The procedure regarding non-co-operative countries and territories targets the failings of anti-money laundering systems, as opposed to the failings of measures to fight against terrorist financing. On this topic, I would like to call your attention to the fact that the Member States have committed to initiate a process, starting with the next plenary session in June 2002, intended to identify countries that do not co-operate in the fight against terrorist financing, meaning countries that do not have appropriate measures for combating this phenomenon. In the next stages, we will discuss, in particular, possible counter-measures for the jurisdictions affected.

Karsten NONBO (Denmark – Folketinget)

Denmark is known as a country that usually shows a number of reservations, legally speaking. In this particular case, we do not wish to show any reservations. We are in the process of preparing legislation on this subject in Denmark, and support the declaration without reserve.

Michel HUNAULT

Thank you for your support. I give the floor to the delegation from Hungary, which is a candidate for membership in the European Union and is included on the FATF’s black list.

Janos HORVATH (Hungary – Parliament)

It is true that Hungary was listed. I appreciate everything that Mr Hofmann said in his introduction. He promised to call a cat a cat. Hungarians appreciate that.

Generally speaking, Hungary is accustomed to appearing on the list of virtuous countries, and I cannot understand why Hungary is on the list of non-co-operative countries. Perhaps we communicated poorly and did not make it understood that we are virtuous. That is why this shadow has been cast upon us.

Hungary’s economic activity is, on the whole, satisfactory. There is no need for me to present the figures on Hungary’s economy here. Regardless, illegal funds play absolutely no part in the development of Hungary’s economy. Hungary has been judged satisfactorily by the business community: a great number of foreign investors are present. They come from many countries around the world to do business. In a sense, Hungary’s best judge is the business community.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for your words. I was delighted to hear them, as some of you said that you did not know how Hungary came to appear on the FATF’s list. The removal of Hungary from the FATF’s list is essential, in my eyes.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my turn to extend an invitation to come to my country. It is always better to see what is happening by oneself. I am a good citizen of the world, of Europe and of Hungary. I therefore know how you feel as we proceed in this exercise. I am convinced that Hungary will come out of this difficulty. Its name will be entirely cleared. I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to voice my comments on the spur of the moment. I would have regretted remaining silent.

Michel HUNAULT

Mr Jean Spreutels preceded you in your wishes, when he intimated that Hungary might soon be removed from the FATF’s black list. Thank you for your invitation.

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA

I am pleased to hear that Hungary and the United Kingdom are favourable to the idea of a standing parliamentary conference on money laundering. Consequently, we will need to establish a list of the points to be developed and examined in the future.

Likewise, I am in support of the idea of continuing to discuss the implementation of a European supervisory authority on financial movements. We have already made progress in this area. The events of September 11 2001 gave new impetus to our undertakings. A large number of recommendations are currently being translated into practice. Nothing is more international than capital movements. Strict regulations can exist at the national level, but they are not enough. A European and global set of regulations is also needed. This will have to be discussed subsequently.

Regarding Point 29 in the Declaration, we will need to deal with how to monitor compliance. The aforementioned Point 29 requires that establishments from EU countries be prohibited from opening subsidiaries, branches or offices in non-co-operative countries and territories. How will we deal with financial establishments whose headquarters are in the EU and which already have branches in the said countries or territories?

We will also need to monitor the integrity of transactions that take place at the level of the EU-based headquarters and in third-party transactions. An international regulation on subsidiaries outside the Union will certainly be required. These points will need to be discussed at future meetings in London or Budapest.

We will need to consider sanctions as well as aid for countries that wish to co-operate, but are not capable of doing so. The position of certain developing countries is very fragile. Consequently, we will need to help them implement a reliable and transparent financial infrastructure. In this context, the EU might grant technical assistance to the countries. This idea could be taken up in the Declaration.

As regards the rest of the declaration, I am in support of all of the recommendations.

Michel HUNAULT

The problem of technical assistance and the supervisory body has comes up frequently this morning. These directions might be studied in greater depth at future meetings.

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER

Austria was mentioned outright by one of the speakers. I strongly contest the idea that Austria could be one of the non-co-operative countries. This is not true, and has never been true. Austria has always fought against money laundering effectively. Anonymous savings accounts were done away with two years ago. It is strange that an expert from the FATF should not be aware of this. It is surprising that he should consider putting Austria on the list. More caution and care is required before taking such measures. At the very least, people should inform themselves beforehand.

Michel HUNAULT

I am not sure whether there were problems with the translation, but that is the exact opposite of what was said. The speaker took note of the fact that Austria had done away with anonymous savings accounts, this being the reason for which it was removed from the list of suspicious countries. It is important that this misunderstanding be cleared up.

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER

That is not what I heard. The participant stated that Austria still allows anonymous bank accounts to be opened and that, in addition, Austria is being considered for inclusion on the FATF’s list, all of which made me angry.

Michel HUNAULT

I am certain that Mr Moulette has made note of Austria’s determination and the fact that it has done away with anonymous accounts.

Bernard BERTOSSA

Does the United Kingdom need some technical assistance so that Gibraltar will no longer be a haven for anonymous accounts?

Michel HUNAULT

I was trying to be diplomatic. I almost regret having given you the floor, Mr Bertossa. Mr McFall may reply, if he wishes.

John McFALL

I have only one comment: let us move on!

Michel HUNAULT

I would like to thank the various delegations who worked on each of the propositions. Points 24 and 29 are particularly ambitious. We must now assert our will and take concrete action to follow up today’s conference.

Frank HOFMANN

I have the impression that we all want to move forward. We want to intensify our co-operation within the framework of the FATF, even though there exist a few minor problems in the wings, in particular with Austria. I believe that we must not take all of the contributions literally.

The session is suspended until 12:55 PM. It resumes at 2:30 PM.

 

 

D - Round Table 3 :

Prudential Rules

Mr François d’AUBERT, National Assembly (France), Co-Chairman;

Mr Roberto CENTARO, Senate (Italy), Co-Chairman;

Mr Harlem DESIR, European Parliament;

Mr Dominique GARABIOL, Former Head of the Inspection Department of the Financial Markets Council (France);

François d’AUBERT (France – National Assembly)

In Round Table 3 we shall discuss the necessary prudential rules and their present inadequacies. In fact, world deregulation of the capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering resulting from financial wrongdoing, organised crime and terrorism, especially in view of the acceleration of capital movements and the growth in financial flows. What is more, the systems for money laundering that now exist have become ever more sophisticated. The people engaged in this are perfectly well aware of the differences in the rules applying in the various countries and make use of these differences between the regulations and laws. There seems to be a crying need for us to tighten up the rules of the game, especially the prudential rules and ethical obligations of the markets.

How can we proceed with this broadening of control and financial regulation? Shall we extend it to all providers of financial or legal services and on the traditional international networks or to the Hawala-type networks or on the systems integrated into the international capital markets (lodging of funds, clearing, inter-bank transfers, etc.)? One of the questions to be answered is who should introduce these prudential rules so as to achieve harmonisation on a minimum regulatory basis, the more so since every country has its own regulatory authorities which often work in isolation. In fact, we find that the authorities that issue prudential rules are fragmented. In France, for example, we have the COB, the Banking Commission, and the Insurance Control Commission. Nonetheless, we can see a trend towards centralisation amongst authorities that issue the prudential rules in certain countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom.

We may also wonder as to the role of the ECB which, since its creation has been aligned solely on its task of monetary policy. In fact, it has been given no powers whatever with regard to prudential and regulatory matters. Consequently, what in France is dealt with by the Banking Commission within the Bank of France is excluded from the purview of the ECB. There are those who regret this. The question requires careful thought. In fact, if we wish to have a fully functional ECB, it must in the future concern itself with prudential rules.

We shall be discussing payment methods. A limit should be placed on payments in cash beyond a certain amount. With regard to financial services and operators, it has been suggested that mandatory approval should be obtained from the authority regulating financial services. Who will be affected? Operators belonging to a fund or securities transfer network, including the traditional informal or parallel networks. In fact, certain operators wear several hats and act as brokers for the investment of both honest money and the proceeds of organised crime. Few operators are concerned, but they need looking at. Also concerned are intermediaries between private persons, the bureaux de change and the financial intermediaries operating on the Internet. This latter field offers many opportunities. By way of example we can mention the gambling in the Net casinos.

We also propose to strengthen random checks, with regulation, if necessary at international level, on the activities of the clearing houses and payment/delivery of stocks and shares. Finally, we intend to apply criminal penalties to the manifest failure by the professions with vigilance obligations that fail to observe them. These are important points. They will enable us to make progress towards our aim of combating money laundering at world level, laundering undertaken by organised crime.

I will now hand you over to Mr Centaro, Co-Chairman of this third Round Table. He is a senator and Chairman of the Anti-Mafia Committee of the Italian Parliament.

Roberto CENTARO (Italy - Senate)

I welcome all participants on behalf of the Italian delegation. In addition, I thank Mr d’Aubert who has just introduced this Round Table. In the space of a few years we have developed from a small-scale economy to one that is totally globalised, with its own rules. Besides, within this framework, certain countries are using capital in a rather doubtful way by making use of a number of intermediaries for their financial flows. Consequently, the emergence of new rules has been accompanied by the appearance of operators who are less and less subject to control. In addition, we should also take account of technological progress which has allowed capital to be transferred ever more rapidly from one point on the globe to another in a few minutes.

Altogether, we are faced with a quite extraordinary accumulation of capital and financial transactions in all countries of the world. Very few countries are protected from this kind of activity. By all appearances, organised crime is using the new technologies to the best effect while governments have great difficulty keeping on their track. In fact, the build-up of transactions may well produce a serious international financial crisis.

It is essential that rules are drafted that permit financial transactions to be undertaken only by registered persons and those recorded on the financial registers approved by governments. In addition, the ever increasing number of organisations conducting these transactions throughout the EU must be reduced so that only a single organisation is left within the Union. Otherwise, the numerous divergences between the various national legislation will create a breach in which organised crime will proliferate. This would prevent us from effectively combating this kind of wrongdoing.

Of course, the financial market is not limited to the European Union alone. In fact, a great many financial transactions take place from the EU to the outside world and from the outside world to the EU. These transactions must be governed by precise rules. It would be pointless to regulate financial transactions within European territory if we do not do so abroad as well. It seems to me that we shall need this central control body to make precise spot checks on the activities of financial intermediaries. In fact, simply being registered can on no account amount to a safe-conduct or a blank cheque. Controls with criminal sanctions are necessary if we are to create a true deterrent. Our objective must be to overcome the cultural divergences between our various countries which are often slow to abandon their own systems in favour of a central European system, such as the ECB, for example. It seems to me that we must set up a central control body in this area.

Besides, the number of cash transactions should be restricted. In fact, it is far easier to slip through the financial net if transactions are made in cash. They are very difficult to trace.

Each of these questions will have to be looked at seriously within the EU in due course, while other operators in the world often make for the unregulated areas, which offers organised crime an inestimable advantage, so it becomes ever more entrenched and ever richer.

Harlem DESIR (European Parliament)

I believe that the fight against money laundering can be effectively conducted only within a framework of the closest international co-operation. In fact, the financial market is not limited to the European Union alone. So we must involve the largest possible number of states (OECD, countries applying for admission to the EU, some of which have had a finger pointed at them by FATF, Russia). However, I think that we cannot take the inertia or complacency of a certain number of other states as an excuse for limiting ourselves to what has already been done in the European Union. In fact the financial centres within the EU play a very important role and handle a considerable share of international financial transactions. We could mention two major clearing houses, Clearstream and Euroclear, the foreign exchange market clearing system, Swift, and the fact that nearly half the transactions on the world foreign exchange market take place in centres within the EU, notably that of London. Besides, certain offshore centres, which have been the subject of enquiries by Messrs d’Aubert, Peillon and Montebourg, are ultimately controlled by EU member states. Altogether, I believe that the EU should take action, not least by putting pressure on the recalcitrants in order to make the international community move forward and to show that there are ways and means whereby those with the will can combat the networks and mechanisms of money laundering. Besides, I feel that the reaction of the international community and the United States has shown that with the political will we can get things moving (freezing financial assets, in particular) and that the argument that the globalisation of markets prevents us from acting has proved a fallacy.

The introduction of prudential rules presupposes not only that we have the legal and regulatory instruments but also effective means of control. That is as far as inter-governmental co-operation within the EU goes. By way of example, we could mention application of Directive 91-308 on money laundering. It has just been revised and strengthened. However, the changes made will not by themselves remove the obstacles that we have come up against.

The problems at Clearstream led to the spectacular resignation of its former director, André Lussi. He was in fact dropped by Clearstream’s main shareholder, Deutsche Boerse. This case has also resulted in a best selling book written by Denis Robert and Ernest Backes. It made me, as a European Parliamentarian, put a question to the Commission on the conditions under which the provisions relating to Directive 91-308 were implemented in relation to this leading clearing house. The Commission replied to me in writing on 2 May 2001: " It is up to the Commission to verify the correct transformation of Community directives by Member States and their correct application by the national public authorities. On the other hand, the correct application by private persons and undertakings of the national laws into which directives have been transformed is a matter for the national authorities of Member States. The Commission does not at the present time have any reason to believe that the Luxembourg authorities will not vigorously intervene ". In other words, we have a European regulatory framework but the strong arm remains national. The Commission is therefore reduced to noting implementation of the transformation without having any means to go further with verification unless it is quite obvious that the Member State has fallen short in a number of ways.

I think we must decide whether our system can remain at the mercy of the greater or lesser determination of a Member State in assuming responsibility, sometimes at odds with the idea it may have of its own interests, even if unfortunately its interests may extend to protecting the activities of financial organisations not conforming to Community regulations.

Consequently, I think that we should go beyond the inter-governmental level in this area and equip ourselves with a Community supervisory body or a Community supervisory mechanism. Either, this area must fall within the purview of the Commission, like competition, for example, which has its own directorate-general able to conduct enquiries, or a specific body must be created under Community jurisdiction.

It is, moreover, essential that we have a central register of commercial companies’ accounts so we can at all times immediately verify the transparency of accounts opened and operations. Finally, I have suggested a special tax on transactions with offshore centres and tax havens. This proposal was in fact included in the draft document. I feel that, together with the other measures, this could be effective.

Finally, we have to choose between appeasement and intervantion. In fact, the EU countries must now devote as much energy to combating money laundering and the mechanisms of tax fraud, which make use in general of laundering, as they rightly do to combat the means of financing terrorism.

François d’AUBERT

In fact, the battle against money laundering implies a new state governed by international law. We all want concordance between the state governed by the rule of law and the effective application of the law, which is not easy. Creating a state governed by the rule of homogeneous and effective law is an important advance.

Dominique GARABIOL (France – Former Head of Inspection, Financial Markets Council)

I should like to throw some light on the various proposals in the document by reminding you what we mean by a prudential facility in money laundering matters. When this facility was introduced 12 years ago (founding decisions of the Arche Summit which set up FATF and the European Directive), the first aim of these measures was to protect the financial facility from its being used for money laundering purposes. At the time we were afraid that whole layers of the financial system would pass under the control of international criminal organisations. This fear came true only shortly afterwards, with the BCCI case. We had, moreover, to make sure that these facilities did not hamper the free movement of capital. The fluidity of the European internal market had to be assured. In other words, this system was not aligned on combating money laundering or attacking the organisations themselves.

Now, this objective has clearly changed. In fact, following the events of 11 September 2001, we expect the prudential facility to weaken the criminal and terrorist organisations. We must then fully reassess the facility in order to gauge its shortcomings and to undermine the financial strength of criminal or terrorist groups.

Transparency must be assured for both operations and actors. The question of the international organisations is clearly relevant. Their status is often uncertain. Moreover, how they are controlled is not clear. These questions have already greatly gained in importance. By way of example, we know that the bodies for the settlement and delivery of securities must be supervised, registered and provided with a constitution. That is the case with Euroclear and Clearstream.

Besides, practice in Europe differs according to the country, as far as sanctions for failure to observe the vigilance obligations are concerned. In certain countries, this sanction is self-regulated. It ranges from admonishment to a withdrawal of approval. In other countries, the possibility exists of criminal sanctions. Having regard to the new objective assigned to the prudential facility, the self-regulating sanction appears inappropriate. In fact, it is difficult to prove that one or other body is guilty of money laundering. Establishing a willing and deliberate link with money laundering operations is difficult. The strategy adopted by these bodies is that of credible negligence. This means being negligent in a credible way so they can subsequently show how sorry they are that it happened. Our concern is not to pin down incompetence or stupidity, but wilful failure to discharge the duties of vigilance. Facilities of this kind would give the various authorities the means to ensure the integrity of the financial system.

François d’AUBERT

Thank you for having shown that we have progressed from a defensive phase to an offensive one with a view to weakening the terrorist and criminal organisations more directly

Frode SORENSEN

The Danish delegation does not wish to make any changes to the text on the subject we are now discussing. However, with regard to Point 51 (Internet), the Danish parliament is at present studying a parliamentary bill requiring consignors to be identified so that an operation can be traced as from its origin. I should mention in passing that an appreciable number of Danes are worried with the new trends on the Internet: the formation of on-line casinos. Denmark has very strict laws on games, but they do not apply to on-line casinos. The fact that these can be used as money laundering centres worries us in Denmark. That is why our co-operation in the future should be aimed at controlling the development of Internet casinos. We must make sure that the casinos on the Internet do not grow like mushrooms in the non-cooperating countries. I would mention in this connection that the Danish authorities consider that a great deal of money laundering in Denmark passes through physical casinos in the country. That is why we feel that the growth of casinos on the Internet could cause us a great deal of difficulty. Those who offer this type of service on the Internet should be subject to prior approval.

This is only a comment. In fact, we are totally satisfied with the present wording of the point.

François d’AUBERT

This is an important contribution. It seems to be covered by point 51. However, the question of Internet casinos will undoubtedly require further attention.

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA

We would support the call by the two co-chairmen for active supervision. What is more, the various monitoring bodies require reforming. Certain countries have already started on this, to keep in step with the developments taking place in the international financial markets and linked with financial wrongdoing. It is essential in this connection that we know whether the supervisory authorities have the necessary resources in terms of staff and skills to identify these financial flows. The workforce at the Dutch supervisory authority has been increased from 8 to 200 within the space of a few years in order to deal with the various developments. Substantial efforts must therefore be devoted to investment. I must admit that the Netherlands simply does not have enough experts or staff to deal with these developments, which require extensive resources in terms of personnel and competence.

The recommendations under item 4 are satisfactory. I feel that we should mention money transfers under point 50 (bureaux de change).

Jean de MAILLARD

In watered-down form, point 52 meets Mr Désir’s request and what I was saying this morning. However, the wording of this point could be improved by replacing the words " at international level if necessary " by the expression " and also at European level ". In fact, we are particularly concerned with the European level. Besides, it is one where we can act. While supervision of the clearing houses is on its way at national level since the Clearstream scandal, there is still no Community control over the clearing houses.

With regard to point 53, I support Monsieur Garabiol’s suggestion. He used the adjective " wilful " in connection with the failure. In fact, the text uses the word " manifest ". I fear that the adjective " manifest " may be too vague and will prevent a common term from being adopted in the various countries. The term " wilful " is also too restrictive. In fact, it is difficult to show negative proof, i.e. negative proof of the intention of a desire that does not exist. I therefore feel that " manifest " could usefully be replaced with " typical ", even though this is still not quite the right word.

François d’AUBERT

Does any delegation object to the first replacement suggested by Mr de Maillard?

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

I do not wish to raise any serious objection. However, I feel that if we limit ourselves to European level we shall limit our own opportunities for intervention.

Dominique GARABIOL

While I share the view of the Spanish delegation, I am afraid that this suggestion may come up against material difficulties. In fact, the European level in the clearing flow has no viable basis. The frontiers of Europe are as permeable as national frontiers within Europe. In suspect operations, the flows leave the UE for offshore centres or for countries that are not necessarily uncooperative. Be that as it may, the paths taken are highly complex. Mr Désir spoke of Swift for example. I cannot conceive of any strict European control over these flows, even if Swift’s head office is located in Belgium. No such control would be effective.

François d’AUBERT

It is true that a wording including the term " international " is on the vague side. However, it could be more functional having regard to the nature of the transactions.

Harlem DESIR

I do not think that the alternatives are mutually exclusive. In fact, we could delete " if necessary " and insert " at international level, including European level ". This would indicate that prudential controls must also be strengthened at European level

François d’AUBERT

This proposal seems to be satisfactory.

Vincent PEILLON

It is difficult to delete the words " if necessary ". Everyone at national parliament level must be committed to strengthening prudential control and the regulation and means of monitoring the bodies entrusted with such control. This is an important point. It concerns the responsibility of the national parliaments.

As we see it, the international characteristic incorporates the idea of regulation at multi-lateral and European level in due course. This provision was debated at length during the preliminary meetings. Besides, the experts have long argued in favour of this wording. That is why, on behalf of the French delegation, I suggest that the wording be left as it is.

François d’AUBERT

The term " international " essentially includes the European level. We shall therefore keep to the initial proposal, which does not exclude the European level.

Does anyone wish to speak on the manifest nature of an omission in point 53? In national law and in case law, the manifest nature of an omission seems to be the more broadly accepted.

Dominique GARABIOL

I feel that this discussion is bogging us down in essential questions of criminal law. The ambiguity of the terms " manifest " or " typical " could be taken to indicate that an organisation that is guilty of shortcomings of this kind within its defensive system would be subject to criminal sanctions. The idea of manifest or typical failing leaves it to an independent factual assessment of the intention of the persons concerned. On the other hand, the term " wilful " may seem imprecise but it refers back to clear provisions of criminal law. In fact, there is no crime without a will to commit it. We should stick to the known concept. Money laundering is a criminal offence in our various states. The idea of extending the criminal sanction, which already exists in certain states, to omissions is a significant extension in a number of member states. To meet with general approval, I feel that this extension will be acceptable only if it is accompanied by proof of willingness to allow the shortcoming. Having been faced with a certain number of these cases, I think that the omission must have been repeated and become known so that the investigators are able to prove them. Besides, the various calls made on the administrative authorities and professional bodies must have proved ineffectual. We have the means of proving an intention to permit a shortcoming.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I have not followed all the discussions on this point. However, the question of criminal sanctions for breach of civil or administrative obligations is an important one. In fact, this question ties up with a number of other questions. It even seems to me that it is not a question that can be studied in isolation. By way of example, a railway accident renders the operating company and the employee liable. Strict liability means that no recourse need be made to negligence. In this case, failure to discharge an obligation results in liability. This is not an important step indeed. I do not know whether this is what the draft document suggests. If that is the case, it would mean that proof of the intention to act in this way is not necessary. Such cases exist, although they are rare.

François d’AUBERT

It is not a matter of reversing the burden of proof.

Hugo COVELIERS

Mr Chairman, I believe that certain versions of the draft document continue to use the French term " manifest " while others do not do so. This is undoubtedly linked to differences in criminal law in our countries. Besides, Mrs Ludford refers to these divergences in her contribution. On the other hand, it is worth considering the term " intentional " as under Belgian criminal law. In fact, the term " manifest " is too subjective. What is manifest cannot be interpreted in criminal law. That is why I suggest we have recourse to another term or leave it out altogether. For example, the term " manifest " does not appear in the Dutch version.

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER

I believe that we are confusing two principles of criminal law: manifest breach and the principle of liability whatever the offence. It seems to me point 53 refers simply to the description of the breach. The various versions speak of serious breach, manifest breach or evident breach. In all cases, breaches are strictly interpreted.

Besides, we also wonder who is guilty of the omission in question. The text in fact says nothing about the person responsible for the omission. It seems to me, therefore, that we should refer, rather than to an omission, to failure to discharge an obligation. I believe that we must be more precise in the terms used from the criminal aspect.

François d’AUBERT

The latest version of the text which has been approved by the various delegations uses the word " manifest ".

Roberto CENTARO

The question of liability under criminal law applies at three stages: objective liability, culpable liability and liability due to negligence. If the term " manifest " implies a formal desire to commit the act, criminal liability arises where voluntary omissions are concerned. However, the sanction would be less substantial than in the case of failure to discharge an obligation to be vigilant. It seems to me that an omission under the duty of vigilance should be sanctioned. In fact, I would consider it to be a serious fault.

Recourse to desire or intention means that there can be no objective liability. In such a case, we are limited to the desire to harm. I believe that this is not necessary. In fact, even in cases of negligence, a criminal sanction must be imposed to ensure that the duty of vigilance is steadfastly and meaningfully discharged.

François d’AUBERT

We represent national parliaments which have a great deal in common, but they have been unable to agree on a single criminal code. In fact, the national legal cultures are often handed down through precedent and different laws. We are trying today to arrive at common denominators which do not entirely have the strength of articles of the criminal code. Formulas must be found that express a strong political will easily transposed into national law.

Jean SPREUTELS

I wish to support your views. Paragraph 53 is essential insofar as it guarantees the efficiency of the proposed system but what we have come up against is a lack of harmonisation in our enforcing law (criminal law, administrative law). We must not become embroiled in the subtle arguments of the criminalists. That is why we suggest the following wording " to attach effective sanctions, criminal where applicable, to an omission in their duties… " (point 53). This formula will get round the discussion on the manifest or typical nature of the omission.

François d’AUBERT

This is a compromise suggestion. Your wording implies that it is possible to limit ourselves to professional or administrative sanctions. In fact, our wording goes further as it places emphasis on the criminal sanctions. Besides, professional and administrative sanctions already exist.

Dominique GARABIOL

Even if there are no criminal sanctions, there have been a number of sanctions since the first Directive concerning the duties of vigilance. The discussion concerns the introduction of a range of heavier sanctions for essentially serious cases. Besides, the situations vary from one European country to another. In fact, certain countries only have administrative sanctions while others already rely on criminal sanctions. The discussion concerning international implications relies on a possible convergence of the various European legislations towards criminal sanctions. To the best of my knowledge, no European country has criminal sanctions based on simple omission. In other words, the European countries that already have criminal sanctions base them on criteria of wilful act. Altogether, the object of the suggestion is to achieve an alignment between the countries of the EU on a certain number of provisions that already exist in certain states.

Vincent PEILLON

France has no criminal sanctions. In fact, we have recently been thwarted in this connection. A certain number of European countries have criminal sanctions. Besides, we have found that some kind of registration of sanctions, criminal sanctions in particular, is lacking in the efficiency of our system of vigilance. I believe we have a disparate situation in Europe. The suggestion of an alignment on the question of criminal sanctions is welcome. No expert has suggested the contrary. That is why I hope that we shall maintain the idea of a criminal sanction. This is one of the progressive aspects of the text. The problem with intentional act has been put very well by Mr Centaro. An intention is always present. On the other hand, manifest nature goes beyond this. To find a compromise proposal to the initial text, we must keep the criminal sanctions while maintaining the concept of intention. I share the views of our Italian colleague on the fact that the term "  manifest " would go further and would make sense. However, if we are to arrive at agreement on the criminal sanctions characterised by an intentional omission, we shall have made progress towards harmonisation. This is a proposal from the French delegation.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE (Belgium – Senate)

We must remember that our aim is to produce a minimum European standard for the effective application of the prudential rules which are not, by nature, criminal. We must define the criteria that make an offence against financial ethics subject to the Criminal Code. I believe that the idea that an omission is manifest is natural at European level. This comes back to the idea of marginal control of activities. The prudential control mechanisms have wider powers of judgement than the authorities and criminal precedent. Manifest nature means that not simply an error of conduct would allow the national authorities a margin of national discretion. It seems to me that the intentional nature of an omission depends on a large number of assessments amongst the various national laws. The criterion of intentional act is not, in my opinion, entirely clear.

François d’AUBERT

The intentional criterion goes without saying if an offence or crime has been committed.

Dominique GARABIOL

The value of the term " intentional " is that in each national law it goes back to something that is established. This discussion will not help us to resolve the fundamental differences between the various national criminal principles. The aim must be kept within limits. We must criminally sanction a wilful omission from the duties of vigilance.

François d’AUBERT

Is any delegation fundamentally opposed to the use of the term " manifest "? I therefore suggest that we maintain this version. I now call on the delegation from the United Kingdom which wishes to speak on Point 46.

Michael FALLON

I in fact need clarification on point 46. I have the feeling that the limitation on cash payments is likely to upset a number of calls for tenders. In fact, some people do not have bank accounts. Besides, I wonder how such a limitation can work in practice. In fact, any transaction can simply be split up.

Dominique GARABIOL

It is true that every transaction can be split up. Doing so is nonetheless an offence. That is the case, for example, with the provisions laid down by the European Directive concerning the supervision of cash operations against money laundering. The sums are fixed. Any operation can be split up but splitting it up is a sanctionable offence. This must be proved, which is not easy, but it is possible. In the countries that have rules of this kind, enquiries have shown that it is possible to prove that payments have been made broken down for the same operation. I feel that splitting up is actually something that we can deal with.

On the other hand, it is true that limiting cash payments will depend on the use of payment instruments of a different kind (cashless). I would remind you in this connection that it is not necessary to have a bank account for this purpose. In fact, there are many payment systems that make use of approved bodies and that allow the operations to be traced. The purpose of the provision is to trace operations.

François d’AUBERT

The limit on cash payments is fixed at EUR 3 000 in France. It is in fact generally observed. Does any other delegation wish to comment on article 46?

Donato BRUNO

Italian law similarly limits cash payments while imposing an obligation to notify any amounts in excess. In fact if the amount exceeds a threshold laid down by law, the authorities must be notified. Besides, payments that are broken down must also be notified if they exceed the authorised threshold.

In Italy, I believe that the authorised threshold for payments in euros is EUR 10 000. However, this threshold is not necessarily that which makes notification necessary. I should like clarification on this difference.

François d’AUBERT

First of all, the amount is not fixed, which allows flexibility in harmonisation between the various countries to which some people object, even in principle. Only one direction is indicated. We shall not therefore discuss the question of notification, which is a very important one. Besides, there are various means of notification. France has a system as under American or Italian law. In other words, there are various means for checking and sanctioning excess settlements in cash. It is no doubt premature to go into technical detail in dealing with this question.

Dominique GARABIOL

I believe that Italy has the most advanced system of mandatory notification. A distinction must be made between two levels of approach: the limitation on cash payments and notification. The object of limiting cash payments is traceability, which does not imply notification. However, in the case of an enquiry, it must be possible to go back along the payment path. That is the aim. At the present stage, this does not prejudice decisions that may be taken regarding mandatory notification. We are concerned simply with tracing the payment path, which is very important in investigations.

François d’AUBERT

Does any delegation have an objection in principle to paragraph 46?

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER

The control mechanisms under point 46 should perhaps be mentioned. In fact, I believe that it is sometimes necessary to make payments in cash to conclude very important transactions.

François d’AUBERT

I understand that, but some countries are already applying proposal 46. We cannot therefore ask them to take a step back. Be that as it may, the formula under proposal 46 points the way but does not go into technical details. If we really want to limit cash payments, it is clear that a system of control is required. However, we ought to arrive at a common denominator on a very sensitive subject which is influenced by the culture of each country. For example, cash payments are regarded as highly suspect in France.

Dominique GARABIOL

The difficulty of making certain transactions should be considered. It is dealt with by the various mechanisms set up by the banks and the postal giro system. In this connection, the Geneva Convention of 19 March 1931 lays down functional rules for cheques. Any person is entitled to go into a bank, hand over a sum of money in cash and obtain a cheque in exchange. This does not involve any technical delay and is executed on the spot. This type of mechanism is in fact widely used in France for property transactions, for example. The banks have a duty of vigilance. They must therefore check the reliability of the origin of the funds. That is the object of this provision.

François d’AUBERT

I suggest you adopt article 46. Unless there is a fundamental objection, I regard article 46, which concerns the limitation of cash payments beyond a certain amount as adopted.

I must thank you for the quality of the work done and your comments which reflect the strong desire of the national parliaments to combat dirty money. This work shows how difficult it is to achieve harmonisation having regard to the various legal cultures, especially in the criminal law. However, common denominators can be arrived at in co-operation provided we agree on the philosophy, which can be summarised under three points:

Finding efficient and effective checks on the development of money laundering and on the new money laundering mechanisms (casinos Internet etc)

We must adapt continuously to the technologies of money laundering.

Protecting the financial system from itself

A financial system that even unintentionally permits money laundering will end up by paying for it one day or another. It is enough to see the damage caused by simple accusations of money laundering, whether justified or not.

Weaken the criminal and terrorist organisations

They must be tracked down wherever they spring up as secretly and effectively as possible.

I believe that national parliaments have arrived at a consensus on this important subject.

 

E - Round Table 4 :

Judicial, Police and Administrative Co-operation

Mr Arnaud MONTEBOURG, National Assembly (France), Co-Chairman;

M. Hugo VANDENBERGHE, Senate (Belgium), Co-Chairman;

Ms Maria ARSENI, Hellenic Parliament (Greece);

Ms Sarah LUDFORD, European Parliament;

Mr Panagiotis NIKOLOUDIS, Public Prosecutor (Greece).

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

I must welcome Hugo Vandenberghe, the Belgian senator who will jointly preside over this last Round Table, on judicial, police and administrative co-operation.

The question of judicial and police co-operation was initially raised by the judges who signed the Geneva Appeal 6 years ago. The discussion has progressed and has gone its way within the European institutions. The European Council at Tampere in 1999, which presided over the formation of Eurojust, is one example. It is true that the national parliaments, which left it to their governments to negotiate the diplomatic agreements within the European framework or within various multilateral arrangements, are not used to dealing with these questions directly.

The Egmont group has done groundbreaking work in connection with co-operation in the area of policing and information units. This is an initial Community response. Nonetheless, judges of all nationalities continue to report a large number of obstacles to us. They have time and again mentioned the difficulties in arranging judicial co-operation on combating organised crime and financial wrongdoing. Certainly, a whole range of agreements of a multilateral nature and a certain number of conventions exist. They were put forward for signature by the states and ratification by the national parliaments. Their ratification is necessary. However, the delays and the progress still to be made on this project must be mentioned. We must, moreover, go further by affirming our collective and concrete political desire and uphold a number of proposals. Following the events on September 11, 2001, political agreement was recently reached on the European arrest warrant. This is a fundamental stage following the setting up of Eurojust in Tampere which was incorporated into the Community framework during the meeting of the European Council in Nice. It is a fundamental stage in the arrest of criminals and in providing evidence to EU Member States who ask for it.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE

The subject of judicial, police and administrative co-operation was the one most frequently amended during the work on the Steering Committee. I shall try and trace the various stages that the present text has gone through while explaining the scope of certain recommendations.

In its initial version, the declaration was aimed solely at judicial and police co-operation. From the start of the work it became apparent that it had to be extended to administrative co-operation for the sake of efficiency. The international dimension of financial crime in fact requires an improvement in judicial, police and administrative co-operation if we are to make any meaningful progress in combating this scourge. One of the guiding principles during discussion was to seek to improve existing structures rather than advocate the formation of new institutions or the preparation of new laws. That is why paragraphs 33 and 34 refer to certain existing structures (OLAF) and the work undertaken on international bodies (UN, EU, OECD, etc. This will enable national parliaments to strengthen their constitutional role in combating money laundering, without rejecting the contribution and achievements of other actors.

Following this brief summary of the general background to our work, I suggest we look at the various proposals and I shall comment on them briefly.

Proposal 36 calls for the development of information exchange between financial information units. Each country of the Union, following the outline decision of 16 October 2000, has a financial information unit. Members of the Steering Committee felt that co-operation between these units should be encouraged. This is an essential element owing to the trans-national character of financial crime. Such an exchange of information should also permit better insight into the phenomenon at European level.

Proposal 37 advocates the ratification, implementation and strengthening of the international conventions intended to facilitate judicial co-operation and to combat money laundering and criminal organisations. Many experts have drawn the attention of members of the Steering Committee to the risk of becoming overloaded. In fact, the laws have been passed but they have not been ratified. Other laws require complex and highly integrated facilities to be set up, entailing very long implementation periods during which nothing happens on the ground. Finally, other laws lack cohesion, which makes them difficult to apply. Recommendation 37 integrates these various comments.

Proposal 38 suggests the indictment of financial crime. This should result in homogeneous legislation on organised crime within the Union and provide for appropriate sanctions.

Proposal 39 argues for the introduction of an adjustment to the burden of proof as to the criminal origin of funds. The proposal has given rise to much discussion. In fact, a number of delegations wondered whether this measure was compatible with the presumption of innocence. I feel that these fears are based on a misunderstanding. In fact, the proposal is intended to introduce a splitting of the burden of proof, which is not the same as reversing it. The accused will not be forced to justify his actions if the prosecution has no hard facts. The latter must show proof of a bundle of factors that permit the existence of the offence of money laundering to be presumed. If the accusation can provide such proof, it is then up to the accused to justify his standard of living and the legal origin of his funds. As a number of members have stressed, the technique of splitting the burden of proof has already been applied under the European Directives aimed at preventing discrimination. Besides, the European Court of Human Rights has pronounced on a number of precedents in accordance with article 6 (2) concerning the presumption of innocence.

Proposal 40 requires criminal sanctions to be harmonised, especially recommending confiscation of the proceeds of crime and the instruments of money laundering. A consensus was quickly formed on this point. The same applied to proposal 41, which suggests mutual recognition of decisions on freezing, seizing and confiscating illegal assets.

In addition, the Steering Committee is convinced that the European arrest warrant is particularly important if we wish to combat money laundering more effectively at European level. The wording of the proposal was adopted at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. However, Committee members favoured keeping up the " pressure ", despite the undoubted political advances made on this point, stressing the need for the rapid and specific enactment of this political consensus, which requires laws to be made for its application in our various countries. This is the object of recommendation 42.

Recommendation 43 calls for the operational character of Eurojust to be consolidated, permitting it not only to exchange information but to assist the appropriate national authorities with the initiation and conduct of investigations and in coordinating enquiries.

To understand the scope of this recommendation correctly, we must remember that the initial declaration advocated the formation of a European public prosecutor’s office. This idea was discussed at length during the work of the Steering Committee. A number of delegations drew attention to the premature, if not counter-productive, nature of this suggestion, having regard to the recent formation of Eurojust and the present diversity between European judicial systems. Several members also commented that it was difficult in one and the same document to advocate the strengthening and creation of two bodies meeting different requirements, Eurojust and the European public prosecutor’s office. In fact, the European public prosecutor meets a Community need while Eurojust meets the need for inter-governmental judicial co-operation. In the circumstances, it was decided to place the emphasis on consolidating Eurojust by opening up the possibility for it to initiate and conduct proceedings before the national courts. The fact that the formation of the European public prosecutor’s office does not appear in the text should not, however, be regarded as a rejection of the actual idea of the institution.

As I mentioned in my introduction, the Steering Committee opted for a pragmatic approach to the subject. That is why it is worth remembering that the Steering Committee failed to adopt certain proposals concerning police, judicial and administrative co-operation that seemed too difficult to implement. I am thinking in particular of the idea of providing for a sharing mechanism between states for assets confiscated at the end of international co-operative measures.

I feel that the text that serves as a basis for our work is not only ambitious but realistic and balanced and will be happily adopted by all delegations.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I agree with the Co-Chairman on the scope of the new European instruments which were agreed on two years ago. The text does not quite do justice of the progress made at this level within the European institutions. As you are aware, the European Council at Tampere on 1999 made a far reaching change in the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty, by opening up a wide range of possibilities for co-operation in the areas of police and justice. Tampere for the first time united the heads of government of the 15 states on questions of justice and home affairs. This Summit allowed real progress to be made in this area.

Paragraph 37 argues for the ratification, application and strengthening of international conventions. I feel a distinction must be made between what concerns Europe and what is international. Besides, paragraph 33 stresses that police and judicial co-operation is less advanced. This is true but the progress made in this connection in the course of 2 years is quite considerable. By way of example, at the time of the 1998 Summit, member states did no more than express reservations on joint action on confiscating the proceeds of crime. Subsequently, giant strides were achieved with, in particular, the framework decision of June 2001. This is now truly rooted in the EU treaty. In fact, as an example, prison terms of three years are provided for proven cases of money laundering. Here we have gone beyond a purely international system. We have been able to create a favourable political climate for change of this type.

I also think it right that this chapter should mention the money laundering Directive 2001. In fact, the provisions have been strengthened, with in particular the introduction of a system of reporting on doubtful transactions. This Directive goes well beyond a simple international convention. The European Parliament has just decided to turn the Directive into a truly legal instrument and it will enter into effect. Consequently, extraditions will henceforth be automatic in the case of the offence of laundering dirty money. I feel that we have gone beyond the provisional system applying in 2001.

The original Europol mandate provided for a simple exchange of information on money laundering while regarding it as secondary in relation to other offences or crimes such as terrorism or drug trafficking. However, following a Council decision in November 2001, it can act in cases of money laundering pure and simple.

Since December 2001, the Council has been able to freeze the assets of terrorist organisations. This decision was disputed in the European Parliament insofar as this step can be taken without consultation. The European Parliament made an effort to apply the brake on this proposal.

Finally, the decision on mutual assistance of May 2000 has still to be ratified by the national parliaments. On the other hand, there is an additional protocol on access to information on bank accounts and banking transactions.

I have made an effort to show that the draft final declaration does not truly reflect the progress made over the past two years on judicial and police co-operation, even though a great deal remains to be done in giving effect to this progress.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

The term used in proposal 39, which may result in some ambiguity, refers to a lightening in the burden of proof. I would go so far as to call it sharing the burden of proof as Mr Vandenberghe has done.

Ms Maria ARSENI (Greece - Hellenic Parliament)

If we take the international economic situation into account, Greece considers the initiative in arranging a meeting of the national parliaments of the EU a very important one. I must say that we attended all the previous meetings and that we agree with all the proposals made.

Greece has set up a legal framework that offers the appropriate authorities an opportunity to cooperate without limitation with all actors concerned with these matters.

In my view, we shall have to be more flexible in future and cooperate more efficiently at judicial level. I feel we have further progress to make on the exchange of information.

The Greek information unit is altogether independent. It has a mixed character. It is concerned with the police, the judiciary and the administration. Thanks to this mixed structure, the unit is able to cooperate with the international services or its European equivalents on money laundering and financial crime.

If you would like further information, I suggest you listen to what Mr Nikoloudis, our national public prosecutor, has to say. He has been working on this question for many years.

Panagiotis NIKOLOUDIS (Greece –Public Prosecutor)

I shall deal with two subjects that I consider very important: the Egmont group and the reversal of the burden of proof.

The Egmont group has worked successfully but it includes members that do not belong to the EU, which considerably limits co-operation and exchange of information. The laws of all EU countries protect European citizens with regard to personal data and their use. The police and judicial authorities of EU countries are able to cooperate under the aegis of these laws. However, this type of police and judicial co-operation is not possible with countries that do not belong to the EU, insofar as this mutual trust does not exist and the protection for and use of personal data is not governed by the same laws. That is why we should perhaps limit ourselves to the frontiers of the EU and not depend on the Egmont group. On the other hand, we must extend co-operation within the EU. I should like to see more effective co-operation, going beyond the remit and the powers of the Egmont group. However, the ideas developed within this group are worthwhile. In fact, they should permit a reply with regard to what is no more than a first stage in police, judicial and administrative co-operation. The Egmont group had the following idea: all units should cooperate and exchange information independently of the nature of the units concerned, in the area of money laundering and financial crime. By way of example, the Greek financial information unit is legal, financial and administrative by nature. This should not prevent it from cooperating in full trust and on an equal basis with a unit in another country that also seeks to combat money laundering, even if its characteristics are different. It must be able to cooperate with a foreign police or administrative unit. We must adopt a constructive attitude. This idea of the Egmont group is altogether constructive. We must set up co-operation beyond the differences and at all levels (administrative, police and judiciary). I have noted on numerous occasions, at international forums, that trust is lacking between units of different kinds and different countries. I feel that the same obstacles also exist between purely administrative units. In the case of co-operation with a view to combating money laundering, it is important that the units are properly chosen and their powers carefully defined. Altogether, this idea of the Egmont group is entirely positive and should be encouraged.

In addition, I feel that reversal of the burden of proof and the possible confiscation of assets resulting from financial crime is the most important and spectacular step forward, resulting from this initiative of the French National Assembly. It is a courageous step. It is one in which I have a great personal interest. In fact, I have presided over the Greek financial information unit for 5 years now.

I should like to give you an example of this decisive step forward and the obstacles that we come up against daily in our investigations of money laundering. Let us assume that we arrest a person who is in possession of a cache of drugs and who was intending to sell his cache. The drugs are confiscated and then destroyed. The appropriate authorities can, moreover, prove that this person has a number of cars, bank accounts and properties. They can also prove that he has never been engaged in any other trade or business and that he has never declared his assets to the state. Are we now able to confiscate these assets? Unfortunately, the answer in Greece is " no ". I consider that no other European country would be in a position to confiscate the assets of such a criminal. This is intolerable. We must reaffirm the need for a change in the burden of proof. The difficulties are certainly many. In fact, we cannot turn our criminal systems, which are based on the burden of proof, upside down. However, in the particular case that I have just mentioned, where proof of the crime is obvious, I feel that the present system does not allow us to act. We should therefore find a solution in order to increase our effectiveness while respecting human rights. Apart from these observations, the Greek delegation supports the provisions of this text.

John McFALL

I should like to speak on paragraph 43, to which we can add a word or two. As you know, Eurojust does not have just an operational role. That is why member states rejected this proposal at the last intergovernmental conference. In fact, certain states feared an encroachment on their systems of criminal justice. That is why I should like to propose a rewording of paragraph 43. We could indicate that we are concerned with consolidating the operational character of Eurojust by permitting it to assist the appropriate national authorities, beyond the exchange of information, where this is necessary to initiative and conduct investigations and coordinate enquiries. I suggest that you consider this amendment.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

I must stress the importance of this chapter on police, judicial and administrative co-operation. All the previous proposals on control and surveillance would have their efficiency reduced if we were not making progress, as the EU is doing, in the area of judicial, police and administrative co-operation. The battle against the crimes we are discussing is a difficult one to conduct in isolation. In my view, the EU has taken great strides forwards recently in this connection. Not everything is as yet in place. Eurojust, for example, has only just entered into its operational phase. Similarly, the European arrest warrant has only just been launched. Once they are in place, all these initiatives will bear fruit.

The European arrest warrant will permit the police services of the 15 to obtain essential information quickly. At the present time, this information takes at least a year, sometimes 18 months, to reach the appropriate services following the arrest of a person who has committed a serious offence. This information, which is late in reaching other member states, loses its effectiveness during this long procedure. The result is that the country in question is prevented from taking the necessary steps to prevent a subsequent offence that could have been avoided if the information had been obtained faster. Consequently, I entirely agree with the comments made by the Greek Public Prosecutor.

Otherwise, I did not entirely understand the last proposal by the British delegate. What is the difference as against the existing system? Can Mr McFall reword his proposal?

Finally, we have amongst us countries seeking to join the EU. It is very important that they are here. Some of them are here as observers, others wish to join us soon. I must say to them that police and judicial co-operation in Europe is important in order to ensure our states are governed by the rule of law and to ensure that the proper administration of justice at European level. I hope that enlargement will enable us to go even further in police, judicial and administrative co-operation.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

Can Mr McFall meet Ms Becerril’s request to clarify his proposal?

John McFALL

Eurojust does not yet have operational status. It is therefore important that each nation’s sovereignty is preserved. In fact, it says that Eurojust will assist the national authorities. This leaves room for doubt. This should therefore be removed by inserting the following expression " if necessary " or " where applicable "(point 43). This allows both national sovereignty to be preserved and the need to cooperate between the various organisations if it is necessary. Besides, certain countries like the Netherlands have indicated that they do not have sufficient resources. They could therefore ask for help when it is necessary.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I am not an expert on the matter, but it seems to me that your proposal shows that you are somewhat confused. As far as I am aware, Eurojust aims at facilitating co-operation between national enquiries and the national public prosecutors in cross-border transactions. Your worry is typically British. In fact, you do not want Eurojust to interfere in purely national judicial proceedings. As it happens, paragraph 43 only tackles the question of coordinating cross-border enquiries that fall within Eurojust’s jurisdiction. This must therefore be discussed at one time or another. Besides, the British government was a signatory to that agreement setting up Eurojust. It seems to me that your proposed amendment (" where applicable " or " if necessary ") implies a principle of notification which is unnecessary in cross-border judicial proceedings. You may perhaps wish to introduce notification at national level. Altogether, I feel that you should word your amendment differently.

John McFALL

I have consulted the British government on this matter. It agrees entirely with me in feeling that this sentence in paragraph 43 should be more clear. My amendment is aimed at making this point clearer while preserving the possibilities for subsequent co-operation. I do not understand why you say I am causing confusion.

Benoît DEJEMEPPE (Belgium – Chief Public Prosecutor in Brussels)

I feel that we shall be saying in due course that a meeting like this one has permitted a qualitative leap in terms of co-operation and harmonisation, but not in terms of integration. In fact, there are two positive elements and elements that are less so. I should like to dwell on the latter.

As far as co-operation is concerned, it has been said that the logic of Eurojust and the logic of setting up a future European public prosecutor’s office are not compatible. I feel that these two logics are not identical. However, they are not opposing but complementary. We should not limit ourselves to binary reasoning and we must take the recoil. A European public prosecutor, were he to exist one day, would meet this kind of need and would not be opposed to other bodies. The European public prosecutor has been demonised in the debate. In fact, it was said that this sovereignty must remain national. However, since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European States have not ceased to delegate parts of their sovereignty. We are living in a European system of sharing sovereignty at all levels. We should remember this in the judicial field. There can be little doubt that a European public prosecutor will be appointed one day. That is why in my view it should be placed on the agenda for the next meeting. The EU has a wider vocation of political integration. It is not merely a free trade area. The European public prosecutor’s office will be one of the elements that will give shape to this political will. Eurojust can only be regarded as a step towards a form of greater integration with regard to Community fraud, and we are at the starting point. An effort must be made towards integration.

It is not unusual for conflicts to exist between European courts as to who should consider cases of Community fraud. In fact, there is no rule allowing these conflicts of jurisdiction to be settled. As an example, we had still to negotiate with the director of OLAF a week ago in order to resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between London, Luxembourg and Munich. As it happens, the case will be handled by the public prosecutor in Brussels. If we do not act, the public prosecutor in Brussels will be de facto the European public prosecutor. Is that what we really want? Can such an important task be entrusted to national representatives who have no real legitimacy at European level, who do not have the material resources and who are subject to the hazards of national political considerations, which still exist? There is a risk of our keeping our eyes closed to this kind of future. The European public prosecutor does not imply an abdication of national sovereignty. On the contrary, it will permit national sovereignty to be enriched and a step forward to be taken at qualitative level.

Beyond the legislative labyrinths and the various forms of paper co-operation, co-operation is undertaken case by case, file by file. The files in question must be interesting for the requested State. In fact, the political willingness to co-operate is not enough form this point of view. We must record progress in this connection at European level. Each country has its own priorities. Certain States even include plans for criminal policy, of which international co-operation forms part. This holds back co-operation at European level. Co-operation should be developed on the ground through more homogeneous European policies on crime. I shall not dwell on this morning’s differences on investigations into financial matters or drug trafficking.

Finally, Eurojust is to be set up in parallel with Europol. Would it not be worth contemplating a structural controlling link between the two, within the framework of a European judicial, police and legal system? It would be enough to word proposal 43 as follows: " to consolidate the operational character of Eurojust by permitting it, beyond the exchange of information, to assist the appropriate national authorities with the initiation and conduct of enquiries, to coordinate enquiries and to supervise Europol ".

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

I shall ask the German delegation to speak. I shall then call on Mr Leclair, Deputy Director of Europol and Mr Vuelta-Simon, a judge and member of the European judicial network. The request for clarification from the British delegation is legitimate but it should not give the impression of a lack of will on our part. We should not draft a proposal that goes back on what our national governments have already signed. As far as this is concerned, I share Ms Ludford’s view.

Kurt SCHELTER

You will not be surprised if I tell you that the subject of police, judicial and administrative co-operation will act as a measure of our desire to combat money laundering. In fact, we must give evidence of a real political desire on our part to make progress in the fight against wrongdoing and crime from the judicial and police aspects.

The text has been enhanced in recent weeks but it can still be improved. That is why I should like to put eight proposals to you.

With regard to point 31, the cross border nature of this co-operation should be mentioned. In fact this is more important than national co-operation.

Point 33 mentions OLAF. I wonder whether this is really necessary. The result is, in fact, some confusion as we are giving the impression that Community fraud is an aspect of money laundering, which it certainly is not.

In addition, I suggest that Europol be appropriately mentioned in point 35. In fact, Europol is the European institution that has fought the strongest against money laundering since the Maastricht Treaty. Europol was formed to combat drug trafficking and money laundering connected with this traffic. That is why it would be inappropriate not to mention it while we mention OLAF. It should in fact receive an encouraging and positive mention. Point 35 states that the Council created Eurojust at Tampere. In fact, it was the Council meeting at Nice that truly decided to create Eurojust. I feel that it is a pity that Eurojust is not present today. In effect, having regard to the aims stated, it would have been a good thing if the Spanish presidency of the Union had ensured that Eurojust was represented here today.

From the German point of view, the amendment of the burden of proof presents an enormous constitutional problem (point 39). There is no need to reverse the burden of proof. In any event, this would be completely unacceptable under the German Constitution. That is why I call for some caution on the wording of this point so that we do not come up against substantial constitutional obstacles.

With regard to the countries applying for membership, I suggest that you stress that these countries should before joining be able to participate in all administrative and operational measures. They should be able to participate in Europol as soon as possible and in the work of Eurojust, as observers. If we really wish to set up an area of freedom, security and liberty in Europe, it is clear that the countries applying for membership should be able to participate in our work as soon as possible.

The events of 11 September 2001 have shown us that very close links existed between terrorism and organised crime, especially money laundering. I feel that we would be well advised to stress how important it is, in combating terrorism, that we direct ourselves at the interface between terrorism and organised crime, namely money laundering.

I have set up a unit in the Land of Brandenburg, that occupies itself exclusively with the interface between terrorism and organised crime, namely money laundering and drug trafficking as in Afghanistan.

Finally, point 43 will prove an excellent barometer, allowing us to judge how serious we are in our approach. As it stands, this point is clearly inadequate. I think we are on the point of making the same mistake as we did with Europol. When we negotiated the Europol Convention in 1994 I was State Secretary. During the German presidency of the EU, we fell out about the powers of Europol. The Spanish delegation exhorted us to make sure that Europol would be able to combat terrorism. It was thinking of ETA. The British delegation for its part, wanted Europol to having nothing to do with terrorism, because of the IRA. These differences made us lose a lot of precious time, forcing us to make lame compromises. Finally, the events on 11 September 2001 allowed Europol to engage in the fight against terrorism.

As far as Eurojust is concerned, we should not make the same mistake as we did with Europol. If we really want to make progress, if we want Europol to play a real operational and practical role, we cannot do without a European public prosecutor. This would not mean some kind of loss of national sovereignty. In fact, as a German, I am familiar with the subtleties of federation.

I hope that we shall make an effort to ensure our proposal has teeth, especially on point 43, by going to the limits of the acceptable in order to do justice to the aims underlying Eurojust.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

The minimalist proposal is due to a number of differences, especially those raised by the Italian delegation. In fact, the Italians have come forward with a number of queries. It may perhaps be worthwhile for them to intervene at this stage of our discussions.

Gilles LECLAIR

I have already said in connection with the latest working groups that I was surprised not to see Europol mentioned. The German delegate and the delegate from the European Parliament underlined a number of worthwhile points in explaining the Parliament’s role. Substantial progress has been made since the Tampere Summit. In fact, the ministers had decided to entrust us with the mandate on money laundering and all forms of crime. This was done at the end of 2000. As it happens, it was 5 years ago that we became engaged in the fight against money laundering. The recent events have confirmed this point. We play an important role in combating terrorism, especially since the European Council’s latest decision in September 2001. In this connection, a specific group of some 60 persons has been working on the question of financing terrorism, in co-operation with Member States. We have an important role in defending the Euro. This directly is linked to money laundering. It is not unlikely that criminal organisations will use the Euro in the future as they use the Dollar. The result will be a substantial number of suspect transactions within the EU. Europol must play a role in detecting flows connected with the European currency.

Besides, we should not forget that Europol and Eurojust must work in parallel. We are complementary. But I feel it is too early to speak of monitoring. In fact, we are only an information service and not a police force, endowed with investigatory powers. While the intensification of our role on the information collecting side may be stressed, it is too early to talk of monitoring Europol since Europol has no direct investigatory role.

I have prepared a paper setting out the complementary roles of Europol and Eurojust. It is at your disposal.

Samuel VUELTA-SIMON (Head of Project, Eurojust)

As far as the future is concerned, namely the European public prosecutor, I share the views expressed by the Public Prosecutor from Brussels. In fact, Eurojust is only a necessary stage on the road to true operational co-operation within the EU. We shall in due course have to consider the creation of a European public prosecutor’s office. The Commission has already initiated the debate. I think there is little doubt that a European public prosecutor will come about.

Eurojust has been functioning on an operational footing since March 2001. This unit solves problems and coordinates enquiries within the EU. Eurojust will soon – as from next month – be able to ask the national authorities to initiate proceedings. That is why I feel that the wording of proposal 43 falls short of reality. In fact, the co-ordination unit will be able to ask Member States to initiate proceedings and to conduct enquiries. Such a request will not be binding but, if the state refuses, it must give its reasons.

Finally, consolidating the operational nature of Eurojust requires Eurojust to be transposed into domestic law to give its national representative the status and the powers that will enable him to work.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

This proposal is open for discussion. In fact, it meets both the needs of the German delegation and the desire for clarification expressed by the British delegation.

Roberto CENTARO

As far as point 31 is concerned, we can assume that judicial, police and administrative co-operation will mean cross border co-operation. In fact, national co-operation is a matter for the national government. So there is no need for us to discuss it. On the other hand, I feel we must mention Europol. In fact Europol has played its role well and deserves a mention.

I agree with the comment made by the Greek Public Prosecutor. The Italian property-based system of prevention which ends up with the confiscation of Mafia assets is based on a reversal of the burden of proof and also on the fact that the person concerned is dangerous and that the person cannot be dissociated from the assets that he has improperly acquired having regard to his normal income. This system based on the reversal of the burden of proof has functioned satisfactorily in Italy. It allows a severe blow to be struck at the very heart of organised crime. It also allows us to get our hands on the property of the person concerned while he is in prison. Certain countries of the EU have constitutional objections to reversing the burden of proof. This problem should therefore be resolved within each country. Besides, the preamble refers to the need to harmonise national systems. An escape clause is always possible.

With regard to point 43, we cannot get away with a simple declaration of principle. To say that we want to set up a European public prosecutor’s office would be to take our hopes for reality. Action of this kind is simply a non-starter. In fact, we are up against the different way in which European public prosecutors’ offices are organised. For example, in Italy, the Prosecution forms part of the judiciary. It is entirely independent of any political authority, whether executive or legislative. In other countries, there is a dependent link between the public prosecutor and the executive. In Italy, there is no alternative to bringing criminal proceedings. There are, moreover, many differences between the constitutional law and the law of procedure that applies in most of the countries of the EU. In view of these differences, the formation of a European public prosecutor’s office would be too difficult. A European public prosecutor who did not take these differences into account would risk encroaching on national sovereignties, which would lead to conflict and undesirable competition. Nonetheless, a European public prosecutor should be an ultimate aim of us all. As one of the previous speakers said, the work of Eurojust must be consolidated. Once we have harmonised organisations and procedures, we can consider the European public prosecutor.

I do not think that national and international enquiries can be automatically co-ordinated. Otherwise, a specific body would have to be set up to handle international investigations. It would be up to the national authorities as to whether they wanted to participate in this or that enquiry. That would have a limiting effect. In fact, Eurojust is the place where information obtained from Europol’s activities is concentrated. Eurojust should be able to provide governments with information and very useful help. To strengthen Eurojust’s role, we could interpret the term " assist ". Eurojust could provide the pointers, even an inducement, permitting the national authorities to proceed on the basis of the information received from Eurojust. I do not think we can go much further. In fact, if we were to do so we would be likely to infringe national sovereignty.

If the term " assist " in point 43 means that Eurojust provides useful information for the conduct of an enquiry, that would be acceptable.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

Two points are under discussion: Lightening the burden of proof, which means sharing proof and which produces a number of national constitutional problems, and authorising Eurojust to ask national authorities to initiate proceedings.

In certain countries, such as Italy or France recently, lightening mechanisms are in force and are operative. An interesting document from the multi-disciplinary group on crime organised by the EU Council led to an assessment of reversing the burden of proof in member states. On the one hand, this goes further than what we were proposing. On the other hand, all practitioners feel that this is one of the prerequisites if organised crime is to be effectively dealt with. I therefore subscribe to what our Chairman Mr Centaro has said. In fact, our positive national laws will one day have to move forward in conformity with constitutional requirements. The precedents of the constitutional courts are evaluative and interpretative. The global requirements in combating money laundering may perhaps enable us to convince the constitutional authorities in this connection.

Furthermore it has been suggested that Eurojust should be able to ask the national authorities to initiate proceedings. I feel that this proposal allows us to meet the British requirements for clarification of the role with regard to the national sovereignty of member states that have judges within Eurojust.

Finally, I think that we can all agree on the European public prosecutor as an objective. Knowing whether this can be achieved or not is, to my mind, beside the point. In fact, no one really knows what can be achieved as to the objectives that we have laid down for ourselves. History will be the judge. Be that as it may, we at least have a desire to work towards setting up European public prosecutor’s office and, in the meantime, strengthen the resources of Eurojust through the proposal by the member of the European network.

I would ask you to give your views on this compromise proposal in order to obtain a stronger wording indicating the desire for a European public prosecutor.

Jeannot KRECKE (Luxembourg – Chamber of deputies)

We prefer a wording indicating the splitting of the burden of proof to one providing for its reversal.

Point 40 provided for a mechanism for dividing the assets confiscated on completion of international co-operation between the states. This passage has disappeared. I do not really understand why. In fact, we have already put this proposal into practice. We have in this connection settled a number of such cases which have not so far given rise to objection. If we wish to move towards a mechanism of this kind which makes confiscation possible in all countries, we must also decide what we want to do with the proceeds of confiscation. The Luxembourg delegation would like this passage to be reintroduced.

Karsten NONBO

On point 43, the British delegation’s proposal is very close to what we were going to say. Consequently, we support the British proposal aimed at consolidating the effectiveness of Eurojust and permitting mutual support, beyond the exchange of information, for the authorities concerned by initiating and conducting legal proceedings and by coordinating investigations.

Eurojust’s aim is simply to assist national public prosecutors with their enquiries and legal proceedings, especially by exchanging information. Eurojust cannot demand anything from member states in connection with criminal proceedings. Member states lay down the prerogatives for members of Eurojust. When Eurojust was formed, Denmark felt that Eurojust should have no operational functions. That remains the Danish point of view.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I think it would be useful for us to have the text that led to the formation of Eurojust. We must know what is expected from Member States as far as assisting Eurojust is concerned, and vice-versa. This is not clearly stated within the framework of proposal 43. We should not suggest less than what already exists. Going beyond what we already have, such as interfering in national investigations would require the inclusion of a reservation (" if necessary "). However, I do not think that this expression would tally with Eurojust’s mandate and I am afraid that the term " if necessary " would be too restrictive.

Gilles LECLAIR

I do not think that the text need include the expression " if necessary ". The right to ask the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation already exists. True, this is not an obligation on member states, but if they refuse they must give their reasons. Europol and Eurojust have the same rights in this connection.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

You do not have to wait for a request from the national authorities.

Ms Marie-Theresia FEKTER

I should like to comment on point 39. In order to deal with the problems that Austria faces with regard to lightening the burden of proof, I should like to make a proposal. The burden of proof cannot be changed. This is a human right appearing in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I think you will all agree that this article must be applied. Consequently, we could mention this article of the ECHR in point 39, indicating that a rule lightening the burden of proof can be introduced only within the framework of article 6 of the Convention. This would allow a European framework to be created to lighten the burden of proof. I must also say that the translations we have been provided with can give rise to different interpretations. In fact, the terms " lightening " and " amending " have different meanings.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE

The European Court of Human Rights has already repeatedly held that the presumption of innocence and proof are separate. In fact, the presumption of innocence does not imply that nothing must ever be proved when proceedings are brought. The burden of proof can be reversed in relation to material elements in the case. The first case considered in this connection by the European Court of Human Rights occurred in France in the early 1990s. It concerned a suitcase with drugs seized to a passenger in Orly. The passenger in question can say that it is not his suitcase or that someone else placed the drugs in the case. Do we not have a reversal here of the burden of proof in the light of the circumstances? We must never ask the public prosecutor to act as devil’s advocate. That has nothing to do with the presumption of innocence. One need only be human. Amendments are possible with regard to splitting the burden. To meet the various worries, it would be enough to refer to article 6.2 of the Convention in point 39. We therefore have the necessary constitutional guarantees.

Olivier MAINGAIN (Belgium – Chamber of representatives)

With regard to point 43, no one is arguing that Eurojust should take the place of the national authorities. However, Eurojust should not solely play the role of assistant on demand. Eurojust also has the role of whistleblower. That is why I suggest that point 43 should be worded as follows: " consolidate the initiatory powers and operational character of Eurojust ", which would stress the innovative dimension of Eurojust with regard to the texts adopted.

On the European public prosecutor, I support the analysis by the Public Prosecutor of Brussels. We must keep this discussion separate from that about Eurojust. If we assume there is a connection between the two, we shall distort the discussion. With regard to the European public prosecutor, the EU must have the legal means for dealing with a number of omissions from the laws within the area of Community competence. In fact, the European institutions have no means of action in relation to their own area of competence. It is with this in mind that we must argue for a European public prosecutor and that a paragraph should be included on this subject.

Jean SPREUTELS

As far as the splitting of the burden of proof and the reference to article 6.2 of the Convention are concerned, paragraph 9 of the draft declaration may well suffice. In fact, article 9 of the draft declaration refers generally to the Convention.

With regard to paragraph 33, it is true that the Egmont group has laid down a basis for co-operation between the financial information units but it is not true to say that only co-operation of an administrative nature is concerned. In fact, these units are essentially different as to their legal nature (administrative, judicial and police). Amongst other things, the Egmont group aims to overcome the legal obstacles created by this legal diversity. That is why I suggest deleting the word " administrative ".

With regard to OLAF, a Convention exists concerning the combating of fraud within the financial interests of the Communities. The protocols to this Convention refer expressly to the laundering of money obtained from Community fraud. Consequently, it is logical for OLAF to be mentioned in the conclusions from this conference. Furthermore, a Directive aimed at enlarging its scope in this connection and at introducing co-operation between OLAF and the appropriate national organisations is in preparation. It would also be in order to refer to Europol in the conclusions we arrive at today.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL

I must remind the German representative, with all respect, that the presence of members of Eurojust has nothing to do with the presidency of the EU. The Spanish delegation is attending this conference at the invitation of the National Assembly which is organising it. You will be aware that Spaniards are highly disciplined in all areas. The National Assembly has provided a list of names. We are all there. Only an anti-corruption specialist was unable to join us because of calls elsewhere. The Spanish presidency has made no suggestions in this connection.

With regard to point 39, several speakers have indicated that they would like to see article 6 of the ECHR mentioned. I have no objection if this makes the text more clear. However, the wording of the text is debatable. We all know quite well what we want to say. We know what spirit we are working in, but those who have not participated in all our work may find it harder to create the link with the Convention.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

We alone are to blame for the Eurojust representative being unable to attend at the last minute.

John McFALL

I have listened to your proposals. We are debating two separate matters. In fact, we should draw a distinction between the question of the European public prosecutor, which has been rejected for the time being, and that of Eurojust, on which we should concentrate. Certain of my colleagues have said that everyone should remain master in his own house. That raises no problems with regard to the text that I have put forward. The problem that I mentioned lies at the heart of the constitutional and judicial issue.

I believe that we should now add the two words that I suggested, together with the proposed amendment to which you have referred, Mr Chairman. Consequently, point 43 will read as follows " to consolidate the operational character of Eurojust by permitting it, beyond the exchange of information, to assist the appropriate national authorities, where necessary (or if application is made) in bringing and conducting proceedings and coordinating enquiries and, where applicable, asking the national authorities to initiate proceedings. "

I believe that this proposal allows all points of view to be covered. In fact, the comment by Eurojust is satisfactory and the responsibilities of each should be clearly established.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

I thank all of you. I should like to make the following proposals taking account of all the comments made

Paragraph 31

The word " cross-border " will be added before the word " co-operation ".

Paragraph 33

Deleting the word " administrative " is suggested for the last sentence of the paragraph.

Paragraph 35

It is suggested that the following words be added to the second sentence of the paragraph: " following the creation of Europol which forms the basis for judicial co-operation ". It is suggested that the words " confirmed by the European Council in Nice " be added after the word " Eurojust ".

Paragraph 39

The following wording is suggested to overcome the difficulties connected with translation: " to introduce splitting of the burden of proof of the criminal origin of funds with due regard to the European Convention safeguarding Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms".

Paragraph 43

I should like to put forward the following proposal to meet all the requests and objections: " To consolidate the operational character of Eurojust by permitting it, in addition to the exchange of information, to ask the appropriate national authorities to bring and conduct proceedings, to assist them in this connection and to coordinate enquiries, with a view to the future creation of a European public prosecutor’s office ". This would allow us to clarify the role of Eurojust, not to forget a future objective, and to place the initiative in the hands of Eurojust which will limit itself to seeking assistance and to co-ordination in the event of a positive response.

Roberto CENTARO

I would prefer it if Eurojust could give instructions to initiate enquiries. In fact, a request for an enquiry could favour Eurojust’s promoting the enquiry. The national public prosecutor may disagree. The need to initiate an enquiry must therefore be stated so as to preserve national sovereignty.

With regard to the formation of a European public prosecutor’s office, it would be more satisfactory to indicate that this can be done after the essential rights and procedural rights have been harmonised.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE

I consider the Chairman’s compromise to be highly satisfactory. In fact, no proposals can be made concerning Eurojust for less than what already at present exits. Otherwise, the prospects for a European public prosecutor’s office should be maintained. In fact, we should not give the impression that Eurojust is an end in itself.

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER

I am looking at the Tampere text. The compromise that has just been suggested does not take it into account. It seems to me that we arrived a consensus during the discussion in January 2002. In fact, we agreed not to mention the idea of a European public prosecutor. I have the impression that you are trying to reintroduce it through the back door. I feel that this is wrong. Given the fact that the operational aspect has been mentioned and that we refer to criminal proceedings and the operational status of Eurojust, we are going well beyond the Tampere spirit. In fact, it was decided that Eurojust should be no more than an instrument for exchanging information. That is why I am asking you to delete the part of your compromise that refers to the European public prosecutor.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

Thank you for your suggestion. The fact is that this is not the back door but a prospect for the future. Besides, I was only replying to the proposal from the Italian delegation.

John McFALL

Mr Chairman, I do not agree. This is not a proposal aimed at reintroducing the public prosecutor’s office by the back door but by the front entrance. I don’t know how closely you followed the discussion this afternoon. If you wish to achieve a consensus you cannot mention the idea of a European public prosecutor. This is a step back and not forward.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD

I feel in fact that this sentence may cause confusion. In effect, assisting the appropriate national authorities goes beyond what Eurojust can do and its mandate. I feel that Eurojust’s operational character must be consolidated. Consequently we are limiting ourselves to a simple description of Eurojust’s mandate.

I feel that the proposal concerning the European public prosecutor is on the provocative side. The European Commission’s green paper of December 2001 concerning a European public prosecutor seeks to protect Community finances from fraud and corruption. Be that as it may, I do not think that this reference is of vital importance in a document on money laundering. Eurojust, in your compromise proposal, is likely to jeopardise the consensus. Paragraph 43 should indicate that the operational character of Eurojust should be strengthened. It is right that Eurojust should be able to start working.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

I therefore suggest the following final wording for paragraph 43: " To consolidate the operational character of Eurojust by permitting it, beyond the exchange of information, to ask the appropriate national authorities to bring and conduct proceedings, assist them in this connection and coordinate enquiries ". A European public prosecutor is not exactly what the European Parliament has on its mind at present. I shall call you to meet shortly at the invitation of the British delegation to continue with our work.

Roberto CENTARO

The prospect of a European public prosecutor should be seen in the longer term. This reference to the European public prosecutor can therefore be withdrawn. It would create too many problems. We should perhaps mention harmonisation of the rights of the prosecution. Rather than bring proceedings, we should perhaps find a different wording. In fact, bringing proceedings implies allocating enforcing powers. On the other hand, a reference to facts would permit known information to be provided to initiate proceedings. If the request is refused, the request need not be reasoned since Eurojust is not answerable to a national public prosecutor. Bringing criminal proceedings is a matter for the national public prosecutor. It would be sufficient to say, " providing facts to initiate proceedings ". Consequently, the national public prosecutor’s office decides for itself on whether to proceed.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

The proposed wording does not affect national sovereignty. In fact, it does not say nor can it be inferred from the proposed wording that the sovereign national legal authority is obliged to give reasons for a refusal. This is only a proposal by Eurojust, which was not made in public. In fact, it was made within the framework of the unofficial co-operation undertaken within a European framework. A suggestion is simply made to the judicial authority whether it should proceed or not. The national judicial authority is not required to give reasons for its refusal. In fact, this would encroach on sovereignty. Your objection seems to be irrelevant to the final proposal. Altogether, I feel that the final agreement, thanks to the constructive contributions by all, allows Eurojust to be given a boost going beyond Tampere. The final agreement implies a certain political will.

John McFALL

Mr Chairman, you have pulled the carpet from under my feet. I am ready to comply in a spirit of consensus. The spirit of my comments and that of the other speakers on the question of the constitution and sovereignty underlines paragraph 43. I bow to the text that you have suggested.

Jeannot KRECKE

If you wish to sum up, Mr Chairman, I should like a reply to my proposal concerning the reintroduction, into paragraph 41, of the splitting of confiscated assets.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

This point has met with a number of objections at technical level. However, if no delegation sees a fundamental objection to its reintroduction, that is what will be decided.

Panagiotis NIKOLOUDIS

The reply is clear as to the proceeds of confiscation. This is a matter governed by the bilateral agreements between states. This will be a satisfactory solution.

Arnaud MONTEBOURG

We have made a great deal of progress. We can now return to our national Parliaments. I must draw your attention to the fact that a language harmonisation meeting will be held immediately. Tomorrow morning the meeting will start at 9.00hrs for an address by the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.

The meeting ended at 18.35hrs.

 

 

 

III – PARIS DECLARATION AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING

Final declaration of the Conference of European Union Parliaments against money laundering
of 8th February 2002.

PREAMBLE

Criminal money laundering and financial crime have been on the constant increase over the last few years exploiting the potentialities given by the globalisation of financial markets; they represent a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also for the security of our democratic societies.

The financing of terrorism uses very different systems and some of these use the legal economy, although it also resorts to the same instruments as all organised crime.

Without the global and coordinated action of States, crime prevention and law enforcement services and authorities will not be able to fight efficiently against those they pursue.

In the fight against money laundering and the use of the financial system by criminal networks, Europe’s exemplary behaviour must be without fault even if the efficiency of its action also depends on the awareness and support of all developed countries.

The persistence of legal mechanisms which lead to impenetrability in financial transactions, the use of ‘‘black holes’’ in the international financial system, and deficiencies in co-operation between European Union member states can no longer be tolerated.

The European Union has however not been inactive since it has updated the directive against money laundering and it has constantly worked on strengthening the European police and legal system which lags behind economic and monetary union.

The recent political agreement on the European warrant of arrest should also enable greater efficiency in the fight against terrorism and financial crime, provided it is quickly applied.

In a wider framework the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering has refined its analyses of the phenomenon and has defined criteria enabling non-cooperative countries and territories, and loopholes in the systems of cooperative countries to be identified.

Stemming from universal suffrage, the national parliaments must necessarily contribute to directing and stimulating the harmonisation of legislation and the cooperation of European Union Member States in compliance with the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and differences between national legal systems.

Following a debate bringing together many European experts, MP’s and also academics and practitioners, the Conference of European Union Parliaments privileged four working subjects and formulated proposals for concrete measures in an attempt to improve efficiency in the fight against money laundering.

10b. In order to follow up and update the measures which it recommended during its opening meeting, the Conference of European Union Parliaments against money laundering has agreed to meet periodically.

 

Subject n° 1 : The transparency of capital movements

An efficient fight against money laundering and financial crime means being able to reconstruct the history of capital movements. The traceability of transactions and order makers is therefore a priority objective, but it comes up against several obstacles, including:

12. The impenetrability of certain legal entities (trusts, institutions, foundations, limited partnerships) and numbered accounts;

13. Objection to investigators with regard to different professional secrets including banking secrecy;

14. The working of certain international financial services (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers) which do not always enable the order maker to be identified.

Proposals :

Provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of transactions carried out using trust or assimilated funds, if the economic beneficiary cannot be identified.

Control the form of trusts (standardised documents and ban of ‘‘suspect’’ clauses).

Provide for the obligation to register trusts in a central register in addition to the identification of the beneficiaries.

Harmonise professional secret release procedures

Generalise access to information held by financial agencies for financial intelligence units.

Create a central bank account register.

Internationally standardise the order maker’s identification in international financial messages (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Provide for the identification of financial transaction originators on the Internet by access providers.

Subject n° 2 : Sanctions against uncooperative countries and territories

The identification of non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering falls within the scope of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) whose 40 recommendations are the international reference standard. This process must guarantee objective assessment.

Determining and applying sanctions depends on the States. A coordinated action by the European Union in this field can only increase the efficiency of these sanctions.

Proposals :

Strengthen the obligations of financial agencies to identify economic beneficiaries before establishing relations with individuals or entities in these countries and territories.

Strengthen reporting mechanisms or provide for a systematic report to the financial intelligence unit of financial transactions with these countries and territories.

Strengthen the prudential ratios applicable to financial transactions carried out with these countries and territories.

Impose conditions on, restrict, overtax or ban transactions with individuals or entities located in these countries and territories.

Ban European Union member country institutions from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in these territories or from holding the accounts of correspondents there.

Ban financial institutions whose head office is located in one of these countries or territories from opening subsidiaries, branches or representative offices in the European Union or from holding the accounts of correspondents there.

 

Subject n° 3 : Legal, police and administrative cooperation

The fight against money laundering and financial crime necessarily involves cross-border legal, police and administrative cooperation due to the systematic globalisation of this type of crime.

Money laundering depends on cross-border economic and financial deals.

The Egmont group has laid the foundations for administrative cooperation between financial intelligence units and the setting up of the European Anti-Fraud Office is an initial community response. Nevertheless, police and legal cooperation lags behind somewhat.

Several international instances (UN, OECD, Council of Europe, European Union) have proposed States sign conventions aimed at improving this cooperation. Beyond the necessary ratification of these texts, their application, often full of reserves, is not optimal.

The European Union has regularly endeavoured to encourage this cooperation. With this in mind, after the creation of Europol which laid the foundations of police cooperation, the European Council’s summit meeting in Tampere namely announced the creation of Eurojust which was confirmed by the European Council’s summit meeting in Nice. Likewise, the recent political agreement on the European warrant of arrest is an important step which must be consolidated over the coming years.

Proposals :

Develop information exchanges between financial intelligence units.

Ratify, apply and strengthen the consistency of international conventions aimed at facilitating legal cooperation and fighting against money laundering and criminal organisations.

Harmonise incriminations in terms of financial crime.

Introduce the sharing of the burden of proof with regard to the criminal origin of money, in compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Harmonise criminal sanctions namely by favouring the confiscation of revenue from crime and the instrument of money laundering.

Mutually recognise decisions to freeze, seize and confiscate illicit assets and provide for a mechanism for sharing between the States confiscated assets stemming from international cooperation.

Ensure that the European warrant of arrest is quickly applied, namely in terms of financial crime.

Consolidate the operational nature of Eurojust by enabling it, beyond exchanging information, to request national authorities of competent jurisdiction to instigate and enforce action, to assist them within this framework and to coordinate investigations.

 

Subject n° 4 : Prudential rules

The world deregulation of capital markets has complicated the prevention of money laundering and financial crime, namely due to the acceleration and the growth in international financial flows that is has generated. The sophistication of techniques and trades which has accompanied financial globalisation needs the reinforcement of capital-adequacy standards and ethical obligations of markets.

This widening of controls and financial regulations should include all providers of financial and legal services, and also international networks, whether traditional and informal (‘‘Hawala’’ type) or, on the contrary, very well integrated in the international capital markets (remittance of funds, compensation and interbank transfers).

Proposals :

Restrict cash payments beyond a given amount.

Provide for the compulsory licensing by the financial services regulatory authority of :

48. agents belonging to a cash or security transfer network, including traditional, informal and parallel networks;

49. company formation agents;

50. foreign exchange offices;

51. active financial intermediary dealers on the Internet.

Strengthen prudential rules and, as necessary on an international level, the regulation of the activities of clearing companies, and fund and security payment-delivery companies.

Match the evident breach of their obligations to supervise the professions subject to them with criminal sanctions.

 

 

 

IV – Minutes of the Formal Session

Friday 8 February 2002

List of participants:

Member States

Germany

Bundestag

Mr Frank HOFMANN, MP

Mr Andreas NOTHELLE, Official

Ms Vesna POPOVIC, Counsellor at the European Committee

Bundesrat

Prof. Dr Kurt SCHELTER, Minister of Justice and European Affairs, Brandenburg

Ms Dagmar ZIEGLER, Minister of Finance, Brandenburg

Dr Marcus WENIG, Director of the Brandenburg Representation in Brussels

Austria 

Nationalrat

Ms Maria Theresia FEKTER, Chairman of the Justice Committee

Bundesrat

Mr Ferdinand GSTÖTTNER, Chairman of the Justice Committee

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives

Mr Hugo COVELIERS, President of the Flemish Liberal Group (VLD)

Mr Dirk VAN der MAELEN, President of the Flemish Socialist Group

Mr Olivier MAINGAIN, Chairman of the Finance Committee

Senate

Mr Hugo VANDENBERGHE, Chairman of the Committee monitoring organised crime

Mr Thierry DEWAELE, Clerk to the Committee monitoring organised crime

Denmark

Mr Karsten NONBO, MP

Mr Frode SORENSEN, MP

Ms Lotte VIBILD SCHONAU, Legal Adviser

Spain

Congress of Deputies

Ms Soledad BECERRIL, Vice-President

Ms Silvia MARTIN, Legal Adviser

Senate

Mr Alfredo PRADA, First Vice-President

Mr José-Manuel BRETAL, Legal Adviser

France

National Assembly

Mr Vincent PEILLON, Chairman of the Information Mission on Money Laundering

Mr Arnaud MONTEBOURG, rapporteur of the Information Mission

Senate

Mr Bernard ANGELS, Vice-President of the Senate

Mr Christian OUDIN, Deputy Director

Greece

Hellenic Parliament

Mr Apostolos KAKLAMANIS, President of the Hellenic Parliament

Ms Maria ARSENI, MP

Mr Panagiotis NIKOLOUDIS, Public Prosecutor

Mr Andreas GIANNOPOULOS, Special Adviser

Ms Maria APOSTOLOU, Director of the Department of European Relations

Ms Paraskevi DROSSOU, Interpreter

Ms Elli HASSAPOPOULOU, Official

Ms Eleni KONSTANTINIDOU, Official

Ireland

Dail Eireann

Mr Michael AHERN, MP

Mr Jim MITCHELL, MP

Seanad Eireann

Mr Michael FINNERAN, Senator

Ms Marie FENNELL Clerk to the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service

Italy

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Donato BRUNO, Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Gianclaudio BRESSA, Vice-Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Pietro FONTANINI, Vice-Chairman of the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Fabrizio CASTALDI, Counsellor at the Constitutional Affairs Committee

Mr Gianfranco NERI, Official at the Office for Relations with the European Union

Ms Cristina DI PIETRO, Interpreter

Senate

Mr Roberto CENTARO, Chairman of the Joint Special Committee on Mafia Crime

Mr Sebastiano CARDI, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Senate

Ms Laura BOEZIO, Protocol Officer

Mr Alessio COLARIZI, Interpreter

Luxembourg

Chamber of Deputies

Mr Lucien WEILER, Chairman of the Finance and Budget Committee, President of the Christian Social Group (CSV)

Mr Jeannot KRECKE, Chairman of the Committee for the Control of Budget Implementation, President of the Socialist Group (LSAP)

Mr Laurent MOSAR, Member of the Finance and Budget Committee

The Netherlands

House of Representatives

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA, MP

Portugal

Republican Assembly

Mr Antonio de ALMEIDA SANTOS, President of the Republican Assembly

Mr José NIZA, Press Officer

United Kingdom

House of Commons

Mr John McFALL, Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee

Mr Michael FALLON, Chairman of the Treasury Sub-committee

Mr Alex KIDNER, Clerk to the Treasury Select Committee

European Parliament

Ms Ana PALACIO, Chairman of the Freedoms and Rights of the Individual Committee

Ms Sarah LUDFORD, MEP

Ms Marie-Christine de SAINT-ARAILLE, Assistant Director

II) Observers: Applicant Countries and Russia

Bulgaria

National Assembly

Ms Kamelia KASSABOVA, Vice-President

Ms Ina KILEVA, Adviser to the Vice-President

Cyprus

House of Representatives

Mr Marcos KYPRIANOU, Chairman of the Finance Committee

Estonia

Mr Rein VOOG, MP

Hungary

Mr Janos HORVATH , MP, Chairman of the European Integration Sub-committee

Mr Jozsef OROSZ, Official

Latvia

Mr Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS, MP

Lithuania

Ms Giedré PURVANECKIENÉ, MP

Malta

House of Representatives

Mr Victor GALEA PACE, MP

Mr Gavin GULIA, MP

Romania

Senate

Mr Aristide ROIBU, Chairman of the Justice Committee

The Republic of Slovenia

National Assembly

Mr Jozef BERNIK, Member of the Finance and Monetary Policy Committee

Turkey

Turkish Parliament

Mr Ahmet TAN, MP, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE

Mr Nejat COSKUN, Director of the Department of Enquiry into Financial Crime at the Ministry of Finance

Russian Federation

State Duma

Mr Vladimir LOUKINE, Vice-President of the State Duma

Mr Nikolay BROUSNIKINE, MP

Mr Mikail GRICHANKOV, MP

Ms Natalia MIRZA, Assistant

Mr Vladimir USTINOV, Parliamentary Adviser

Mr Serguey PARINOV , Interpreter

III. Experts

Mr Bernard BERTOSSA, General Prosecutor, Geneva

Mr Harlem DESIR, MEP

Mr Jean-François THONY, Judge of the Court of Appeal in Versailles, Adviser to the United Nations

Mr Gilles LECLAIR, Deputy Director, Europol

Mr Jean SPREUTELS, President of the Financial Intelligence Unit, Belgium

 

The session commences at 9:11 AM, and is chaired by Mr Raymond FORNI.

Raymond FORNI (President of the National Assembly – France)

It is a pleasure for me to open this last day of the European Conference on Money Laundering and to welcome today the Prime Minister, Mr Lionel Jospin, the Presidents of the Parliaments of Greece and Portugal, and members of Parliament of the 33 assemblies from 25 Member States of the European Union and countries applying for membership, and representatives of the European Parliament. It was of particular interest to us that countries wishing to join us within the European Union told us of the commitments that they were ready to make to combat money laundering. We are also pleased at the attendance of the Russian Federation which passed an important act against money laundering a few days ago.

I must pay tribute to the work done by all the delegations and European experts over the past three months at the two meetings of the Steering Committee. The fruitful exchanges that were made on these occasions allowed us to complete the text which will be put to you today, while taking account of your suggestions to the full extent possible.

Let me remind you why we are here. Money laundering is a sickness of our democracies that has long affected our economic life. This perversion of international financial channels facilitates the development of serious crime linked to fraud, drug trafficking, mafia activities and corruption. The attacks on 11 September have, moreover, led to an international rethink, making us aware of the urgent need to combat terrorism, which sometimes makes use of the same outlets and similar methods to those for money laundering to finance itself. Combating money laundering is also combating terrorism. Consequently it is not enough to track down a few hundred suspect accounts, but we must re-examine the rules globally that govern the movement of capital. The statistics show the extent of the sickness and the work to be done. Dirty money accounts for more than USD 500 billion. As for tax havens, where more than 4 000 offshore banks and more than 2 million post-box companies have been identified, these drain off more than half of the assets held beyond frontiers.

Faced with this menace, we as members of parliament must fully play our role, but we can do so only by working in concertation with governments, the European Union and the international bodies such as the Council of Europe. Whether this means ratifying international conventions as quickly as possible or drafting specific, mutually compatible rules within the Union, we have the responsibility within our parliaments of fashioning the essential instrument for the battle against money laundering: the law.

Our approach follows the line taken at the Laeken Summit, where the objectives spelled out at Tampere were reaffirmed. This Summit also made us realise the importance of launching new initiatives. Today's conference is an illustration of this. It has enabled us to take note of the delay occurring in this connection, calmly and without being side-tracked. As Europeans, we must show the way. We must assume our part of the responsibility: more than half of direct or indirect laundering of capital occurs within Europe and in its associated territories. We can no longer tackle this problem in isolation as it requires the traditional political splits to be left behind, to be dealt with at a European level in the hope of building the widest possible consensus. The diversity of the views that have been put to us today shows it. If we so desire, we can address other countries and multi-national organisations speaking with a single voice, in order to forge together the instruments for new regulations.

We need a basket of measures involving all sectors and all the actors affected by money laundering. That is why we are now suggesting that within your parliaments and in your respective countries you become the spokesmen of this challenging message set out in the "Declaration of Paris on money laundering". We also suggest that you take up the suggestion of the Dutch delegation, namely that you now already take steps to evaluate the impact of our commitments and our decisions within the framework of our national policies and then meet regularly to take stock of the progress with our work and our ideas.

The meeting that you are attending today shows that we were right to rely on the determination of the more committed of the parliamentarians in the European Union and in "Greater Europe". Through this commitment, we can in fact translate the hopes you have raised today and which are shared by all of us today into action.

Lionel JOSPIN, Prime Minister - France

We have met today to consider a challenge that concerns all of our planet: the battle against money laundering. This concern is already a long-standing one for the international community. Originally, it was aimed at preventing the recycling of considerable sums of money, drained off by drug trafficking. The battle was then broadened to include the laundering of funds obtained from other crime: organised gangsterism, pimping, trafficking in human beings and corruption. In fact, globalisation now allows several hundreds of millions of dollars to be circulated around the globe within the space of a few seconds by electronic transfer, during which the perpetrator and the beneficiary are able to adopt a range of identities. The battle against money laundering must therefore change its dimension. A number of declarations have been made to this effect and the combat against laundering is now recognised as one of the essential aspects of international financial regulation.

Are we doing enough? There can be no doubt that we cannot hope for sustainable economic development without a healthy, robust and upright financial system. The integrity of financial systems constitutes a world public good, it therefore requires joint public action to regulate it. Europe is situated at the forefront of this action and today's meeting shows our resolve. Faced with money laundering, Europe must speak with one voice and assert its views on the world stage.

Fighting against organised crime and strengthening international rules are part of the European project. Europe is more than just an internal market, making use henceforth of a single currency. It also symbolises a community of values in which freedom, social progress and personal integrity are essential. As Europeans, we regard finance as serving the economy, which itself serves mankind. We cannot therefore permit our financial systems to be used as a means for allowing the proceeds of crime to prosper. European must set an example. That is why I am delighted with the unprecedented progress made in European law between 1999 and 2001, in three essential areas: crime prevention, law enforcement and judicial co-operation. The call from Geneva has not remained unheeded and the Tampere Summit marks a major step in the mobilisation of Europe against cross-border crime, especially with the creation of Eurojust.

Europe cannot tolerate the existence of impenetrable or anonymous entities such as trusts, nominees, anonymous foundations and non-resident companies, through which considerable financial flows pass without any true relationship with economic exchange, the only object of which is to prevent the identification of their economic beneficiaries. These entities frequently form a highly efficient vector for laundering operations. They are also open to financial manipulation, as we have seen in connection with the Enron crash. This company excelled in displaying a profitability which soared as its losses were concealed in "special vehicles", namely subsidiaries more often than not located in offshore financial centres. It is still possible today to set up a "letter-box" in certain territories, with less than 100 dollars and in 15 minutes, which allows the most reprehensible financial activities to be concealed behind the screen of anonymity, banking secrecy or the absence of administrative or judicial co-operation. We must put an end to these facilities which permit all kinds of wrong-doing, by taking action first of all at home, in Europe. The introduction of a minimum standard of transparency was, in particular, seen as a priority for action at the Tampere Summit. The Commission must issue a report on this question and come forward with specific measures but little progress has so far been made, as the last JHA/ECOFIN report has confirmed. France will ensure that progress with this vitally important work, on which FATF (The Financial Action Task Force) is also engaged, is not further delayed.

This fight must also be conducted on a world scale, the quality of international regulation still depends on the weakest link. Faced with increasing integration of financial markets, it is now crucial that we ensure that all participate in this combat. No country must base its development on "half-hearted" regulatory strategies. An approach of this kind is in fact indefensible since it makes the system as a whole pay the price of the actions of a few. Let us cease to be permissive towards the financial centres that deliberately turn their backs on jointly agreed measures. If an offshore centre continues to ignore them despite being repeatedly called to order, we must take counter-measures as my government recently did towards the Republic of Nauru. In fact, I today signed a decree to this effect. The combat must be conducted at world level since the destabilising and perverse effects of financial crime are universal and hit the developing countries still harder than other countries. You will know that the battle in this connection against financial wrongdoing is a struggle between lawfulness and lawlessness and not between rich and poor. Because they are shown proof of their common desire for solidarity between the North and South, Europeans must together ensure that the battle against secret financial flows is fully integrated into development policy.

I would like Europe to suggest strategies of the "win-win" type to the countries of the South, firstly by associating them with international thinking on the standards of security against money laundering. Collective disciplines are in fact always more easily accepted if they have been the subject of collective debate. Besides, Europe should offer its support to countries that act in conformity with the international rules, especially by offering the technical assistance that they need. Europeans must then decide whether to maintain public development aid for countries or territories which, after having received the necessary warnings, continue to infringe the group discipline. What is in fact needed is a cohesive approach. The French Government intends to suspend the funding granted to developing countries that may be placed in this situation, unless the funding is destined for projects that directly benefit the people. My government is similarly taking action to ensure that international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank, incorporate the struggle against money laundering and terrorist financing into their activities and offer technical assistance to the countries concerned. When devising its strategy in favour of a country, the World Bank must henceforth examine the steps to be taken to strengthen the soundness and integrity of the financial system in the country concerned. By working in this direction, the IMF and the World Bank will contribute both to financial stability and to development, which is precisely in line with their mandate.

The progress achieved in recent years has shown the importance of the political desire for and the strength of closely co-ordinated multilateral action. We must in no event underestimate the extent of the task awaiting us in tackling new risks, but also so that the combat is conducted everywhere with equal determination. The world today offers innumerable possibilities for recycling the proceeds of crime. Certain financial centres would barely prosper but for the anonymity that they guarantee for doubtful money. General declarations of participation in the battle against money laundering are sometimes barely followed up if economic interests are threatened.

Today, together with yourselves, I am calling for a general mobilisation against money laundering by putting forward as a priority three lines of specific action aimed at:

strengthening the transparency of the financial system;

associating new professions in the battle against financial crime;

extending international co-operation.

We must first of all improve the transparency of the international financial system, even if such transparency is not an end in itself. Confidentiality is necessary to protect the private sphere or certain important data in economic competition, but these legitimate worries have all too often served as an excuse for maintaining an opacity that in actual fact favours criminal activities. Everyone is aware that the recycling of dirty money thrives on a lack of transparency, which concerns a fundamental principle, namely knowledge of the customer and the economic beneficiary, a condition not only for crime prevention, the detection of suspect transactions and traceability, but also for strengthening international co-operation in the face of the globalisation of crime. FATF is at present engaged on these problems and France is participating very actively in its work.

What I now expect of you is that you lay down a standard of transparency which will serve as an international benchmark. The objective in view is clear: the public authorities engaged in the battle against money laundering must have access to information concerning economic beneficiaries. Such information must also be accessible to the financial institutions carrying out their inspection duties. In this fight for transparency, we must nonetheless keep our sense of proportion. Parliaments can legislate, governments can form financial information units (like TRACFIN in France), courts can issue international warrants. However, all these measures will only have limited effects if the use of intermediary structures allows the investigatory thread to be cut, as is the case at present. That is why France is seeking to make traceability of financial flows an absolute political priority. Let us start by abolishing anonymity of certain international transfers, as FATF has suggested since October 2001. We must at the same time combat excessive banking secrecy. Although progress has been made to ensure that this cannot be used as a weapon in financial crime or in financing terrorism, such secrecy in a great many countries still places a brake on international co-operation and the discharge of the duties of vigilance. I would like the Basel Committee to make rapid progress on the French proposals aimed at permitting parent companies of banking groups to undertake direct monitoring of the situation at their subsidiaries in third countries. In fact, the risk of money laundering should henceforth be assessed not branch by branch but at group level. The mechanisms for internal control should be able to work on this scale.

The second line of action in our campaign must be to involve the professions concerned with our fight against money laundering. Every country has, according to its own legal traditions and its own political choices, spelled out the nature of the obligations imposed on financial intermediaries: a precise listing of the checks to be made in certain cases, supervisory obligations in others, as in France. I know that the banking and financial professions in our country are very aware of this. Nonetheless, the internationalisation of financial flows and resort to new technologies are making it ever more difficult to detect suspect movements. Checks must therefore be adapted to make them more efficient. Our Minister of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry, Laurent Fabius, has recently sat down with the banking professions to work out a proper code of conduct, especially with regard to the honouring of cheques. I hope that these thoughts will quickly take tangible form and that a minimum standard of security to be observed by the banks will be laid down. Obviously, such a standard cannot form a substitute for a general level of vigilance, which will remain essential and embracive. Its application will nonetheless be made easier if we stipulate correct practice. I am convinced that the financial professions, against whom no general suspicions can be levelled and of whose dedication to the struggle against money laundering in my country I am well aware, will support this approach which seems to me to meet their needs.

The results obtained through the vigilance of the financial system has allowed new money laundering schemes that were jeopardising other occupations, likely to become embroiled in financial scams or to be used as smokescreens by criminals, to be brought to light. There are plenty of examples of these new practices which have necessitated the progressive broadening of crime prevention and the participation of further professions. The accountancy and law professions are at the heart of the debate and I welcome the recent adoption of the review of the European Directive on Combating Money Laundering since the result obtained reconcile the respect for fundamental rights, such as the privileged relationship between the client and his lawyer within the framework of legal proceedings, and the efficiency of the struggle against money laundering. Europe has taken great strides in the matter and I would like our international partners to follow the same road in due course.

The third line of our mobilisation is to strengthen international co-operation. Combating money laundering demands the dedication and co-operation of the public authorities worldwide. The same applies to action undertaken to eradicate terrorism and put down international crime in all its forms, whether it is drug trafficking or arms trafficking.

This dimension of co-operation makes me broaden my thoughts for a moment. On the day following the attacks on 11 September, we showed unfailing solidarity with the United States and contributed on their side towards a response called for by the aggression of which they were a victim. We are in fact determined to continue to participate in this joint action against terrorism.

However, we must think carefully about the lessons that must be drawn from the events on 11 September. We cannot in fact reduce the world's problems to the single dimension of combating terrorism, however important that might be, nor count exclusively on the predominance of military resources to overcome it. Our conception of the world is aimed at building a more balanced international community, a safer and more just world. In fact, this idea is based on a multilateral approach and is aimed at all forms of co-operation permitting members of the international community to deal together with the underlying problems, since none of them can hope to resolve them on its own. Whether this concerns negotiations on armaments, agreements on environmental protection or drawing up the necessary rules so that globalisation will benefit all through development, France with Europe and with its partners throughout the world has set its sights on the future. We hope that the United States will not give way to the strong temptation of unilateralism and will join with us again on this path, since without them the new balances that we are looking for will be more difficult to achieve. As far as we are concerned, we shall continue to endeavour to expand our ideas.

The spirit of co-operation is particularly pertinent to the battle against money laundering. Acting together requires joint principles of action. We have them: they are the forty recommendations of FATF. Acting together also comes down to our clearly expressing our determination, which implies a refusal to engage in double-speak. International regulation and co-operation have progressed greatly in recent years, thanks to three lists of names drawn up by FATF, the Forum on International Financial Stability and the OECD. By publicly mentioning the countries that refuse to play the game, the international community has obtained its first great success. We must now firmly stay on course. I would like in particular for the IMF to speed up its evaluation of the more problematical offshore centres, already identified by the international financial community, that it reports on the findings of its analyses, and that the conclusions are drawn, since the delay in this area has lasted too long.

Combating money laundering means remembering that the freedom of financial flows, while useful from the economic aspect, is not a value in itself. Transparency and traceability are the necessary counterparts of this fluidity. Regulating the financial system is therefore indispensable. The race for maximum profitability, easy dissimulation, the absence of control and the arrangements with the controllers have led to spectacular bankruptcies such as those of BCCI, LTCM and Enron. These bankruptcies illustrate the drift to which free play on the market without ultimate control can lead. Despite real advance recently, a great deal of effort must still be put into making it materially impossible on an international scale for funds of criminal origin to make use of our financial system. The international community cannot embark on further stages of the battle against crime without tackling the problem of opaque structures head on. We must therefore introduce complete traceability of financial flows and eventually attack this real "machinery of opacity" which has infected our financial systems. This difficult task will take some time since multilateral negotiation proceeds at its own pace, but I hope that we shall act faster than in the past because of the dangers threatening our companies.

We know we can rely on the parliaments of Europe and on public opinion to help us move forward. In this connection, I wish to pay tribute to the considerable work of research and analysis undertaken on these points by the French parliamentary information mission on money laundering, presided over by Vincent Peillon, assisted by Michel Hunault and Jean-Claude Lefort, and for which Arnaud Montebourg is the rapporteur. I regard your work today as a very important stage. It is in fact remarkable, even historic, that you have together managed to draw up a joint declaration, precise and specific, that the future may in fact come to know under the name of the "Paris Declaration". You are therefore giving a strong political signal of our common desire to act against the scourge of money laundering and to introduce better international financial regulation. On these subjects, as on others, when Europe is united its voice is heard.

Raymond FORNI

Prime Minister, we thank you for coming here and appreciate your having visited us. We also thank you for the things that you have said, which are not simply words for the occasion, but which have contributed to our joint reflection. Our work will be concluded only if close co-operation exists between the executive authorities of each of our countries and the legislative authorities that we represent. That is why I regard the presence of the Prime Minister as an encouragement for us to continue with our work.

I now invite the speakers of the parliaments of the countries of the European Union or their representatives, and those of the parliaments of countries applying for membership, to give their views. We shall end these statements by one from the representative of the Duma, followed by that of the representative of the European Parliament before passing on to adoption of the Paris Declaration.

Frank HOFMANN (Germany – Bundestag)

Mr President, I congratulate you for having had the idea of organising a conference of parliamentarians from the European States to discuss the battle against money laundering. Last year, I got to know French Parliamentarians who are deeply engaged in this work, such as Mr Montebourg. I admire their dedication to this cause and I would like to help them with their efforts. We have already organised three conferences. The Paris Declaration for combating money laundering rests on a great many European shoulders. Thanks to you, Europe has made progress on the question of a joint approach. We shall defend this European Declaration within our respective parliaments and we shall act as the spokesmen for our colleagues from the other parliaments who have given their approval to this Declaration.

Dr Kurt SCHELTER (Germany – Bundesrat)

I would thank you all for this conference and congratulate you on its success. I am speaking on behalf of the Bundesrat, the Assembly of German Länder. The latter have expressed themselves in favour of strengthening law enforcement. In fact, the Paris Declaration includes some extremely specific points in this connection. We have resisted the temptation to pad the text with platitudes. One or two points I do not find entirely satisfactory. I would, in particular, have liked us to have given more prominence to the phenomenon of terrorism, the role that Europol and Eurojust are playing, and what the candidate countries can do with regard to crime prevention and judicial pursuit in combating money laundering. However, I am convinced that this conference has been a resounding success and that it will allow an important signal to be sent since it reflects the political desire of the parliaments of the European Union and the countries applying for membership. This signal should not be underestimated within the global framework of the fight against money laundering. The Bundesrat and members of the national and European Parliaments will therefore continue to stand by your side, as they have already done.

Ms Maria-Theresia FEKTER (Austria – Nationalrat)

Austria, as a member of the United Nations, the European Union and the FATF, strongly supports the combat against financial crime and organised criminality. Thus we welcome all efforts which improve and increase the efficiency in the fight against money laundering, provided that all these measures are compatible with the Austrian Constitution, the United Nations Convention, Human Rights and other European Instruments.

With regard to the content of the Paris Declaration, Austria wishes to voice criticism in two respects. First, based on constitutional considerations we strongly oppose the lifting of professional secrecy advocated under item 18. Particularly in criminal proceedings this measure is in contradiction to the principle of a fair trial as laid down in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Moreover, Austria is against the establishment of a central register of bank accounts as provided under item 20. Such an instrument would give rise to mistakes and could easily be misused and would, above all, be disproportionate from a cost-profit point of view. We accept, on the one hand, the intention aimed at by such an instrument, but, on the other, we are convinced that a speedy access to information concerning bank accounts containing criminal funds, fund transfers as well as the identity of beneficiaries can also be achieved by other means. Such a system of information is already implemented in Austria without recourse to a central register.

I am pleased about the broad consensus reached on the declaration against money laundering. This was in particular possible because of the determination that all measures to shift the burden of proof with regard to the origin of criminal funds and as contained in item 39 would have to be in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights. I expect that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights will have considerable impact on the implementation of such regulations concerning the burden of proof.

Finally let me express my and my colleague’s gratitude for this invitation. It was interesting to participate in these discussions. However, I have to ask for your understanding that we are not able to commit the Austrian Parliament by our positions. I can assure you that the Austrian Parliament is in favour of all measures undertaken in the fight against money laundering. In addition I can promise that we will bring this declaration to the knowledge of all Austrian parliamentarians and that we will strongly support the principles contained therein in all our discussions.

Raymond FORNI

With regard to the desire expressed by means of this declaration to harmonise procedures for lifting professional secrecy, it goes without saying that it is a point for reflection so that each country can adopt an identical strategy in order to facilitate the battle against crime. Furthermore, I would remind you that this declaration is in no way "binding" by nature, unlike a treaty or a convention ratified by a number of States, but it represents in a certain way a commitment to defend the attitudes that it lays down within the framework of their national efforts. I welcome your final proposal, namely your commitment to support this declaration amongst your colleagues when it has been adopted.

Hugo COVELIERS (Belgium – Chamber of Representatives)

I thank you for your welcome and your hospitality. In the course of these two days we have had sufficient time to respond to the initial proposals and so prepare a compromise text. It is of course very tempting to re-embark on discussion, after the statements already made, but I shall not give in to this so as to respect the speaking time for my colleagues. I am pleased to note that the text of the Declaration again sets out the basic principles for combating money laundering: to determine the identity of a person ordering the transfer of funds, estimating the amount of money concerned, verifying what it relates to, identifying the beneficiary of the transfer and knowing the reason why he is receiving this money. These basic elements should permit us to deal with the problem. It is sometimes very difficult to distinguish interests of the community. It is up to our parliaments to watch for any departure. In the Belgian parliament, we have already incorporated most of these measures into our legislation, some of which are still at the stage of parliamentary bills. We will revise these bills in order to incorporate any additional measures put forward by the Paris Declaration. In fact, the struggle against money laundering is an essential factor in the battle against organised crime and terrorism. By acting in this way, we shall be able to preserve our society and defend the freedoms that it represents.

Hugo VANDENBERGHE (Belgium – Senate)

We shall in a few minutes adopt a joint declaration whereby our parliaments undertake to strengthen the battle against money laundering within the European Union. I must thank you and congratulate all who have contributed to the success of this initiative which I enthusiastically support. I particularly have our Chairman Mr Forni in mind, the organiser of this conference. I must also congratulate Mr Peillon on the way in which he put life into the discussions of the Steering Committee.

The laundering of dirty money has long been regarded as a widespread phenomenon, linked especially to drug trafficking. During the 1980s, a general awareness of the breadth of the problem and of organised crime and its multiple ramifications led to a series of initiatives aimed at co-ordinated and effective combating of money laundering. The formation of the FTFI at the G7 Summit in Paris in 1989 is the most telling illustration of this. However, now that structures are being set up for surveillance and for law enforcement, the techniques of laundering are evolving, obtaining maximum benefit from the efforts of financial globalisation and the development of new technologies. As Prof. François Chenais has shown in his study of the laundering of dirty money and financial globalisation, the removal of barriers and internationalisation of our financial systems have permitted dirty money to hide itself more effectively, to move more freely and to be put to use, sometimes far from its geographical location and social origin. In the circumstances, there are many who feel that business crime has reached such a stage that it now represents a serious risk not only to the economic and social stability of many countries, but also to the pre-eminence of the law and of democracy itself. Faced with this threat, democratic societies must respond with firmness and find the answer. The Declaration that we shall adopt consequently outlines a series of specific measures to be implemented. The Belgian Senate supports it with all the greater conviction since combating organised crime and money laundering has been one of its major concerns for many years. Our Senate in fact set up a parliamentary committee in July 1996 to enquire into organised crime in Belgium. It produced a real x-ray of the phenomenon. In its final report of December 1998, the committee in fact stressed the role that Parliament should play by ensuring ongoing attention to and systematic control of the trend in organised crime. A monitoring commission on organised crime was consequently formed. The Belgian Senate has in fact set up a permanent unit whose task is to study the problem of organised crime and systematically, in conjunction with the executive arm, to monitor the effectiveness of steps taken to combat this scourge. This experiment has many similarities with the approach that we have been discussing today.

I must remind you that the struggle against financial wrongdoing must also be accompanied by the creation of increased awareness amongst public opinion as to the extent of this scourge. As political agents, we therefore have before us a real educational task in the face of a phenomenon whose particular nature is to proceed almost unperceived. Today's conference has been a particular advance in this respect.

Talleyrand wrote, "Financiers do their work properly only when the State does them harm". We all of us here are conscious of the difficulties associated with implementing the recommendations set out in the final declaration. However I feel that the strong political signal that we are giving today witnesses the intention of the parliaments of European countries to ensure that our States do not permit illegalities that threaten the security of our people.

Karsten NONBO (Denmark – Folketinget)

We are satisfied and happy that this conference has been held as it provides us with an opportunity to deal with serious subject. The positive result of this conference, which is oriented on the future, is perfectly reflected in the declaration that we shall be adopting. Mr Sorensen and I myself do not represent the Danish government, but the opinions that we express reflect those of the two largest Danish parties in the Folketinget, the Danish Parliament. In our country, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour is responsible for administering the rules for combating money laundering, but the Ministry of Justice deals with the criminal aspect. A Money Laundering Secretariat, answerable to the public prosecutor-general concerned with economic crime, acts as a national contact point for the prevention of and the fight against use of the financial system for money laundering. From the Danish point of view, combating money laundering is a question of prime importance. That is why we intend to pass the necessary laws within the next few months to ensure success in the battle against crime. We are very satisfied with the Paris Declaration and we promise to contribute actively toward the success of the work we are undertaking.

Ms Soledad BECERRIL (Spain – Congress of Deputies)

The countries of the European Union have speeded up their work in the past few years in the battle against money laundering. Tax laws of the various countries, enacted in isolation, have not so far proved an adequate weapon in this fight. Today, we are working happily together with the financial institutions. The Member States of the Union, and FATF have made tremendous progress, thanks to the adoption of new laws, new directives and new recommendations, and thanks to the co-ordination and harmonisation of efforts made towards identification, follow-up and transparency. However, removing the barriers between countries, introducing the free circulation of goods and persons, and the extreme speed at which financial systems operate are forcing the European Union to strengthen its actions to combat the movement of capital of unlawful origin. Such capital is in fact continuing to circulate with impunity and often lies at the origin of acts perpetrated against public security and democratic institutions. We in Spain have had to cope with terrorism for dozens of years. These terrorists use funds of illegal origin, as they are chiefly obtained by extortion. Some of these funds also come from organisations pursuing cultural aims. I think, therefore, that you will understand how strongly we feel that the wordings of the resolutions from this conference should mention the procedures and methods for combating the financing of terrorism. This knows no national boundaries. Consequently, it is a threat to all countries. The European Union has crossed an important bridge, providing for police and judicial co-operation at European level in the case of serious crime, thanks to the creation of Eurojust and the European Arrest Warrant.

Spain, which is assuming the Presidency of the European Union gives priority to combating terrorism, doing so by virtue of such documents as the United Nations International Convention, the Security Council Resolution and the European Union Plan of Action against Terrorism. The Spanish government is therefore preparing to issue a parliamentary bill to block the movement of capital and freeze fund until their origin and destination have been proved as not linked to terrorism. The work of this conference is of particular interest and great value, since it is a way of stimulating the member countries of the European Union and, I hope, the countries applying for membership, to strengthen their measures for combating serious crime committed against their inhabitants and legally established states. We thank the French National Assembly, Messrs Forni, Peillon and all participants who have made such an effort to ensure that we can finally approve this declaration.

Alfredo PRADA (Spain – Senate)

I must first congratulate Mr Forni and Mr Peillon for arranging this conference. Europe is engaged in a process of globalisation. This process is an ambivalent one as it promises enrichment and progress but it also represents a danger to our democratic values, values that we are unwilling to abandon. As politicians, we have the duty to improve the functioning of institutions that uphold these important values and our way of life, and to take action against individuals and groups of individuals who undermine these values. These groups have the particular feature of abusively using modern technical resources that are typical of our society in the 21st century. They are a real threat. That is why we must form a common front, as we are doing today, together give careful thought and adopt rule to improve the international battle against crime. In assuming the presidency of the Council of the European Union, Spain has opted from amongst various priorities to place emphasis on the problem from which it has suffered for a number of years and which is now recognised by all as a particularly serious one: terrorism. Other countries suffer from this, but less directly so. Nonetheless, they are aware that to maintain a free society we must adopt an organised, co-ordinated approach to eradicate this evil that terrorism entails and which, unfortunately, has taken on a universal dimension. That is why we have asked for recourse to the European Arrest Warrant to be included in the declaration.

When the Berlin Wall fell, a great many of us thought that threats against our democratic systems were a thing of the past. In fact, the attacks on 11 September have proved the contrary. We can no longer continue to live and ignore terrorism. The world has now woken up to this situation, with which we are all too familiar in Spain. The struggle against terrorism should represent a daily concern for our statesmen. Terrorism in fact represents the sole threat against law and freedom. It is a deadly disease that saps all democratic systems and which requires great perseverance on the part of all our peoples to find a solution. We cannot place life and death, tyranny and freedom, terrorism and the state governed by the rule of law in the balance at the same level. These values cannot be balanced. Combating organised crime should be implemented in a number of environments. In Spain, we voted in specific laws to combat drug trafficking and money laundering and a Joint Committee of our two Houses is working on extending the battle against drug trafficking. It is my hope that today's meeting will be one further defence of our freedoms and states governed by the rule of law, for all peoples of Europe.

Raymond FORNI

Before asking Vincent Peillon to speak, I will take this opportunity to thank him for the work done during the preparatory stage and during today's discussions. I would also thank Arnaud Montebourg. Both have initiated thinking within the French Parliament without which this meeting could never have taken place. I am also particularly proud to preside over the National Assembly, an institution that represents the people as directly as possible.

Vincent PEILLON (France – National Assembly)

I was glad that our Prime Minister mentioned the Geneva Appeal of 1996, an appeal that was originally isolated and initiated by judges who felt that they should demonstrate that globalisation favoured or was capable of favouring crime as much as law and freedom. By raising this concern within our parliaments, we are doing useful work. We in fact desire globalisation that respects our fundamental values, freedom and justice. Each of us knows that Europe has a destiny and a responsibility of its own. We will defend common democratic values, which must surpass terror, barbarity and crime, provided that we do not give up and we are able to work together, as we have been able to do during these past two days. That is why I must thank all those who have ensured that the Paris Declaration and this Conference of Parliaments exist and can continue to exist. Of course, I thank President Forni for having stressed this essential concern with our European colleagues. I also appreciate the work done by his staff and the offices of the National Assembly. We have chosen an original method of work but we have found that the presence amongst us of public prosecutors and judges from the four corners of Europe, the heads of the financial markets, the directors of Europol and Eurojust, and persons concerned with the control bodies and the financial information units, has allowed a text to be drawn up of particular technical value and to enrich our discussions. My thanks also go to all the delegations. We set the challenge a few years ago of working at European Union level, convinced that we would in future be European citizens as much as citizens of each of our countries, and that it was indispensable that we should unite in combating trans-national crime, and the warmth and goodwill that you have shown throughout all this show that Europe really exists, that beyond our geographical origins and, sometimes, political ones, we share in a platform of sound values. On the four points that we have chosen, this declaration exceeds most of the international agreements. Some of you feel that this document does not provide for sufficient measures, while others feel it is too audacious. Our duty was to establish a "reference frame" for the battle to come. In particular, I was pleased to see today that this Paris Conference will be repeated and I thank in this connection John McFall for his invitation to the United Kingdom. It is important that we abandon the hypotheses that all too often create a hiatus between what we say and what we do. In fact, we have committed ourselves to meet again to note the progress of our work within our respective parliaments, compared with the objectives that we have set ourselves and to draw up new points. For all this, I thank you.

Bernard ANGELS (France – Senate)

On behalf of the French Senate I fully subscribe to the Declaration of the Conference against Money Laundering. In our capacity as representatives of the peoples of Europe, it is in fact our duty to ensure that we are aware of the danger that lies in inadequate monitoring of suspect movements of capital. On the day following the attacks of 11 September, no-one can pretend that a permissive attitude towards control of tax and banking ethics does not harbour any risk. Europe is required to set an example. Both Member States and the candidate countries, none of which should still appear on FATF' blacklist, must work towards setting up or strengthening the necessary measures for transparency of financial flows. Besides, we remain optimistic as to the implementation of the directive concerning the taxation of savings. We know that combating money laundering also extends to the sanctioning of tax offences, as the history of the battle against major financial wrong-doing in the United States has shown. We must at all times bear in mind that the main object of capital movements is to finance the real economy and not to feed speculation. The instruments to achieve this are certainly not lacking: OLAF, Europol, Eurojust, FAFT, etc. Furthermore, a number of agreements have been drawn up on the initiative of the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe. I am therefore convinced that this conference will enable us to express a common desire to recognise, ratify and make use of the existing instruments. The financial intermediaries for their part must recognise their responsibilities and must throw themselves into the pursuit of this work forcefully and with conviction.

Apostolos KAKLAMANIS (Greece – President of the Hellenic Parliament)

I thank you for organising this conference and congratulate you on this initiative, which is a first for our Parliaments. Our presence shows that our people and our national parliaments are seeking to consolidate our democratic institutions and to combat corruption and economic crime. Today's Declaration against money laundering is proof of this. I feel that it will be accepted by public opinion in my country and the Parliament, where committees have been working for some years in the struggle against organised crime and drug trafficking and towards obtaining greater transparency. Money laundering is not an isolated economic crime but lies at the heart of a network of multiple criminal activities. Combating money laundering comes up against major political difficulties as it gnaws at the heart of our political representative systems and saps the confidence of our peoples in the political world and its representatives. Nowadays, corruption threatens all our democracies, trying to hide behind legitimate interests of the business world and the economy, thus forcing States to dependency situations. As parliamentarians, we are trying to heed our citizens' worries and we should take the necessary steps to protect our political institutions, especially by improving transparency for everything to do with the operation of the State, such as the financing of political parties, the press, etc. Money laundering cannot be efficiency combated without real international co-operation. That is why we are convinced that sanctions against countries and territories that do not cooperate are an essential condition. The application of these sanctions of course depends on secure and objective procedures and the monitoring and careful evaluation of the threats that these countries may present. With regard to the reversal of the burden of proof, we feel that some adaptation is necessary of the criminal procedures against money laundering while respecting the rights of the individual.

Al Capone is said to have stated, "Corruption is omnipresent in American life. Today it is the supreme law. The Chicago deputies that are not corrupt can be counted on the fingers of one hand". Corrupt people of this kind still exist. They are strong and represent a serious danger to our democratic institutions. It is therefore up to us to find a very strong response to this threat. We must pick up this challenge and unite against all those who undermine our democratic systems.

Michael AHERN (Ireland – Dail Eireann)

I would like to pay tribute to the French National Assembly for the initiative it has taken in arranging and hosting this conference of European Union parliaments against money laundering. Up to now the initiative in the area of action against money laundering has tended to come from the international arena, whether through the original initiative of the G7 in setting up the FATF or through directives at European Union level. While this is understandable in view of the globalisation of financial markets and the particular need for international co-operation, it is timely that national parliaments and parliamentarians should begin to take a more active interest in these issues.

Accordingly, the delegation of the Irish Parliament is happy to welcome this declaration. As the preamble to the declaration notes, money laundering and financial crime have increased over recent years and pose a direct threat to the stability of the global economy and also for the security of our democratic societies.

The four areas which are highlighted in the declaration are central to the fight against money laundering. In particular, the question of transparency of capital movements is fundamental if money laundering is to be seriously tackled at the international level. I am aware that this is one of the areas which the Joint Council of EU Justice and Finance Ministers has discussed and that the Commission is working on proposals to establish transparency criteria to deal with mechanisms used for money laundering. We should encourage the Commission to accelerate its work in this area.

On the question of non-co-operative countries and territories, we should welcome the work of the FATF in this area. While much more needs to be done considerable progress has been made in encouraging these territories to bring their anti-money laundering regimes to an acceptable international standard. At EU level, it is essential that we fully support the work of the FATF in this area and the Irish Parliament has recently passed legislation which will allow for the fullest implementation of the FATF countermeasures against countries and territories which fail to take appropriate action against money laundering.

It is evident that the fullest co-operation between the law enforcement authorities in each Member State should be encouraged. The declaration refers to the recent establishment of Eurojust which is designed to encourage co-operation in this area. Given that Eurojust has yet to begin operating under its existing remit, consideration of any extension of that remit might best await experience of its practical operation. While the declaration rightly emphasises the importance of co-operation between law enforcement authorities across national borders, co-operation between relevant authorities at the national level can be just as critical.

Responding to the problem of drug trafficking is one of the most difficult problems faced by law enforcement agencies worldwide. Experience has shown that the major players tend to distance themselves from day-to-day operations. This has produced a situation in many countries where persons involved in drug trafficking, and other serious crime, can openly enjoy the proceeds of their suspected crimes. In the mid-nineties in Ireland, a number of terrorist and drug-related murders took place. On 26 June 1996, a well-known journalist, Veronica Guerin was shot dead in Dublin. Arising from the considerable public concern on these issues, the Irish Parliament enacted legislation aimed at the identification and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. The Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) was established and was charged with the primary responsibility for the enforcement of these laws and brings together relevant police, tax and social security personnel together with relevant technical experts.

The critical element in the operations of the CAB is that it may confiscate the proceeds of crime even where the person involved has not been convicted of a criminal offence; it is required only to establish, on the balance of probability, that property is the proceeds of crime. Since its inception in 1996, the CAB has obtained "freezing orders" on property to the value of more than 19 million Euro. In the same period, the CAB has demanded over 47 million Euro, and has collected almost 13 million Euro, in taxes and interest. Given the relatively small size of the Irish economy in EU terms, these figures represent a considerable success in bringing the full force of the State machinery to bear on persons engaging in drug trafficking and other serious criminal activity.

Finally, let me repeat the support of the delegation of the Irish parliament for the continued success of the work of the EU parliaments against money laundering.

Donato BRUNO (Italy – Chamber of Deputies)

I must thank President Forni both personally and on behalf of my colleagues. We all have the future and the correct functioning of the European economy and justice at heart. The Italian Parliament has always attached particular importance to the co-operation set up between the parliaments of the European Union and has always worked to strengthen and promote this co-operation. We are in fact convinced that an exchange of ideas and experience and that the creation of a kind of parliamentary network can contribute towards strengthening the role played by the representative Assemblies of the Union and to promote the opening up of avenues for joint action. Inter-parliamentary co-operation can also result in joint documents being adopted. I would remind you that if documents of this kind can be adopted, they cannot be regarded as binding on parliamentarians, who speak on their own behalf within different bodies. The principle is in fact explained in the protocol appearing at the head of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Nonetheless, we regard this declaration as a good start to make our Parliaments more aware and to force them to consider combating money laundering as one of their future priorities.

Roberto CENTARO (Italy – Senate)

I give you the kind regards of the Italian Senate and thank Mr Forni for this highly worthwhile initiative. As a senator I have taken part in this work since the start and have contributed towards drafting this declaration. In the face of organised trans-national crime, we have to cope with an immense accumulation of funds which threatens the operation of our economies and our democratic institutions. If we are to ban tax havens from society, we must also identify the necessary steps to combat financial wrongdoing. Crime cannot and must not pay. The contents of the Paris Declaration represent an appropriate starting point in this connection to guide our work within our respective Parliaments. It is essential that we adopt these measures and reach out for other through the reinforced legal integration of the Parliaments of the European countries, aware that this process is an indispensable stage towards true political integration.

Lucien WEILER (Luxembourg – Chamber of Deputies)

Luxembourg expresses its satisfaction at the fairly large consensus obtained for this conference text, a text to which it has fully subscribed. After the excitement provoked by the contents of the report of the Information Mission on money laundering, I feel it is important to confirm the desire of the Luxembourg Parliament to put an end to international financial criminality. Luxembourg and its Parliament would in fact feel it foolish to do otherwise. The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies welcomes the greater parliamentary involvement in the fight which forms the subject of this conference. Our Parliament and our Government are fully aware of the challenge in this connection. The legal "cordon sanitaire" that we have set up around the activities at the Luxembourg financial centre has already stood the test. No account connected with terrorist activity has been discovered in Luxembourg following research into terrorist financial networks made following the attacks on 11 September.

Another prospect for parliamentary co-operation could also be to tackle the roots of the evil that we have been discussing today. We are convinced that the European Parliaments must in future show greater determination in combating operations and transactions that generate flows of dirty money, namely drug trafficking, paedophilia, trafficking in human beings and arms trafficking. We must not underestimate our adversary or the subject of our fight. We must therefore take a close look at operations that lie at the origin of the phenomenon that concerns us today. Financial crime is more often than not collateral with an underlying criminality, frequently connected with arms trafficking. That is why I hope that the Parliaments of the European countries will give new impetus to combating arms trafficking. Having regard to the volume and extent of arms trafficking on our Continent, the challenge is substantial. This being so, Luxembourg welcomes the strong political signal that the French Prime Minister has mentioned and which has gone out from this meeting.

Ms Timeke WITTEVEEN-HEVINGA (The Netherlands – Chamber of Representatives)

I am pleased that in so little time we have been able to put together an efficient joint declaration, thanks to the excellent work undertaken by the Steering Committee and the initiative of Mr Forni. The agreements arrived at at European level to combat money laundering will allow this evil to be efficiently tackled. We must now respect the principle of a state governed by law, but this declaration strengthens the role of the European Union. The multinationals must face up to their responsibilities on the question of integrity and transparency and the banks must examine their consciences. Even if certain provisions may well jeopardise our competitive position at world level, respect for democracy is primordial. It is important now to finalise the agreements made. We must in my opinion revise item 43 of the Declaration as far as the role of Eurojust is concerned. I shall nonetheless defend this declaration in the Dutch parliament since it should persuade our parliaments to make every effort to combat money laundering together.

Antonio de ALMEIDA SANTOS (Portugal – President of the Assembly of the Republic)

I thank you for the excellent organisation of this meeting and your warm welcome. The Declaration has my support. The effort made has been worthwhile. I pay tribute to the Chairman Mr Forni, for the initiative for this project, as we shall henceforth have a new instrument to combat money laundering. The value of an instrument of this kind is the spirit that underlies it. The representatives of the parliaments of the European Union will let their counterparts in other democracies know that they consider it indispensable that a crusade is conducted against the inaction, tolerance and even connivance from which the actors in money laundering have benefited so far. No person in politics can pretend not to know that if organised crime and terrorism represent such a threat and enjoy such success, the reason is the funds that they generate, often exceeding the national budgets of the States. We also know that this dirty money not only finances criminal organisations acting at world level but also invades the legal economic sector, which is thereby converted into an instrument of domination, especially political. Orwell's "Big Brother" could become a reality. Unless we act upstream, enforcement downstream will have little effect. Fighting on our own within the enclosed space of our countries against the "parasites" that can move unapprehended in a space open to all means opening the door to impunity. That is why I am glad that steps are being taken to provide a response at supra-national level, a response that must in due course become universal. We must let countries that remain permissive towards this scourge know that the European Union is disinclined to stand by inactively while the values of its civilisation are being destroyed.

To come back to the wording of the final declaration, I must say I trust in the future. In fact, the moment will come when the objections of principle still raised today will eventually be dispelled in the face of the growth in the risks with which we are faced. Organised crime and terrorism are aimed precisely at destroying the principles that we hold dearest and respect for which compels us to reject recourse to certain measures to combat them. But does this approach still make sense if it helps the criminals responsible for them, whose objective is to destroy these principles, to escape? We are therefore opposed to reversing the burden of proof, by providing for an adjustment to the burden of proof at the origin of financial crime. As a lawyer and law-maker, I have always been faithful to the principle according to which the burden of proof lies with the accuser. However, the present activities of organised crime and the serious risks that attach to it persuade me to doubt whether it will be possible for much longer, without providing for a salutary exception. Without effective judicial and legal resources, we will be unable to stop the new enemies of our civilisations and we shall perhaps have to go back to war - an alternative that we must at all cost avoid.

John McFALL (United Kingdom - House of Commons)

I congratulate the Prime Minister, Mr Forni and Mr Peillon, for holding this meeting after the attacks of 11 September. I feel that the suggestions made are not "restrictive" as you have said, but that we are all obliged to seize the opportunity to spread the message in our respective parliaments. The United Kingdom feels fully committed to the spirit of this declaration. There is no greater threat to the economic prosperity and stability of our countries than money laundering, since it is perpetrated to the detriment of whole communities and at the price of immense suffering on the part of the individuals and families caught up in this atrocious business. We cannot limit this message to Europe but must broadcast it world-wide. We must work hand-in-hand with the United States and FATF. I look forward to the day when these hopes are realised. We shall then have shown proof that working together, in a spirit of solidarity, will have made a difference and that we will remember that the seeds of our success will have been sown at this conference.

Ms Kamelia KASSABOVA (Bulgaria – National Assembly)

I would like to thank our host, the French National Assembly. We greatly appreciate that we were able to participate in a discussion of this kind. Our Parliament will adopt a very positive attitude towards the Paris Declaration, which will form a legal basis for combating money laundering. In 1997, our Criminal Code was amended to include provisions against money laundering. We supplemented this legislation in 1998. Furthermore, our statute law is compatible with the laws of other countries. We set up an international information office in 1998 to conduct enquiries and provide information on money laundering. The countries of the European Union congratulated Bulgaria for the steps taken in June 2001. We have already ratified the Palermo Convention and will this year have ratified the New York International Convention concerning the fight against terrorist financing. The Bulgarian government has set up a specific programme with the priority aim of amending the Criminal Code and criminal procedures, against those responsible for money laundering and their accomplices. The programme also includes measures to combat drug trafficking, based on the provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as the seizure and confiscation of certain property and earnings. This approach is in line with the commitments that we have made in connection with the Strasbourg Convention. We therefore intend to contribute to the joint efforts made by the European States in order to combat organised crime, terrorism and money laundering.

Marcos KYPRIANOU (Cyprus – House of Representatives)

I must congratulate the French National Assembly and its President for tackling a subject so worrying to all democracies and which is the scourge for the economic and financial systems of all countries. Parliaments must ensure that the laws and international agreements are applied. The House of Representatives has amended, on its own initiative, several bills related to money laundering, rendering these even stricter than relevant international conventions. An ad hoc Committee has also been set up to tackle issues related to organised crime, as well as money laundering. For example, upon the decision of the Ministerial Council, Supervisory Authorities over certain professions, i.e. lawyers and auditors, have been appointed. Supervisory regulations are soon expected to be issued. Moreover, a threshold for crash transactions has been set and the reversal of the burden of proof, as to the source of funds, has been adopted, based on the civil and not the criminal procedure. Our presidential system allows Parliament to play its full role of parliamentary control. With subjects of this kind, government policy and the actions of parliament converge. Cyprus fully supports the Paris Declaration and reiterates its political desire to apply it. We shall pass the message on to our government and we will supervise its application. By attacking money laundering we are attacking the heart of organised crime.

Rein VOOG (Estonia – Parliament)

I thank Mr Forni and the French National Assembly for organising this conference and I was delighted that my country was invited to attend. Most of the proposals entered in the Declaration are already applied in my country but it remains for us to do a considerable amount of work. Estonia has entered a new stage in combating money laundering. Certain laws have been adopted or improved in order to make them conform to the international rules. The Estonian authorities have actively collaborated with the international organisations, especially by making certain recommendations within the FATF framework. In fact, we already have some experience of this subject. That is why I welcome the proposal by the German delegation, that the countries applying for membership should as from now participate in the activities of Europol and Eurojust. After having introduced measures against money laundering, we have paid increasing attention to this aspect. The banks and financial institutions are now taking their responsibilities very seriously. We are now trying to train our staff and make the public more aware of our actions. In addition, international co-operation is essential. We should coordinate the various actions taken by numerous organisations and institutions concerned more effectively. Finally, we must closely monitor the general trend connected with money laundering at international level. We feel we can make a considerable contribution to international combating of money laundering.

Janos HORVATH (Hungary – Parliament)

I bring you cordial greetings from the Hungarian Parliament. I am ready to defend the Paris Declaration within my Parliament. We passed an act against money laundering back in 1994 and since the attacks on 11 September our government has taken further steps in this connection, such as unhesitatingly adopting the declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the introduction of a plan of action to speed up the enforcement system at European level and the formation of an inter-ministerial committee to adopt the necessary measures for judicial and police co-operation. In addition, the Hungarian government on 2 October submitted a bill to Parliament on combating money laundering and terrorism. The bill was approved and is now effective. In addition, we are setting up a system for combating international terrorism by applying restrictive measures in the economic, financial and commercial fields. Furthermore, the scope of the act will henceforth cover the professions, such as those of lawyers and estate agents, likely to benefit from the system of trusts. Besides, any person crossing our frontier with a sum equal to at least 4,000 Euros must declare it. Finally, a stricter control system will be applied at the foreign exchange offices. FATF has recently studied all the measures introduced by Hungary and felt that they could allow it to be deleted from the list of non-co-operative countries. I personally thank a number of my colleagues, especially Mr McFall and Ms Becerril, for their unfailing support.

Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS (Latvia – Parliament)

I thank you for having given me the opportunity to attend this conference. In 1996, when Mario Monti came to Riga, he acknowledged that our country was combating money laundering. Our prime minister at the time reaffirmed his commitment to do battle with this scourge. We are making it a priority and we intend to work together with other countries fighting the same battle. We welcome the setting up of a central register which will allow information on money laundering to be collected and certain training programmes to be set up. We abide by the United Nations programme combating drug addiction and are cooperating with FATF and the European Union and intend to do so with the other Baltic States to combat money laundering. We wish to assist them with the necessary technology in this connection. We long ago passed suitable laws to prevent and counter money laundering. The Bureaux de Change must in particular declare their currency transactions where the sum exceeds 10,000 Euros. Following 11 September, we set up a plan of action against terrorism, providing for a closer check on visas, a reduction in bilateral contacts between States that support terrorism, stricter control of immigration flows, civil aviation, the carrying of mail, the transport of freight, etc. We have also ensured that all necessary information is being gathered to reassure the population. Of course, we shall support the Paris Declaration and are committed to continuing to cooperate with the countries of the European Union and those seeking membership.

Ms Giedré PURVANECKIENÉ (Lithuania – Parliament)

I must express my particular gratitude at being able to participate in the preparation of the text against money laundering. Lithuania supports this action and has always devoted its efforts to combat wrongdoing and money laundering. An act was voted in to this effect in 1997, then amended in 1998, 1999 and 2001. New amendments are still being considered, allowing arrangements for the free circulation of capital and the introduction of an intelligence system for combating money-laundering operations. The three Baltic states have some experience in cooperating in the fight against money laundering. Our colleague in Latvia has mentioned the Riga Declaration: this was signed by the Presidents of the three Baltic States in 1996. The declaration resulted in co-operation between our parliaments and the Council of Ministers of the Baltic States. We therefore support the Paris Declaration.

Victor GALEA PACE (Malta – House of Representatives)

I thank the French National Assembly for having organised this conference. I am pleased to be able to explain my country's position regarding money laundering since it has produced some problems on the international and diplomatic scene. Malta does not seem faced with serious problems with money laundering. However, our government has paid particular attention to the subject. Numerous changes have therefore been made at legislative level and in the financial environment. As a financial centre, Malta is responsible for granting licences to all financial institutions in the country and for monitoring financial flows that pass through Malta. We passed a law on money laundering in 1994. The maximum sanction is a fine of 2.5 million Euros and 14 years' imprisonment, in addition to confiscation of the money and property of the persons convicted. Furthermore, the Maltese Central Bank has adopted certain measures against money laundering which apply to the financial institutions, investment companies and exchange agents. The latter are in fact required to identify their customers, keep the books up to date, notify doubtful transactions and train their staff in money laundering techniques. Banking secrecy has been suppressed following an investigatory order made by the courts at the request of the Minister of Justice.

Malta is a member of the Council of Extra-Territorial Centres, the Council of Europe and the latter's Restricted Expert Committee on combating money laundering. Malta has also participated in the Vienna Convention, having signed but not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on organised crime at trans-national level. The organised crime unit has had to deal with a number of cases under the act of 1994 against money laundering. The police, in particular, set up a specialist unit in 2001, whose staff will examine all matters put to it by the financial registration unit, also set up in 2001. The persons responsible for this unit come from the Ministry of Justice, the Central Bank and the police forces. All doubtful cases can therefore be examined. The unit can also proceed to exchange information with foreign institutions undertaking similar functions and will be authorised to act not only in Malta but also abroad. Generally speaking, all legislation concerning money laundering has benefited from support both by the Government and the Opposition and the Labour Party. The development of new technology permits financial flows to cross the globe very rapidly. It is therefore more urgent than ever to combat money laundering. That is why Malta will continue to cooperate at European and international level to attack this modern phenomenon of organised crime decisively.

Aristide ROIBU (Romania – Senate)

It is a great honour for me to attend this Conference of Parliaments of the European Union against money laundering. Against the background of globalisation there are no boundaries to organised crime, drug trafficking or money laundering. While acting with a view to achieving the standard required for integration into the European Union, Romania has made efforts to harmonise its laws in this connection. Consequently, in 1999 it enacted a law on the prevention of and sanctions against money laundering, especially harmonised with the provisions of the European Council Directive concerning the use of the financial system for this purpose. In addition, Romania passed an act in 2000 against corruption. Our act against money laundering sets out explicitly and in detail the categories of offences connected with money laundering, with special reference to the ways in which this crime is committed and the unlawful sources from which these funds originate, such as drug and arms trafficking, the various forms of contraband, fraudulent bankruptcy, games of chance, and offences committed with credit cards or computers. The act also sets out the obligations of financial institutions and banks, insurance companies and bureaux de change. For this war to be waged effectively, our government has recently prepared a national programme for the prevention of corruption and set up a national crime prevention committee. Romania remains open in this connection for co-operation with the specialist institutions in developed European countries in order to benefit from their experience and transfer the Community provisions into its national legislation.

Jozef BERNIK (Slovenia – National Assembly)

I am delighted and honoured to represent the Slovenian Parliament and I send you the good wishes of the President of the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia Mr Borut Pahor and of my colleagues. Slovenia is a young country which has been unable to avoid certain scourges, such as money laundering. In 1995 we therefore passed an act specifically against money laundering, which was updated in 2001. The European agencies have helped us considerably in our struggle against this financial wrongdoing and I congratulate the participants of this conference on their combined approach to this danger, which is becoming ever more of a threat to our values and our financial systems. The document that we shall adopt today will be extremely welcome in my country and we shall do our best to apply its provisions. Mr Jospin mentioned two other problems: conflicts of interest and corruption in both private life and public life, both nationally and internationally. These problems poison the foundation of our societies. That is why we must try to combat the common enemy hand in hand. True, we all have divergent interests and systems, but we are all obliged to combat systems of corruption. In fact, our present weapons are inadequate. The Enron case in fact shows that self-regulation is not a perfect mechanism. We therefore need international bodies, as "guardians" of our societies, as it were. I conclude by assuring you of our support.

Janoslav PETRIK (Czech Republic – Senate)

The Czech Republic also supports the fight against money laundering and wishes all participants at this conference every success in combating this scourge.

Ahmet TAN (Turkey - Parliament)

I send you the thanks of the President of Turkey's Grand Assembly to the authors of this initiative. The results obtained have required dedication on the part of all concerned. That is why we wish to be associated with the contents of the Declaration put to us today, which reflects the political desire of all participants present to combat money laundering in all its forms. Turkey has already ratified the Vienna Convention, the United Nations International Convention concerning the fight against terrorism, the conventions of the Council of Europe, and the FATF recommendations. In addition, Turkey is at present strengthening and harmonising its legal system with regard to the fight against money laundering. Our financial crime unit is at present overseeing the application of the recommendations and the use of international instruments by the administration. One of the main sources of terrorist financing is achieved through money laundering. Turkey has suffered a great deal from terrorist acts and is therefore more than willing to cooperate with you to eradicate this threat. We regard the member countries of the European Union and the countries seeking admission as indispensable partners, given that terrorist organisations, especially those established in Turkey, maintain relations abroad. This conference is an effective way of combating money laundering. Another meeting on money laundering and terrorism will be held in Vienna next week, while the session of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly in Berlin will make the fight against terrorism in all its aspects a priority. We are delighted to be here to demonstrate our support to you and we assure you of our entire co-operation.

Raymond FORNI

Before I ask the representative of the State Duma of the Russian Federation to speak, I must thank the President Mr Seleznev who agreed to send a delegate to take part in our meeting. I regard this decision as a token of Russia's interest in our work and a sign of friendship and trust.

Vladimir LUKIN (Russian Federation – State Duma)

On behalf of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and its president, I express my gratitude to the French party and especially to Mr Forni for having taken the initiative in organising this meeting and for inviting a Russian delegation to participate in this joint work, with a view to preparing general and European principles for combating money laundering, thus fighting against terrorist activity. Russian deputies have recently passed a law against laundering of illegal revenues. Furthermore, a presidential decree has been signed, following the measures for applying the UN Security Council Resolution No. 13-73 of 28.9.01. In addition, a financial monitoring committee began to operate in our country in February 2002. It now consists of 40 persons and cooperates at international level, especially to ensure training of personnel and the purchase of the appropriate equipment. The directorate of this Committee intends to suppress the obstacles preventing my country's membership of the FATF. Information concerning suspect financial activities will be passed to the police services in my country between now and the end of February.

We feel that the Paris Declaration will have crucial repercussions in many countries, including ours, by contributing towards the preparation of rules of European law and, more broadly, universal law. Legal provisions differ from one country to the other, but we believe that the enactment of universal criminal and financial legislation will be a decisive step forward. Europe must express itself in one voice with regard to the fight against money laundering. It is important that a clear and precise classification is made of the offences and the system of sanctions for criminals and financial institutions that have fallen short of vigilance. We feel it equally important that sanctions are imposed for abuse of power regarding control structures. However, we must deal very cautiously with the notion of non-co-operative country and territory. The rules preventing correspondence accounts to be held there or branches or subsidiaries to be opened in them may in fact provoke the anger of the financial elite in those countries. In my view, the problem should rather be resolved within the framework of existing law, simply by making every effort to make investment in offshore centres less and less attractive. Finally, the lifting of professional secrecy conflicts with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It might perhaps be correct to regard this declaration and the provisions for its implementation as an extraordinary measure, under conditions where the terrorist threat is growing. We could even contemplate introducing firmer measures, as the situation develops. Be that as it may, Russia will continue to cooperate actively in this area with the European Union. It has already taken useful steps in this direction. Concluding, I must say that, in parallel with the problem of money laundering, my country is facing other serious problems, which I have attempted to mention.

Ms Sarah LUDFORD (European Parliament)

I must remind you that the members of the European Parliament represent some 360 million persons and will soon, I hope, represent some 500 million. We are acting in partnership with the national parliaments of Member States, whose activities we are furthering. In the years to come, we shall gather the fruit of the progress made in the past two years in the sectors of domestic affairs and justice to assist member countries to combat financial wrongdoing and money laundering. The Councils of Ministers of Justice and of Ministers of Economic Affairs take concerted action to fight against unlawful financial transactions. At the Tampere Summit, the European Union undertook to enact joint laws to counter cross-border transactions, and common bodies of law, allowing a certain margin of manoeuvre to permit interaction between the various legal systems. I am convinced that we shall be able to complete the Paris Declaration at the next meeting in London. The quality of the work undertaken is in fact excellent, since certain sanctions are provided in the event of non-application of these laws. We adopted a new Directive on money laundering in December 2001, while Europol's mandate was strengthened in 2000. We formed Eurojust, a permanent body, and we concluded a political agreement, adopted by the European Parliament two days ago, concerning the European arrest warrant and we are arranging for a series of measures to combat terrorism, which will include the freezing of assets. The next meeting of the participants here today should be able to take stock of progress made by Member States and National Parliaments.

In an exercise of this kind, points of detail and minor differences will unavoidably occur. I would remind you that I cannot commit the European Parliament, as I have no mandate to adopt this text. I would nonetheless assure you of the total commitment and the political will of the European Parliament, under the leadership of Pat Cox, our new President, to cooperate with you in your fight against crime, terrorism and the laundering of dirty money, which pose a serious threat to our societies.

Raymond FORNI

We can now proceed to adopt the final document of this conference. I would stress that doing so amounts to personal approval. This particular method of expression is no doubt the best means of ensuring that its adoption will encourage us to maintain the approach taken. This action is not only a personal expression but is a token of a strong political message, since after a fashion we are representing our respective peoples. That is the definition of a parliamentarian. He must assume responsibility for the decisions that he takes, before the people that appointed him. It is important to remember that we possess a common desire, which is to combat financial wrong-doing and money laundering, despite the adjustments here and there to take account of the situation in each country. Even though other problems remain to be settled and other questions to be dealt with, this mobilisation of the European parliaments on this subject is important in my view, not only because financial wrong-doing is a running sore but also because the attacks on 11 September revealed to the world how dangerous these activities are and the fragility of our democracies. It remains for me now to confirm that you have no further objections to the text of the Declaration that you have jointly prepared, subject to the comments made.

The representatives of the Parliaments of Member States approved the Paris Declaration unanimously.

I now invite the observer countries to give their view, since their support for this declaration will be highly symbolic. In their progress towards membership of the European Union, they must in fact take account of this scourge. Moreover, by permitting us to broaden the base of this declaration, they are giving us a valuable advantage. I have always felt that the membership of new countries in the European Union is not only an opportunity for these countries but also an additional advantage for ourselves. In fact, as Ms Sarah Ludford has stressed, the Europe of today will, thanks to them, have achieved considerable weight at international level.

The representatives of the Parliaments of the countries seeking membership approved the Paris Declaration unanimously.

I am pleased with the idea and the method that have led to this excellent result. I was very happy to welcome you today, as Vincent Peillon did yesterday. I thank the parliamentarians who participated in this conference, the experts to have assisted us, our respective collaborators, the members of my staff and the officers of the National Assembly who have made such a worthwhile contribution. Finally, I thank the press who have already broadcast the message from this international conference in France.

Our policy comes down to this ongoing struggle in which each of us is engaged to transform the dream that drives it into daily reality for all of us who have placed their trust in it. You have participated in your own way in this arduous work and I am convinced that our democracies have gained by it, as has the European idea.

The session ends at 12:20 PM.